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NATO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS DISCUSSES SECURITY OF EUROPE

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 1 Nov 80 pp 47-49

[Remarks by Secretary General Luns: "How Safe Is Europe?"]

[Text] The text on these pages was spoken by Dr J.M.A.H. Luns as an introduction during a closed international conference organized by the Club Euro 9 held in the European Conference Center Domaine de Rouret in France. This [Elseviers] publication is made with the permission of the secretary general of NATO and of the directors of the Club Euro 9.

The threat which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must keep its eye on has undergone several changes in the past 3 decades. If we look back to the time which brought forth NATO, the years of the so-called "Cold War," we picture a bipolar world, characterized by sharp confrontations between the East and the West. Frequently those confrontations precisely determined the problems which at that time threatened international stability, and equally the methods which had to be chosen to counter them. We now live in a world which is much more complicated, with tensions between developed and undeveloped countries, with world storms of a militant nationalism, with proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and the struggle for increasingly scarce natural resources. All of this is added to the differences of opinion between the East and the West, to the growing list of potential dangers to peace and stability.

It is self-evident that the countries of the alliance must find practical means to surmount these new problems, but NATO as such must primarily exert every effort to confront the traditional threat from the East. In the opinion of many Western countries, the particular signs of this threat have undergone a change, in the sense that the danger of an open armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact seems to be reduced--this under the deceptive impression of a reduction of East-West tensions which are called "detente." Nonetheless, the threat always retains a constant underlying element: the Soviet Union's extravagant striving to maintain an extraordinarily large and very strong military power, an endeavor which has not notably lessened with detente. On the contrary. At the same moment that detente reached its peak, the Soviet Union proceeded with a strengthening of its military means the like of which has not been known in time of peace and which, so far as I know, shows no sign of slackening.

This strengthening has taken place in all directions. The result is a continuing and impressive development in the Soviet arsenal, in the nuclear as well as in the conventional area, so that the Soviet Union is now in a position to deliver a blow with extremely modern weapons on land, in the air or on the sea. I want to go into this last entirely new aspect--the expansion of the fleet--in a bit more detail.

Until recently, the Red Army has always enjoyed priority in the expansion of the Soviet armed forces. The Soviet Union is a land power. By nature it has no interest at all in commanding the seas. NATO, on the other hand, nearly all of whose members have always been maritime powers, is primarily a maritime alliance whose natural tie is the Atlantic Ocean and the seas bordering it. The commercial exchange upon which the economic welfare of the West depends in peacetime takes place on this great sea axis. The security of these routes of communication is of the highest importance to the effectiveness of Western defense in times of crisis. Therefore the West cannot permit itself to take lightly the fact that for several years Soviet strategy has been directed increasingly to the mastery of the sea.

All too tangible evidence that Moscow's strategic doctrine is expanding its horizons is the incessant endeavor of the Soviet Union towards the development of an ultramodern and offensive naval potential on all the oceans. To name just one aspect: at this moment the Russians possess more submarines than all of the other sea powers of the world put together. Recently, there was again talk of Soviet plans to expand the fleet with very important and very impressive nuclear powered assault aircraft carriers. If such an expansion of the striking range and power of the Soviet fleet were to become a reality, to put it very cautiously, that would have extremely unsettling results. In any case it is already unsettling enough to have to note that for some time Moscow has been engaged in strengthening at considerable expense its amphibious assault weapons, which had earlier been of marginal importance. In this regard, my attention was recently drawn to a report according to which the Soviets have begun the construction of long-range hospital ships which are undoubtedly intended for offensive operations far from the Russian territorial waters.

Developments like this, and those which can now already be foreseen, give strong inducement to the thought that the writings of Admiral Gorshkov must be taken seriously. If this is indeed the case, as I personally believe, Moscow may very well have a general plan to exercise its mastery of all the seas in time. I believe that there is not much sense in debating this point. What is indisputable and what disturbs me no end is that, regardless of their current intentions, the Soviets are expanding their means of carrying out offensive naval operations far from their territory at an alarming rate. Furthermore, the expansion and the diversification of the Soviet naval power are not related in the least even according to the grandest estimates to what they would have need of to protect their own territory along with its traditional markets and sources of raw materials.

Under those circumstances, NATO has no other choice than to make all needful sacrifices to maintain effective, modern, and comprehensive armed forces itself. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan has made the alliance aware of the risk that events can transpire far from the official NATO territory which have a direct influence on the West's vital interests which NATO has had to protect since its inception. This awareness has come about particularly in naval circles, where it is now generally recognized, for instance, that the other NATO countries should

have to do more within their territory of the treaty organization in order to place the American fleet units in a position to carry out their mission outside that zone in the interests of the security of the West. As far as I am concerned, I can only rejoice at this development. It demonstrates that the boundary which was drawn by the Atlantic Treaty at 23°27' North Latitude need not necessarily be an artificial barrier to the carrying out of activities in the general interest as prescribed by a healthy understanding.

Sacrifices will have to be made for this. In order to maintain their military potential at an adequate level, the countries of the alliance have set themselves the goal of increasing their defense budgets by a real 3 percent, that is to say, without taking into account increases which are the result of inflation. Without desiring to slight the extent of the current economic problems, I feel this is a very modest goal, the moreso if one compares it with the immense expenditures Moscow is lavishing on its military apparatus. To name one figure: the NATO countries spend about 4 percent of their gross national product; the Soviet Union about 15 percent. Nonetheless, several NATO countries have unfortunately let it be known that they are not in a position at the moment to realize the goal of 3 percent.

As the leader of the alliance, the United States has made public a certain impatience by calling on the other member countries to make every effort to maintain the agreed upon formula of 3 percent. To those who are irritated by that impatience, I should simply like to point out that the flourishing of postwar Europe's prosperity and the overwhelming growth of social provisions, in many cases far exceeding that which has been offered the American taxpayer, would not have been possible without the shield of the American military power which was maintained in place by that same taxpayer.

Being persuaded that the first responsibility of governments is the security of the governed, I must admit to my great displeasure that those who govern do not always possess the political courage to do what is necessary to guarantee that security, even if that should be at the expense of the comforts to which they have let their voters become accustomed--comforts which are undoubtedly genuine for the immediate future, but which are illusory over the longer term.

I should like to return now to the Afghanistan question. Some maintain that a certain amount of justification can be found for the Soviet invasion of that country. They say for instance that the Soviet leaders felt obligated to intervene to consolidate a regime that they could not permit to fall; both for ideological and practical reasons, and also to make the tens of millions of Moslems in the Soviet Union immune to the "infection" of a reborn and militant Islamic fundamentalism. A third argument--maintained by Moscow itself--is that the military intervention was necessary to frustrate the West's attempts to cause anti-Soviet subversion in Afghanistan. This last is naturally even less worthy of discussion than Soviet propaganda's many other false contentions. As far as I am concerned, it is not particularly important whether people want to believe in one or the other of the first two arguments, or even in both of them. What is important is that in the invasion of Afghanistan a new step be seen in the execution of a grand Soviet design whose goal is: to strangle the Western economy by cutting the West off from the oil sources of the Middle East. In this respect it is quite possible that initiatives taken earlier by the Soviet Union to consolidate its position in the

Middle East (particularly with respect to access to naval bases in Iraq) are not entirely fortuitous. It may be supposed that there a global strategy can be seen which dates from before the "energy crisis" of 1973 and which gives rise to the thought that Moscow was a step or two ahead of the Western countries in predicting that crisis and in taking the appropriate measures. It is not difficult to imagine that the invasion of Afghanistan forms a part of such a strategy.

However, what weighs most heavily and what must concern us most is the facts. The decisive element of the current situation in Afghanistan is the concrete fact of a massive military presence of the Soviet Union which proves to have been prepared from the outset to stay for a long time, independent of the intensity and duration of the local opposition to it. If people allow themselves to be seduced into cynicism, as is so prevalent in our times, they can suppose that we in the West ought after all to accommodate ourselves to a continuing Russion occupation of Afghanistan, just as, for example, we have accepted the Russian domination of Mongolia. But there is a fundamental difference between Afghanistan and Mongolia which we cannot ignore without danger. Mongolia does not offer direct access to the Middle East oil sources either overland or through the air. If cynicism under the mask of "Realpolitik" and the inclination towards detente between the East and the West go so far that certain Western circles express indifference to the lot of Afghanistan and the suffering of the Afghan people, then even an indifference of that kind would be hard to understand in the case of the oil-producing nations around the Persian Gulf. Therefore the NATO countries must express their displeasure with Soviet actions in Afghanistan clearly, forcefully, and sternly. They must be rigid in that position, even if it be only to restrain Moscow from even more dangerous adventures in the region, apart from all moral considerations. As regards the manner in which the allies have reacted to the invasion of Afghanistan thus far, I must admit that the picture which I can sketch for you is heavily shaded in the most favorable case. I have already referred to one encouraging tendency: the new awareness that NATO dare not limit itself to a narrow geographical vision, and that a certain redistribution of the joint missions is indicated. It is further possible to note with satisfaction that the allies have applied themselves again without much trouble to realizing certain goals of their long-term defense program, the program that was launched by the NATO Council at its 1978 meeting in Washington.

Although I admit that in the long run the defense problems are undoubtedly the most important, I would like to point out that the reactions of the allies to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in other areas are less satisfying. Although strictly speaking these events are outside the competence of NATO, I am disturbed over the relative inconsistency of the economic measures. So far as I know, the Soviet Union continues to profit from the considerable lines of credit which the Western countries offer her on conditions which are much more favorable than those which are offered to their own private citizens or private firms either to purchase a residence or to establish a new commercial enterprise. It is also plain that the flow of peak technologies and industrial know-how from some Western countries to the East has not undergone any apparent change, despite all of the pleas for economic sanctions in reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I will not deny that in the short term such measures can be a double-edged sword. I also understand that in light of the recession which is ravaging a number of our countries the governments in the West find it difficult to be able to resist the temptation to carry on trade with any partner at all, or within certain limits

under whatever conditions. Still, I wonder whether it is now opportune to give the Kremlin one more reason to believe that Lenin was right when he maintained that the capitalists, in their pursuit of profits, would even sell the rope with which to hang them. I am personally of the opinion that this moment would be ill chosen to do so.

Finally a few short remarks on the recent events in the Persian Gulf and in Poland. As concerns the Persian Gulf: the outbreak of hostilities on a large scale between Iran and Iraq followed so shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that it is a spectacular new indication of the fact that events can transpire far from the traditional boundaries of the NATO area which directly involve the broader and no less traditional concerns of the alliance in the area of security. Just as in the case of Afghanistan, we must take the lesson from that that NATO must form the habit of viewing the world around us in as broad a perspective as possible. I do not want to say that an attempt must be made to alter the North Atlantic Treaty. What I think is that the organization will not be able to limit its attention to the geographic area as it is prescribed in the treaty, if it wants in the least to continue to protect the vital interests of its member states. As far as the situation in Poland is concerned, I say that the governments of the allied countries are right in that in their public statements about the unrest in that country in general they have taken a cautious position. Still, I would like to make one observation about that development: the events in Poland have confirmed one more time that the communist ideology--even if it is applied with a degree of pragmatism--is not capable of establishing an economy which provides for even the most basic requirements for human life, or of creating a society which can fufill the essential human desires for free life.

I personally do not feel that it is out of the question that the Soviets will intervene in Poland. If that should happen, that would give detente a nearly fatal blow. That brings me to the dominant thought I would like to impart: If NATO continues to give proof of the same strength, the same alertness, the same unity, it will--only under those conditions--be able to confront the challenge of a more complicated and more dangerous future in the same manner as it has long since done in a world which was infinitely simpler than that of today.

6940
CSO: 3105

ECONOMIC DISPARITIES COULD DAMAGE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 11 Dec 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] Amsterdam, December 10--Persisting economic disparities between EEC states could damage the European monetary system, EMS, in the medium term, EEC Commission Vice-President Francois Xavier Ortoli said here today.

He told a FINANCIAL TIMES banking conference the EMS had given a high degree of exchange rate stability between European currencies and influenced national policies by imposing tighter discipline.

But it had not reduced economic divergences sufficiently, particularly for inflation, and closer parallelism in monetary and economic developments was essential.

Mr Ortoli said it would be desirable for relationships between the dollar, yen and European currency unit, ECU, to be kept within plausible ranges reflecting economic, commercial and monetary realities, while avoiding excessive rigidity.

The EEC should be able to act on the basis of a strengthened partner in such a scheme, he said.

Coordination

EEC intervention should be coordinated so that the interventions against the dollar or in dollars did not affect daily EMS management or the situation of the dollar itself, Mr Ortoli said. Intervention in EEC currencies had expanded, accounting for around 25 percent of total intervention recently, even if it did not match that carried out in dollars.

Factors such as different fluctuation margins had eased internal EMS strains and the weakness of the mark had prevented the whole system being forced upwards, he said.

Official determinatio to make it a success had probably modified market behaviour and the psychological impact of the system's existence could have helped currency stability almost as much as the way it worked technically, he said.

Shaping the second phase of the EMS to meet fully the needs that have come to light in the last two years was more important than its rapid implementation, Mr Ortoli said.

A decision must be made on what internal monetary policy powers the European monetary fund should have to transform an exchange rate agreement into a full monetary system.

In the short term EMS fluctuations had been due more to capital flows and nominal interest rates than to inflation trends and there should be more harmonisation of national monetary policies, he added.

Mr Ortoli said the fund would have to use whatever monetary creation powers flowed from its credit operations to ensure a sufficiently binding link between monetary and economic decisions, within the competences granted to it.

The ECU could contribute to more orderly international monetary relations, initially just as the numeraire in EEC borrowing.

But there may be a need to go further and use the ECU, alongside member state currencies, in relations with non-EEC central banks, he said.

CSO: 3120

BRIEFS

LIBYAN STEEL PLANT ORDER--Libya has placed a 7.6 billion schilling order for a cold-rolling mill with the Austrian Voest-Alpine Steel Corporation as main contractor. The Austrian company will be in charge of the technical and business management of the project and will supply the rolling mill installations worth about 4.2 billion schillings. Subcontractors will be the FRG companies BBC for electrical installations and Dillinger Stahlbau for the assembling, and a Korean firm for the building works. [AU250905 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 23 Dec 80 p 8 AU]

CSO: 3103

CYPRIOT MINISTER OF TRADE INTERVIEWED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Nov 80 p 12

[Interview with the Cypriot minister of trade and industry, Mr Konstantinos Kittis, in Nicosia, by Khalil al-Taqi; date of interview not given]

[Text] The Cypriot minister of trade and industry tells AL-QABAS: "The Arab countries are our contry's primary trade partner." "We are seeking to obtain oil from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in order to make up for what we used to import from Iraq." Mr Konstantinos Kittis, the Cypriot minister of trade and industry, told AL-QABAS in an interview: "Cyprus's trade and economic relations with the Arab countries have experienced a great deal of development during the last few years. One could also say that the Arab world has become our country's largest trade partner, and that some of our local industries depend on the numerous and large markets found in the Arab countries when it comes to the marketing of their products."

He added: "The importance of Cyprus's trade relations with its neighboring Arab countries becomes even greater when one realizes that these relations developed after the distressing events which had swept over Cyprus after the coup of 15 July 1974 which led to the Turkish invasion of our country--the result of which was the destruction of our economy and the creation of our problem of widespread unemployment. And we do not forget the fact that, after all of this had happened, thousands of unemployed Cypriots were welcomed into the Arab countries to work there. As a result of this, they constituted a strong link between their country and their Arab host countries. In addition to this, our Arab brethren have continually supported our country's political cause, which is that of finding a just and durable solution to the Cyprus problem. They have also helped to maintain the stability of Cyprus's economy--a matter which we consider to be a basic and necessary condition for our survival as a nation."

In his interview with AL-QABAS about the development of the Cypriot economy, Mr Kittis went on to say: "The years after we obtained our national independence were a time period during which we achieved rapid economic and social progress. The growth rate of our national income was one of the highest in the world. Investments were being made in all parts of our island. Encouragement was given to all types of private enterprises in the field of agriculture, industry, and tourism, and they were successful and experienced development. Also, our national income experienced a good rate of development in terms of social services. The rapid rise in prices was also brought under control, our balance of payments was favorable, foreign capital continued to flow into the country, and we maintained a relatively high level of foreign currency reserves.

"Then this progress came to a halt. Economic problems cropped up because of the Turkish invasion in July 1974 and the subsequent occupation of 40 percent of our arable land, the uprooting of 200,000 Cypriots from their homes, and the destruction of our country's most important resources. In order to deal and come to grips with this emergency situation which had arisen, the government considered it its primary concern to provide aid to the homeless and uprooted. At the same time, it introduced projects designed to revive the economy by including the participation of the private sector. The result of this policy was seen in a noticeable improvement in most sectors of our economy. Our first plan for economic action for the fiscal year 1975/76 stipulated the providing of work opportunities for the unemployed, the providing of incentives for reviving industry and other principal sectors of our economy, and stimulating the putting aside of savings. The economic plan of action for the fiscal year 1977/78 was based on deriving additional benefit from the work done by the labor force in our island, securing the mobilization of capital in order to gain additional benefit, and the creation of additional resources.

Development of Trade

Concerning commercial development in his country, the Cypriot minister of trade and industry told AL-QABAS: "After we declared our independence, commerce in Cyprus experienced considerable development. This was reflected in the contribution which trade and commerce made to our gross national product and commercial growth rate which surpassed that of previous years.

"At the same time, great efforts were made to increase exports and to decrease our deficit in trade by replacing imported goods with goods manufactured or produced locally.

"Our island's foreign trade showed a clear deficit which was covered by invisible sources of money such as those resulting from the existence of British bases in Cyprus, money spent by tourists and UN forces in the island, money sent in from abroad, and the influx of foreign capital. And it should be pointed out that our imports consist largely of basic commodities, equipment, and raw materials. "In order to provide further impetus to our exporting activity, the Cypriot government mounted an advertising campaign abroad concerning our agricultural and industrial production. The government participated in trade exhibits abroad and made efforts to send Cypriot trade missions to other countries.

"A series of programs and steps were adopted in order to achieve the goal of raising our level of exports. They included the providing of easy financial and other terms, providing financial incentives, and taking steps to encourage efforts in the direction of exporting. "However, in the summer of 1974, the Turkish invasion dealt a mortal blow to our foreign trade. The result was that our means of importing and exporting were cut off. And in view of the fact that a large part of our island, which played a great role in our agricultural production, was occupied, our agricultural exports decreased. But we have been able to replace citrus fruits, which used to be considered our principal item of agricultural export, with potatoes.

"In addition to the other agricultural products which we export to Arab countries which are friendly to us, minerals constitute our other principal item of export. Likewise, our industrial exports have risen to high levels and today they constitute our principal export items. The most important industrial items which we export are cement, ready-made clothes, shoes, paper products, cigarettes, building materials, suitcases and travelling bags, large-size transportation vehicles and trucks which are assembled locally, tin cans, lumber, water pumps, furniture, cosmetics, matches, and canned goods.

"In 1978 our imports totalled 282.7 million Cypriot pounds, and our exports totalled 106.4 million pounds. Most of our importing and exporting was done with the Arab countries and the with some of the countries of Eastern Europe."

Mr Kittis then talked about the mining industry as being Cyprus's oldest industry. He said: "Mining is one of Cyprus's oldest industries. It began here in the Copper Age, that is, starting with 5000 B.C. The copper industry played an important role in Cyprus in the time of the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans. Historians are still in disagreement about whether or not the word 'copper' got its name from the island Cyprus, or the island took its name from the substance called 'copper.'

"The mining industry is still important in Cyprus's economy. In 1976 we exported minerals totalling a value of 8.75 million Cypriot pounds as compared with 10.7 million pounds in the year 1973. One reason for this obvious decrease in exports was the Turkish invasion."

Trade With the Arabs

The Cypriot minister of trade and industry told AL-QABAS: "Cyprus's commercial exports to the Arab countries have developed steadily and rapidly. My feeling is that the possibilities for the future in this regard appear to be excellent. Today the Arab countries constitute the primary market for the industrial goods which Cyprus exports. The most important items which they import from us are cement, clothes, shoes, cigarettes, building materials, packing materials, wood and lumber products, busses, trucks, rubber products, plastics, water pumps, construction machinery, cosmetics, and a great many other items. It should be mentioned here that some of these items and materials are expressly manufactured in order to be exported from Cyprus to Arab markets. The most important markets in the Arab world for Cypriot products are Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.

"It is expected that these countries will continue to play a very important role in the future with regard to Cyprus's commercial exports. Cypriot exports to the Arab countries are on the increase because these countries are importing great quantities of goods. "I feel that there are particular principal reasons why there has been such development in the trade between Cyprus and the Arab countries. They could be summarized as follows:
Cypriot products have had a role in Arab markets and have enjoyed a good reputation among Arab importers and consumers.
The prices of Cypriot industrial products are competitive with the prices of products of many other countries.
Cypriot products are of high quality.

The distance between Cyprus and its Arab markets is a short one, and Cypriot industrialists have been able to prepare their products in such a way that they correspond to the needs of their Arab consumers. For this reason, Cypriot products do not take long to reach their Arab markets.
Close and friendly relations exist between Cyprus and the Arab world, and the Cypriots and the Arabs understand each other and are very much alike in mentality. This has greatly contributed toward the development of commercial relations between Cyprus and the Arab countries.

"Furthermore, the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Cyprus, which believes in the importance of Arab markets for Cypriot products, is making every effort and is taking special steps to increase the scope of Cypriot exports to the Arab world. It is doing this by, for example, participating in trade and other exhibits in the Arab countries, organizing trade missions to visit these countries, organizing visits by Arab importers to Cyprus, and opening up trade centers in the Arab countries. In addition to all of this, the Ministry of Trade and Industry is keeping track of developments in Arab markets and distributing trade information to Cypriot industrialists and exporters."

In his interview, the Cypriot minister of trade and industry touched upon Cypriot activities in the field of building and construction in the Arab world. He said: "During recent years there has been an increase in the activities in the field of building and construction in the Arab countries. These companies, in their various projects which involve millions of [Cypriot] pounds, employ both local Arab and Cypriot workers, technicians, and experts. Cypriot workers, technicians, and specialists, by means of the checks which they send home, are contributing toward the support of Cyprus's economy and its foreign currency reserves.

"These Cypriot workers and contracting companies are maintaining Cyprus's good name in the Arab world, especially in the Arabian Gulf countries, since they are demonstrating the high quality of the work done by Cypriots.

"Cypriot companies have been contracted to undertake a number of projects in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, and Iraq. The jobs which have been implemented or which are in the process of being implemented include the construction of roads, dams, buildings and houses, low-cost housing projects, hotels, tourist facilities, airports, and schools.

"The total value of projects implemented every year by Cypriot contractors in the Arab world is estimated at 4.5 million dollars. This means that Cyprus, a very small country, has been able, by means of its contracting companies, to compete with the giants of the world."

The Cypriot minister of trade and industry, Mr Kittis, concluded his interview with AL-QABAS by providing his evaluation of the impact of the Iraqi-Iranian war on his country. He said: "First of all I would like to say that the only ones who are benefiting from this war are the enemies of both Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, most of the oil which Cyprus imports comes to Cyprus from Iraq. Although it imports a very small amount of oil in comparison with what other countries import, it is nevertheless the lifeline of Cyprus's economy. Our plants, agricultural machinery, etc. all use the oil which comes to us from Iraq. And although we have some oil

reserves, these reserves will not last for long. This is why we are being hurt by the war which is going on between Iraq and Iran--a war which we hope will end as soon as possible.

This is why we are sending a delegation to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to discuss supplying Cyprus with crude oil which we could refine in our refinery in Cyprus."

9468
CSO: 4902

BRIEFS

NAVY PLANS SUBMARINE PURCHASE--The Danish navy's submarine fleet will be modernized in coming years by introducing either a Swedish or a West German submarine, navy chief Rear Admiral N.F. Lange announced in an interview. The rear admiral also told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that four of the present fleet of six submarines are being phased out. This includes both the dolphin class submarines dating from 1958-64. They are already operating at the lowest level. In relation to the defense minister's note last year the submarine force will be down to three in 1985, including two of the present narhval class submarines and one new submarine. To these will be added in the following 2 years two submarines, so that the total force in 1987-88 will be five. The price of a submarine is around 270 million kroner. The new submarines will probably be a little larger than the present Danish submarines and will have improved technology, but probably a smaller crew, perhaps only 17-18 men, navy quartermasters administration chief Rear Admiral J. Petersen said. At present defense high command is examining information on the new submarine types and will make an application to the finance committee in the summer. [Text] [LD081531 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jan 81 part 1 p 2]

CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

FINLAND, USSR CULTURAL PACT--A cooperation plan between the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the USSR-Finland Society and the Finland-USSR Soceity has been signed in Moscow. The document was signed by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Talyzin and Councillor of State Martti Miettunen as representatives of the friendship societies. According to the plan, the second Finnish-Soviet adult education seminar will be organized in Leningrad this spring. The second seminar on theatrical arts will be organized in Moscow in May. The friendship societies will also organize a seminar in Finland on agricultural problems. [Text] [LD061412 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1030 GMT 6 Jan 81]

CSO: 3107

POLL: COLUCHE'S CANDIDACY TAKES VOTES FROM PSF

Paris LE MATIN in French 15 Dec 80 p 4

[Article by Claude Weill: "Presidential Election: Coluche's Candidacy Takes Hold"]

[Text] What do Frenchmen think of Caluche's candidacy? They find it rather amusing and attractive. Are they ready to vote for him? Many say they are. Who are the "Coluchists"? Generally they are the younger voters. From which party would Michel Colucci take the most votes? Principally from the PS [Socialist Party]. Such are the main findings of an IFRES [French Opinion Polling Institute] survey published yesterday by LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE.

Some 16.1 percent of all Frenchmen "are altogether inclined" to vote for Coluche in this spring's presidential election; 22.6 percent "are somewhat inclined"; 18.5 percent "are not really inclined"; and 36.6 percent "are not at all inclined." Such are the results of an IFRES poll conducted on 1-9 December from a sample of 922 persons and published in yesterday's LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE. These figures must be weighed with a great deal of caution because they reflect voting "inclinations" and definitely not voting intentions.

In other words, those persons questioned were not asked to choose between announced or possible presidential candidates, but merely to state whether they did or did not "feel inclined" to vote for Coluche. This is indeed a very vague notion. And nothing allows us to infer from this poll that if Michel Colucci is a candidate, he will receive about 16 percent of the votes. It should be noted, for purposes of comparison, that in answering a similar question in a poll conducted by SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] for LE SAUVAGE last spring, 27 percent of the persons questioned said there was "a great likelihood"--9 percent: "a very great likelihood"; 18 percent: " a fairly great likelihood"—of their voting for an environmentalist candidate in the first round of the 1981 presidential election. Yet these poll results are incommensurate with the actual showing of environmentalist candidates in the different national elections: 4.39 percent, for example, in the European [Parliamentary] elections of 10 June 1979.

What the IFRES poll does measure, however, is the degree of favorable public response to Caluche's move into politics more than its strictly electoral impact, although it is difficult to determine just how many of the 38.7 percent answers favorable to Coluche are tongue-in-cheek answers and how many actually reflect real convictions.

In this respect, the poll's main importance is that it permits us to better grasp the sociological dimension of the Coluche phenomenon.

There are more male "Coluchists"--or should we call them "Coluchians"?--than female: 19 percent of the men say they "are altogether inclined" to vote for Coluche, and only 12.7 percent of the women feel the same way. "Coluchists" are young: 21.4 percent of those persons "altogether inclined" are in the 18-25 age group, 20.4 percent in the 26-35 group, and 10 percent in the 36-45 group. They generally do not belong to the more prosperous circles: 31.5 percent of the "altogether inclined" persons are employed in service-related jobs and 17.6 percent are white-collar and blue-collar workers, whereas only 12.6 percent are in the liberal professions and 11.4 percent are executives and owners of businesses.

Unfortunately, IFRES did not furnish a breakdown of answers by political party affiliation. But another question in the poll does shed some light on this point. To the question, "If you are rather inclined to vote for Coluche and he does not run, for whom would you vote?, 27.9 percent of the respondents said "I would abstain or return a blank ballot," 15.8 percent said "for the PS," 4.3 percent "for the PC [Communist Party], 8.5 percent "for another leftist party," 10.1 percent "for the majority," and 2.7 percent "for another rightist party." These figures confirm that Coluche is primarily--as he personally describes himself--the candidate of the abstentionists and those voters who would rather go fishing than vote. But the figures also show that among the more politicized voters--in the traditional sense of the word--Coluche draws his supporters more from the left, and particularly from the socialists. PS officials claim that "Coluche is playing Giscard's game." In any event, this poll does show that his candidacy is liable to be detrimental to Francois Mitterrand.

8041
CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

PROTECTION FOR DIPLOMATS--The Quai d'Orsay is worried about the safety of its diplomats. Protected access points are to be provided to several embassies. In addition, an emergency fund will be set up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide for payment of funds to those diplomatic personnel who become victims of terrorists or acts of violence. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 29 Dec 80 p 21]

MILITARY SECURITY REPORT--The military security office has made known in a recent report that, despite a few attempts, the soldiers' committees failed to engage in any sustained activity during 1980. The office has noted, however, an increase in requests for exemptions made by conscientious objectors, many of whom, according to the report, are failing to return to their posts. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 29 Dec 80 p 21]

ANARCHIST EFFORTS--The anarchists are attempting to establish themselves in the overseas departments and territories [of France]. An anarchist federation has just been established in Reunion, and others are to be set up in Martinique, Guadeloupe and Caledonia. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 29 Dec 80 p 21]

CSO: 3100

OFFICIALS VOICE CONCERN OVER STUDENT UNREST

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 9 Dec 80 p 8

/Text/ Premier G. Rallis, major opposition leader Andreas Papandreou, the rectors of Supreme Educational Institutions /AEI/ and the Central Council of the National Student Union of Greece /EFEE/, have stressed in separate statements the extremely serious crisis being experienced in the country's higher education. It is worth noting that all of them--regardless of whether they agree or not with the seizures of schools--point out that the causes for the crisis lie in the educational structure. The premier points out that for the restructure and improvement of education the cooperation among all university agencies is necessary. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement /PASOK/ president /Papandreou/ considers the responsibilities of the right and of the professorial establishment as very grave and adds: "The mature student movement is not about to fall into the education undergrading trap which is promoted for the convenience of foreign-brought intervention in education." The rectors believe that the crisis was unavoidable and that the students are not responsible for it. EFEE thinks that the initiatives of the above mentioned university and political agents have projected with particular acuity the real causes for the AEI grave situation.

Rallis: Structures Must Be Changed

During the meeting of the Rectors' Assembly and in response /to a question/, the premier said in part:

1. In order to continue to develop and ensure its national independence and its social welfare, our fatherland needs high caliber professionals and a parallel improvement in modern technology. Therefore, the issue of education in our country--and especially the supreme education--is a national issue and should not be an object for political or partisan exploitation.

2. Violence, no matter where it originates, has no place whatever in our social life, and even moreso when it concerns university life where youth is professionally and socially developed, where ideas are freely exchanged, and where science and research are cultivated. It is for this reason that in a speech I delivered a few days ago, I urged the students to return to their classes because "true democracy cannot coexist with terrorism and violence."

3. It is a fact that our universities are experiencing a crisis as they have in the past and as perhaps many universities in the world are experiencing today. It

is natural that problems should rise between teachers and students and especially in the areas of study programs and examination subjects. On the contrary, what is not natural is to prolong the crisis and to leave the problems unsolved. The students must understand that even if the most ideal teacher to student ratio is attained, it is only through study, hard work, devotion to learning, attendance in classrooms and laboratories that efforts for the modernization of programs or the material and technical infrastructure can be successful.

I believe that a responsible dialogue between professors and students is always useful and constructive while, on the contrary, extremist manifestations become an obstacle and a barrier to the education of our children.

4. Therefore, the sincere cooperation among all university agencies is necessary as is also the reorganization of the AEI structure for its improvement. The law-framework the Assembly of Rectors prepared in cooperation with other agents constitutes a decisive step in the right direction for modernization compared to the existing status. The government is determined to introduce this plan to the Chamber of Deputies when the latter resumes its sessions. In the meantime, we are waiting for the opinion of the AEI schools.

Premier Rallis thanked the rectors for the initiative they have taken and assured them that the government will exert every effort to improve the program of studies. This effort, however, will be in vain if the opposition parties do not persuade their youths to stop the acts of violence and terrorism which interrupt the educational work of the universities.

Finally, Rallis said that he is willing to meet with the rectors again if they have measures to propose for ending the acts of violence.

Andreas: The Right and Professors Are to Blame

Following the meeting he had in Kastri yesterday afternoon with the committee of the university rectors, major opposition leader and PASOK President Andreas G. Papandreou made the following statement:

"The struggle of the students brought to surface the causes of the great crisis plaguing the country's AEI. The fact is indeed encouraging that today the professors also are becoming sensitive to this crisis through the Rectors' Assembly which candidly points out the causes of this chronic crisis.

"The antiquated, anachronistic institutional framework of the AEI operation, the extremely insufficient material and technical infrastructure, the unacceptable low student-professor ratio, the qualitative inefficiency of the teaching personnal in many sectors, the lack of any assistance to students who are obligated to work while attending classes--all these have led to the dangerous and explosive situation the universities face today.

"The responsibility of the Right which has governed the country for nearly 50 years as well as that of the professional establishment is very heavy. It is also true that the student movement which for 6 years has shouldered the efforts for the democratization and modernization of higher education resorted finally to

struggle methods which oftentimes contributed to the further undergradation of the studies and to the development of deadlocks.

"In a university democratically organized and linked to the social environment and the productive procedure, and in a university with the proper curriculum the students will be called upon to contribute decisively through their participation in the elevation of the educational standards. But even today the mature student movement is not about to fall into the trap of education undergradation which is being promoted for the purpose of limiting knowledge and facilitating the foreign-brought intervention in education.

"We are certain that the students will return to the universities in order to undertake simultaneous struggles for their education and for the improvement of the institutions and the level of studies--struggles directly connected with the popular massive movement in the cities and the countryside. Parents and working young men and women and students will fight for an education in the service of the nation and the people--an education which, in the unquestionable prospect of change, will be a salutary weapon for an independent social, national and development."

Rectors: Crisis Was Inevitable

The full text of the announcement by the [university] rectors is as follows:

In its repeated meetings the Rectors' Assembly has discussed thoroughly the situation existing today in the AEI's and has established that advanced education in our country is experiencing a serious crisis which is assuming larger dimensions as time passes. These dimensions led to certain determinations as to the causes of the crisis and resulted in proposals for meeting it.

It is the assembly's assessment that the causes for the crisis are to be found not only in the student body and in the isolated seizures of schools moreover. The anxieties of the largest part of the student world and their protests--regardless of whether they are expressed through proper actions or not--constitute a simple symptom and an unavoidable result of the crisis which plagues the Greek universities today and not the causes of this crisis. The roots of this crisis are directly linked to the gravity of serious problems which have remained unsolved for many decades since the country's responsible leadership (government and political parties) consistently failed to tackle properly the problem of education and always placed it second on the priority list of national targets. At the same time, one should not ignore the part of responsibility which burdens the AEI agents.

The most momentous problems related to the present crisis in AEI and which appear to be more acute in certain university schools are the following:

a. Lack of a modernized institutional framework capable of meeting today's educational demands and of ensuring the normal operation of AEI in the context of democratic conformity.

b. Lack of curriculum in certain schools for the preparation of capable professionals as the needs of the country dictate.

c. The unfavorable teaching conditions and the difficulties inherent in the system of examination which difficulties are the result of the teacher-student ratio and which cause the reaction of the students to the learning and grading methods.

d. The matriculation in AEI of more students than it is possible to teach. The consequences are known.

e. The lack of opportunities for professional development and career planning, a fact which creates disheartening and discontent among the students who see thousands of unemployed graduates.

f. The serious lack of building installations, teaching aids and research facilities, teaching and research personnel, and so on, with the result that many schools cannot operate systematically. Indicative is the fact that the cost of education in Greece just approaches 20 percent of the domestic product at a time when many OECD countries spend more than 50 percent of their domestic product.

Following the above assessments, we believe that instead of blaming only the students for the crisis in the universities and instead of the political parties trying to exploit the AEI crisis for party benefits, the responsible political leadership should solve, with a sense of responsibility and in cooperation with all appropriate AEI agencies, the above problems and thus free the higher education from its present deadlock.

Within this framework we propose the following first series of measures.

1. The procedure for completing the law-framework should be shortened so that it can be acceptable by all and its implementation in AEI ensured.

2. The procedure should be accelerated for improving new programs of studies which will modernize higher education.

3. AEI organizations should be approved for modernizing the AEI administration and for speeding up the procedures especially as concerns the provision of services to students.

4. The Chamber of Deputies should increase substantially, at least by 50 percent, the appropriations for the AEI expenditures provided in the 1981 budget.

5. The 1981 Public Investments Budget should provide sufficient credits to cover the AEI building needs and the procedure should be promoted for establishing international models in each university schools and for scheduling completion of the projects.

6. The teaching and administrative personnel vacancies should be filled immediately as requested by the schools.

7. Legislation doubling the teaching positions should be enacted and the administrative personnel should be increased by 50 percent.

8. Incentives should be legislated for the development of regional universities so that they may function properly and thus fulfill the objective for which they were established.

9. The new programs of studies submitted by the universities to the Ministry of Education should be approved as soon as possible.

10. Measures should be taken for the professional development and career establishment of AEI graduates.

11. Through common agreement between the political parties and all AEI agents the sanctity of the university should be established.

EFEE: Causes Are Clear Today

The EFEE Central Council issued the following announcement yesterday:

The burning problem of the AEI crisis is at the epicenter of the problems of the universities and of common opinion in general. The recent developments and the initiatives by the students, the political parties, and the universities have brought to surface with particular intensity the real causes of the miserable AEI situation and have pointed out the prompt and pressing need to adopt measures for a democratic way out of this situation.

With its struggles based on its democratically tested positions, the student movement aims at bringing about structural changes in higher education, as well as substantiation of the university studies and improvement of their level. For this reason the EFEE Central Council aims at the immediate promotion of relevant measures and states that it will support actions in this direction. On the contrary, the government, despite its immense responsibility in this AEI crisis--responsibilities pointed out not only by the students but also by the universities--is not taking any measures in this direction but insists on petty party expediencies and is attempting to put the blame on the student movement.

The Central Council will meet today for the purpose of adopting measures for promoting the objectives of the student movement within the context mentioned above.

7520
CSO:4906

HISTORIAN INTERVIEWED ON EEC ACCESSION

Athens ATHENIAN in English Dec 80 pp 17, 18, 19

[Interview with Thanos Veremis, historian, date and place not given]

[Text] ON October 18 the Government announced that Greece had accepted the terms of the latest NATO proposals for the country's reintegration into the military wing of the alliance. Greece left the military branch of NATO on August 4, 1974 in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The country's reentry was greeted with enthusiasm by other members of the alliance. In Greece, however, the announcement was received with considerable caution and even hostility. The chief objections were that the reason for Greece's withdrawal – the military occupation of 38% of Cyprus by Turkey – had not been resolved and the fact that important details regarding the operational command of the sea and air space over the Aegean were not revealed.

In a recent interview, historian Thanos Veremis, maintained that the continuing imbalance between Greece and Turkey within the framework of NATO was established at the outset when Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952:

The entire post-war orientation of Greek defense was based on the U.S. credo that Greece's main security concern was of an internal rather than an external nature. According to a National Security Report of 1949, Greece should have 'a military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in order to avoid communist domination,' while Turkey was designated with 'a military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure her continued resistance to Soviet pressures.' The Greek Army was therefore primarily supplied and organized to face the communist threat from within. A modification of the original report, appearing two years later, included an external operational assignment for the Greek forces but it made it clear that Greece would not be supplied with the necessary material to repel a foreign attack and furthermore that the United States could make no commitment to come to the aid of her ally if faced with an external attack. Greece was nevertheless expected 'through certain limited accessories to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces in case of global war.'

Given the allocation of defense roles between Greece and Turkey, it is not difficult to assess the implication of their joint entrance into NATO on the former's security. Whereas Greece was primarily geared to face her internal threat and ill-equipped to resist a Soviet attack, she was expected to aid Turkey which was presumably the primary target in the Balkans, at the risk of attracting enemy reprisals.

Q. *On what basis were these quite different roles drawn?*

A. It was a result of historical circumstances that came about during World War II and its aftermath. Since Ataturk, Turkish diplomatic policy has followed a consistent and successful course of aloofness and self-interest. Although she signed a treaty of affiliation with Britain in October, 1939, she kept out of that struggle and has played as passive and independent a role as possible in East-West relations since.

By contrast, Greece joined the Allied cause even without a treaty of alliance with Britain and invited attack by the Axis in her rejection of Italian demands. The result was Axis occupation and a subsequent Civil War between Communists and non-Communists in which America's role via the Marshall Plan became decisive. Hence there developed in Greece a situation in which an outside power was needed to settle an internal affair which, in a sense, made it captive. Turkey never had to face occupation or civil war and therefore did not become dependent on a foreign power. Hence the distinction within the framework of NATO that Turkey was to be equipped to combat an external power and Greece an internal one. For this reason, Turkey has always had greater importance than Greece insofar as NATO defense policies are concerned.

Q. *How has this greater dependence on the part of Greece affected its relations with NATO and Turkey?*

A. In the first place it has allowed an attitude to arise that the West will not lose Greece but can lose Turkey. Hence, in case of friction between the two countries, it does not become a choice of holding onto one or to the other, but of holding onto Greece and Turkey or onto Greece alone. This has allowed Turkey to follow "a hard-to-get" role which it has pursued very successfully.

Q. *How has this greater dependence of Greece on the USA affected the relations between the two countries?*

A. Mostly negatively. A good relationship depends on relative autonomy. Over-dependence has been bad for Greece, bad for the U.S. and bad for the relationship. It ends up with something like the Colonels which brought Greek-American relations to their lowest point. Before the Junta, anti-Americanism came from expected quarters (leftists, etc.). During the Junta and after, a new, broader anti-Americanism appeared based on a kind of nationalism which conservatives felt as well.

Q. *Will Greece's re-entry in the military wing of NATO increase this?*

A. It greatly depends on Greece's attitude towards the negotiations that will follow re-entry. If Greece acts in the old way: in a spirit of over-dependence, as belonging in an unqualified way to the West, in a belief that something may not be worth fighting for, then re-entry is a bad thing.

Q. *What did Greece accomplish after pulling out of NATO in the first place?*

A. Very little. In November 1974 the U.N. Assembly passed a unanimous resolution urging a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus and a return of all refugees to their homes in safety. This resolution was endorsed by the Security Council in December – a moral consolation. But the proposals were all ignored by Turkey.

Q. *Did it help to generate the Congressional embargo on military hardware to Turkey?*

A. I doubt it. That was an internal American affair; an opportunity for Congress to flex its muscle vis-a-vis the administration in a post-Watergate atmosphere. If the Greek lobby had some influence it was only in an American domestic context. One can go so far as to say that the Greek Government did not want the embargo. It sounds paradoxical, but the embargo marked a worsening of Greek-American relations. Congress's support of the Greek cause aroused an adverse reaction on the part of two presidential administrations. In fact, the whole embargo episode emphasized glaringly Greece's heritage of over-dependence on the U.S.

Q. *What proposals have been turned down by Greece with regard to control of the Aegean?*

A. Submitting to Turkish operational responsibility the airspace of half the Aegean, which would include the sovereign airspace over certain Greek islands; conceding to a Task Force under rotating NATO command control of the Aegean Sea; endorsing a NATO-supervised channel through the center of the Aegean: all of these considerations mentioned in the Haig and Rogers Plans have been rejected by Greece and would be unacceptable to any Greek government for they would entail violations of Greece's sovereign rights. As Prime Minister Rallis said in his Harvard speech in September 1979 when he was Foreign Minister: "Claims that could result in an enclavement of the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean in a Turkish continental shelf and in a Turkish-controlled airspace are obviously unacceptable to Greece, all the more so since such claims have no basis either in International Law or in International practice."

When it comes to sovereign rights, there are no first and second-class territories. The islands off Asia Minor are as much a part of Greece as, say, a piece of the Peloponnesus – as Florida is as much a part of the U.S. as California. It's a funny thing, but when it comes to security matters, an outsider often doesn't see what is obvious to an insider. Someone asked me once: "Why is Greece so concerned over these islands? They are so peripheral." And I said, "Why don't you hand Schleswig-Holstein over to Denmark?" He was surprised and I was shocked; he was, after all, a German!

Q. *Why did Turkey choose to lift its veto on Greece's reentry at this time?*

A. There may have been some arm-twisting on America's part. Also, the present regime of military officers in Turkey was in a better

position to accept it. Being at the apex of the power pyramid, they were easier to convince. A civilian government would have been more circumspect: look what happened to Menderes.

Q. *How might Greece's reintegration into the military branch of NATO be advantageous to Turkey?*

A. It would make Turkey's strategic position more integral. Without Greecce, there is a void in the flank of NATO that extends to Italy. I don't think, however, that Turkey would ever imperil itself by taking sides in case of war. Its importance lies in its position as a monitoring base and in the generally held belief that it will not aid the enemy. It is a matter of negative advantage. In dealing with Turkey, the fact that they will *not* do something is your primary concern. But you can never be sure if they will do something for you actively. It is their passivity that you buy off by making concessions. I very much respect the consistency of Turkey's foreign policy. With what they command in terms of resources and – with the exception of their provocative stance towards Greece – they have made the best possible moves in order to safeguard their own security. The one thing that altered their consistent aloofness was when Stalin decided to put pressure on them. This drove Turkey into NATO, something which Turkey would ordinarily never have done. She welcomes the aid she can get from NATO but is always ready to withdraw her services when she feels her self-interest imperilled. It might be apropos to mention here that it was during the period of the embargo that Russia offered Turkey economic aid, which she accepted. By doing so, Turkey clearly indicated to Congress that she could revert to other means in order to promote her interests.

Q. *What options does Greece have now that she has reentered NATO?*

A. Greece is probably better placed to hold protracted discussions with Turkey in regard to operational responsibilities over the Aegean. Turkey may accept the status quo ante with a limited control area lying just off her mainland, although this appears unlikely at the present moment. And, then, of course, Greece can, if pushed to the wall, withdraw from NATO again. In this case, she will follow the difficult path of going it alone. It will mean paying the bills for buying weapons outside NATO. At the same time, by doing so, she will be clearly saying that in no way can any other nation endanger the sovereignty of her islands, and if it does, that she will act in the way any nation will act when its sovereign rights are violated.

Q. *If Greece remains in NATO what should her role be?*

A. It should be based on a limited form of autonomy. Greece's giving the USSR a contract for commercial ship repairing at the Neorion Shipyards on Syros last year is an example. It boosted morale and indicated to NATO that Greece too could pursue her own policy. It was valuable in showing that Greece was able to assert herself for once. Her good relations with certain Balkan states is another example of creative autonomy. The Government's policy as "honest broker" with countries which are not such happy members of the Warsaw Pact is advantageous to NATO as well as to Greece.

Ultimately, however, Greece's role in NATO depends on the relations between the US and USSR. Will the US resume a kind of detente and come to an agreement on arms limitation, or will it all go into the waste basket? Or will a new sort of cold war period emerge? There are increasing economic difficulties on both sides. The USSR has projected its military power in the past because of its economic weakness. The US, on the other hand, did not have to compete at that level because it was secure on the economic side. Will its present financial problems and its dependence on imported oil make it militant, too? The USSR is fairly self-sufficient now, but in ten years' time it may be as dependent on oil from the Middle East as the US is now. That is where, most likely, the confrontation will take place.

The ability of Greece to conduct an autonomous foreign policy will be determined to a certain extent by external factors over which she has little control. There is always, however, a margin for independent action which may be enhanced or restricted by domestic factors.

Thanos Veremis was born in Athens in 1943. He studied Political Science in the USA (B.A., M.A.) and Modern History in England (D.Phil. Oxon). Since 1977 he has been lecturer of Modern Greek History at the Pantios School of Political Science. In 1978-79 he was a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Co-editor of four volumes of *The History of the Hellenic World*, he has published articles in many journals.

His latest book, *Greek Security Considerations*, is a concise yet comprehensive account of how domestic and international factors have contributed to the formulation of Greece's security policies. The publication is particularly timely as Greece re-enters the military wing of NATO.

CSO: 4920

NEW PLAN FOR ECON. OF SOUTH DISCUSSED

Need for New Approach

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 23 Nov 80 p 16

[Article by Alfredo Recanatesi, formerly editorial writer for Sole-24 Ore: "The New Plan for the South"]

[Text] For policies concerning the South, the time for a more sophisticated approach seems to have come. It is within this context that one should view a bill finalized by Minister Nicola Capria concerning the law that, as of next year, will have to provide the economic stimulus for Southern Italy. A bill more issue-oriented than operational which defines more than solves the fundamental choices on which Parliament will have to take a position according to primarily political criteria.

In Minister Capria's bill, the basic political, and we believe preliminary, choices which the government will have to make, are substantially two: the territory on which it will be deemed necessary to intervene and the means to use.

The territorial problem is one of great importance, and it would be unrealistic to expect that a solution can be reached without opposition and traumas. It concerns, in fact, the definition and recognition of those areas which are "a little more" Southern Italy than others and those which are "a little less" so.

Due to a combination of stimulative laws which have functioned through this year and spontaneous and positive evolution of some local resources, southern Italy, as defined by the present legislation, is not devoid of areas which have accomplished substantial advances toward the standards of the more privileged regions with respect to volume and type of production and, therefore, level of income and economic welfare. Take, for example, the province of Latina; its economic fiber is by now developed and, even with all the faults and instabilities deriving from a still very recent industrialization, has surpassed the initial phase of an entrepreneurial and economic business which becomes capable of supporting itself.

On the other hand, there are still areas in southern Italy where the effect of the legislation which has been implemented until now has been marginal, if now almost nonexistent. Basilicata, for example, has remained much more Southern than Puglie; the same goes for Calabria in comparison with Campania or with the major

part of Sicily. For this reason, accepting the suggestions that studies for the South have been raising during these last years, the Capria bill would like to introduce a distinction in the level of incentive to be created in the various areas of the South, believing, on the one hand, that it is inappropriate to apportion resources for the promotion of initiatives in areas which are already self-sufficient and, on the other hand, that an average dose of incentive is inadequate to start a developing process in those places which, until now, have demonstrated the most obstinate resistance.

The principle is undoubtedly correct, but one can understand how complicated its translation in options and operational choices will be, since, according to the bill's proposals, it involves moving back the present northern border to exclude lower Lazio and the southernmost tip of Marche completely and to earmark, on the other hand, additional allocations for Basilicata and Calabria. Problems also may arise due to the special allocations planned for the cities of Palermo and Naples; in this case, it is not so much a matter of moving borders, but of completely unique situations in which the implications of social order go beyond those of economic order, even if they often originate from the latter.

The second fundamental political option that the Parliament will have to exercise relates to the means to be used to create the stimulus. One can accept, in principle, abandoning policies favoring capital investments which produced enterprises with little utilization of labor, to favor those more specifically conceived to increase employment. The political problem in this case will focus on procedures. Regardless of the technical form that the assistance may take, one must establish the degree of political discretion to which the granting of the assistance itself will have to be subordinated. And the problem with privileged credit in general is that, precisely for this reason, it will hinder a fast and quick conclusion of the new legislation for the South. Role of the administrative agencies, responsibility of the banks, conformity of opinions, nature of the judicial proceedings and controls, regional powers, make a beehive which has grown disproportionately and which nobody until now has looked into at all systematically, especially after the controls placed by the courts on the Bank of Italy and IMI [Italian Credit Institute] precisely for the criteria on the basis of which the benefits of financial privileges were so generously granted to companies belonging to the SIR [Industrial] Group.

If, in the final analysis, Minister Capria's bill appears correct under the technical aspect, bringing to fruition, in a constructive manner, the experience achieved in decades of assistance, as well as under the institutional aspect, leaving up to Parliament the great political options, it would be foolish to assume that the passing of the new law could be easy and fast. One must appreciate, at any rate, the fact that it is being started with the purpose of achieving greater efficiency and, therefore, greater productivity of the resources that will be allocated on behalf of the South and, above all, on behalf of those areas which, as we said at the beginning, are "a little more South" than others.

Economy of South Debated

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 23 Nov 80 p 16

Debate in Naples at the presentation of the 'Svimez Report' with Ministers Capria, Compagna and Scotti.

[Report by Salvatore Maffei]

[Text] Naples--Minister Capria, Compagna and Scotti participated in the debate started by the "1980 Report on Southern Economy" by Prof Pasquale Saraceon, president of SVIMEZ [Association for the Industrial Development of the South].

The speaker sounded a warning picked up by Guido Macera, economist; the warning concerned the proliferation of the so-called "new Japans" or "emerging countries" that is, of new overpopulated countries which invest, produce at the lowest labor costs and export at competitive prices.

How do we protect ourselves? We have to get used to the idea that Italian industry must progress without increases in employment. A greater productivity is needed with the same labor force. To reach this goal it is necessary that investments be made for renewal of plants.

Yes, therefore, to the revitalization of the Fund for Southern Italy which the communists would like to abolish or restructure. Yes, to extraordinary allocations (in Germany there are 800 types of incentives, in Italy only 45) but with the understanding that they be linked to government partnership. In other words, since employment in recent years has increased for this type of enterprises, they should be favored.

Ferdinando Ventriglia, president of ISVEIMER (Institute for the Economic Development of Southern Italy), described himself as deeply worried. Money is extremely expensive and inflation is a fire that is running rampant in an inaccessible forest. The balance of payments has reached a deficit of 10 trillion (lire), the safety level of reserve currency did not break because the foreign debt is still holding. But for how many more months can it hold? We are already in debt for 10 billion dollars. Sooner or later the international savings market will slam the door in our face.

To finance the investments proposed by Minister Capria (20 trillion "lire" in 5 years which will become forty thousand due to monetary inflation) will be necessary for the governor of the Bank of Italy to print more paper money than he has ever done before.

We issued 200 billion (lire) in debentures with a 5-year maturity at 16.64 percent, tax-free and with variable interest.

Almost nobody wanted them. How can we think of financing the investments maturing in 10 years planned by Capria? We are building sandcastles.

Introducing himself as a "man who can give good advice," the minister of merchant marine has come up with three: The first good advice--he said--is to extend for a decade the Fund for Southern Italy. The second is to dry out the area of extraordinary allocations, to restrain it to magnify the extraordinary nature of such allocations, to define it in order to avoid the creation of confusion and superimpositions between responsibilities of the government for extra-ordinary allocations and regional responsibilities for ordinary allocations. The third is not to let oneself be influenced by those who every 5 years want to be part of the "happening" involving a change in every aspect of the legislation about

the South. Finally there is a presumption which I really oppose: to whoever insists on splitting the Fund for Southern Italy, I answer that the splitting of RAI [Italian Radio Broadcasting and Television Company] has produced poisonous fruits."

The "happening" was a low blow to PCI economist Napoleone Colajanni. In his absence his place was taken by Senator Carlo Fermariello, who addressed Minister Capria with: "Don't you listen to Compagna; his suggestions would lead you onto damnation."

The minister for (European) community politics, Vincenzo Scotti, said: "It is useless to continue to discuss the South, skirting the laws and considering as very marginal the fundamental tool for development and promotion, namely a triennial strategy which alone can produce a deep structural change in our presence within the European Community."

The representative of Confindustria, Dr Enzo Giustino, said: "As far as incentives are concerned, it is necessary to proceed along a traditional line, yes, but with renewed caution, favoring the interest of productivity and marking time with respect to occupational incentives, that, from all indications, do not have immediate payoff."

Minister Capria concluded the debate, pointing out how the socioeconomic changes which took place in the South require reflection.

9758
CSO: 3104

CDA WANTS OIL FIRMS TO FINANCE MORE JOBS

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 11 Dec 80 p 5

[Text] The Hague, December 10 -- The Christian Democrats (CDA), mainstay of the Van Agt government, called in parliament today for an additional 450-million-guilder employment boosting programme for next year to be financed indirectly by the Shell and ESSO oil companies.

Mr Jan van Houwelingen, CDA spokesman on economic affairs, launched the plan in the second chamber during a debate on the government's social and economic policy plans for next year.

He said the finances needed to create more jobs should be raised by revising the share-out arrangement agreed between the oil companies and the state on natural gas proceeds from the smaller reserves.

'Surely ESSO and Shell can surrender a bigger proportion to the state because they have seen their incomes rise drastically since gas prices were linked to oil prices,' he added.

Govt. Plans Inadequate

Mr Van Houwelingen launched his plan after criticising as inadequate the government's employment-boosting plans for which it has allocated one billion guilders.

The CDA rejected more drastic cuts in public sector spending and social security, as recommended by the Liberal VVD party.

Mr Van Houwelingen observed that the country's financing deficit was already running out of hand and could not be increased further to finance the CDA plan.

A revision of the share-out arrangement for proceeds from the smaller gas fields in favour of the state would produce at least 500 million guilders on an annual basis, according to CDA figures. The CDA plan would cost 450 millions.

The CDA spokesman conceded that the state could not get the entire sum of 500 millions from the oil companies next year but he felt the government should commit itself to the CDA plan now.

Economics Minister Gijs van Aardenne is a declared opponent of proposals which have so far been made to erode the profits of the two oil companies and has warned that such a move could lead to lower investments by Shell and ESSO in the Netherlands.

Investments

Mr Van Houwelingen told the chamber, however, that these profits would amount to about 15.5 billion guilders in the period from 1980 to the end of 1984 and that they were offset by investments of 14 billions.

Even the 14-billion-guilder figure was inflated however because the government itself contributed to it through investment account (WIR) subsidies and an added disadvantage was that the investments would produce few jobs.

Earlier in the debate the Labour party submitted a motion urging the government to withdraw its proposal to curb wages by reducing indexation and the 1981 holiday allowances.

It said that, instead, the government should put a floor in indexation and holiday allowances to spare the lower income brackets.

CSO: 3120

INCREASED GAS EXPORTS TO AVERT OIL CRISIS DISCUSSED

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 10 Dec 80 p 1

[Text] Paris, December 10--The Netherlands last night suggested that it could raise its natural gas exports in the next few months to avert a threatening oil crisis, our correspondent reports.

The suggestion was made by Economics Minister Gijs van Aardenne at the end of a meeting here of the 21-nation international energy agency (IEA).

The oil-consuming countries resolved at the meeting to draw much more heavily on stocks over the next few months to curb demand for imported oil.

Speaking to newsmen after the meeting Mr Van Aardenne said that to avoid having to purchase oil at 'ghastly prices' the Netherlands could raise its gas production in the coming months, and added:

'Countries that buy gas from the Netherlands could for the same reason procure more without revising (existing) agreements.'

The Netherlands supplies more than one-third of all the gas used in Europe under long-term contracts concluded with West Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium.

The minister said the IEA countries had not made an appeal to the Netherlands to raise its gas production during their talks here on how to counter a threatening oil crisis.

Spot Markets

The threat is posed by the war between Iran and Iraq and the relatively high need for energy expected during the coming winter months.

The IEA ministers yesterday agreed to draw more heavily on existing ample stocks to avoid having to pay prohibitive prices in the spot market. They will exert pressure on oil companies to help keep down spot market prices.

The avoidance of purchases on the spot market would ease the prices in the free markets and Mr Van Aardenne expected the oil-exporting (OPEC) countries to exercise restraint in fixing oil prices.

The minister said that further oil price rises would seriously hit the world economy, and hence employment.

Mr Van Aardenne thought he could count on the help of the oil companies because 'no-one is served with a deeper crisis.'

In the event the scheme did not work the minister expected that import ceilings would be set for oil. He said the danger of this was that it would lead to more stockpiling and to panic among consumers, something he and his IEA colleagues wished to avoid.

CSO: 3120

BRIEFS

PREFERENCE FOR VAN AGT--Hilversum, December 11--Slightly more people would prefer Premier Dries van Agt to opposition leader Joop den Uyl as Prime Minister of the new cabinet after next May's general elections, the independent AVRO broadcasting organization said today. Quoting the results of the latest public opinion poll by the Lagendijk agency, the AVRO said 34% of the 1060 people questioned wanted Mr Van Agt to be returned to the office. Mr Den Uyl scored 30% and D'66 floor leader Jan Terlouw 18%. The agency further found that 71% of the respondents were in favour of a new coalition government, whereas 26% favoured a national government. The largest group of respondents (24%) preferred a coalition of the Labour, CDA and D'66 parties, 14% a return of the present CDA/VVD cabinet and 14% a coalition of the CDA, Liberal VVD and D'66 parties. The poll also showed that 58% of the Labour voters felt that D'66 was the most suitable coalition partner for their party. The same percentage in favour of D'66 was scored among CDA voters. But 73% of the D'66 voters said they preferred a coalition with Labour. The large majority of VVD voters (87%) among the respondents saw the CDA as the best coalition partner. [Text] [The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 12 Dec 80 p 1]

U.S. ARMY DEPOT APPROVED--Vriezenveen, December 11--The municipal council here last night approved in principle the establishment of a storage depot for army equipment to be used by U.S. NATO forces at times of rising tension in Europe. A majority of the council, comprising the Christian Democrat (CDA) and the community parties, agreed that the storage of heavy U.S. equipment like tanks was a duty incumbent on the Netherlands as a NATO partner. The two parties also welcomed the 300 jobs to be created at the depot and the impulse it would give to the building industry but regretted the large area of agricultural land which had to be sacrificed. The depot will be built on a 35-hectare site in the northwestern region of Twenthe in eastern Holland in an area known as Bedrijven Park. The green light for the depot is still to be given also by the municipal council of Almelo which administers the park. The council will discuss the issue on December 16 and if it approves the plan the site will be sold to the defence ministry. [Text] [The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 11 Dec 80 p 1]

CSO: 3120

BRIEFS

SURPLUS ENERGY EXPORTS--The final figures for foreign trade indicate a total deficit in Norway's traditional foreign trade of around 35 billion kroner in 1980. This is the largest deficit in Norway's traditional foreign trade ever recorded. In 1979 the corresponding deficit was 23.6 billion kroner. But the deficit is more than covered by exports of oil and gas, so that Norway will have a trade surplus of almost 6 billion kroner for the year as a whole, against a deficit of 800 million kroner in 1979. [Excerpt] [LD090931 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Jan 81 p 21]

'SPECIAL TREATMENT' FOR USSR--Norway cannot give the Soviet Union any special treatment on Svalbard, Storting Foreign Affairs committee chairman Gro Harlem Brundtland said in a speech on Svalbard yesterday. "The Soviet Union points to the considerable Russian industrial activity on the island. It claims therefore that Norway should hold advance consultations with the Soviet Union on new regulations which it intends to introduce. Norway, as the state with sovereignty over the island cannot accept such consultative arrangements. It would conflict with the treaty's clause on equal treatment," she said. The Foreign Affairs Committee chairman stressed that Norway would give necessary consideration to the fact that life in the Soviet mining communities is in many ways different from Norwegian lifestyle. "There is neither a practical need nor a political desire for Norwegian authorities to interfere in the Artikugol Trust's internal company administration, in the Soviet Mineworkers' Trade Union conditions or their private circumstances. But it is important that current Norwegian regulations are respected by everyone. Even though there is disagreement between the states on individual aspects of Norway's administration of the island, this does not free individuals from observing laws and regulations," Gro Harlem Brundtland said, stressing that Norway enjoys considerable esteem for the way in which it has exercised its sovereignty over Svalbard for the last 50 years. [Excerpt] [LD121609 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Jan 81 p 5]

CSO: 3108

LIBYAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORS TWO POLITICAL ACTS

Qadhdhafi Via Satellite

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 5 Dec 80 p 64

[Article by Ignacio Cembrero]

[Text] For the first time since he took power in 1969 Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi yesterday offered to directly answer questions from an audience: 300 professors, department heads and some students from the Economics Department of the Autonomous University of Madrid (UAM).

Several dozen students and 250 professors and department heads from 25 countries (ranging from India, Turkey, Chile and, of course, Spain, to the island of Mauritius) were invited by Libyan authorities to participate in Madrid in a 4-day, all expenses paid international colloquium on the philosophy of Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi and the Green Book and were able to personally question Libya's number one leader for more than 1½ hours.

A satellite hookup with Tripoli (the first between Spain and Libya) was the technological marvel that enabled Qadhdhafi to follow the colloquium in its entirety from his residence and to appear later on two enormous screens set up in the assembly room of the UAM Economics Department to deliver an initial speech on Wednesday evening and to answer questions from the audience yesterday.

In all, there were 32 hours of satellite communication, at 50,000 pesetas a minute, which must have cost Libya some 96 million pesetas, although the rumor is that the heavy use of the telecommunications line got the Libyan treasury a small discount.

Spanish Television, whose equipment was contracted for the retransmission, proposed a less expensive land hookup via Italy to the Libyan authorities, but fearing a loss of quality and possible technical foulups, the organizers rejected the suggestion.

Thus, Libyan TV viewers watching the program on the Arab television channel did not miss a minute of the digressions that can stem from the Universal Third Way, the one that surpasses capitalism and socialism, thanks to the formation of people's representation committees, as outlined by three small volumes that make up his Green Book.

Libya, which along with the other Arab nations pledged at the Bagdad Conference to subsidize a $150 million fund to aid Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories, is so far the only member of the Arab League that has not paid its debts.

While a swarm of hostesses handed out Arab language newspapers, key rings, wallets, pictures of Qadhdhafi and 7,000 copies of the Green Book to the student crowds at the doors to the assembly room, the lecturers read their papers on such varied topics as "Qadhdhafi's Accurate Criticism of the Parliamentary System," "Legislation and Social Law Under the Universal Third Way" or "Sports as an Aspect of Human Civilization, According to the Green Book," whose author, Canadian Professor Claus J. Herrmann, took the opportunity to denounce "the Satanic and bestial sport of bull fighting" that arouses "the demented joy of the spectators."

When asked why the UAM was chosen for this international first, the head of the Libyan press, Omar Magrabe, replied that the "Autonomous University" is "a democratic university that has a fabulous team," while in his speech Qadhdhafi himself recalled the ties between Spain and the Arab world. For their part, the Spanish organizers explained that the rector of UAM, Pedro Martinez Montavez, personally met Qadhdhafi last year in Benghazi, Libya, during an initial seminar on his book and that he was willing to hold a similar conference at his university as long as the costs were defrayed by Libya. "And in fact we did not get any matching funds," they underscored.

Suddenly, word moved through the corridors: "He's coming on! He's coming on!" Those who had stepped out for a moment to have some tea and biscuits (made without lard, of course) hurried back to see his appearance. "Qadhdhafi always does the surprising," the Libyan organizers said with satisfaction.

And suddenly there he was, serious, introspective, clad in a military green raincoat with a blue "nicky." Women say that a magnetic flow emanates from his body.

With voices somewhat trembling with emotion, about 25 of the invitees addressed "Brother Qadhdhafi," as they call him, one after the other, and asked him, as student Maria del Mar did, whether he assigned women a secondary role, or like the Italian count of Motelucci, why the Arab countries are exchanging their oil for the West's paper money symbols and not a commodity linked to the source of life. Others, such as the woman president of the Greco-Arab friendship group, asked him in a guilty tone what they could do at the close of the seminar to propagate the ideas in the Green Book, while a member of the Indian Supreme Court suggested to him that centers be opened up to study his thought.

Qadhdhafi answered all of them firmly, unhurriedly and smilingly, demonstrating that he has mastered the art of conversation to a tee. But then the time came to bid farewell. He did so by clasping his hands in a brotherly goodby, while the audience, which had listened to him in silence and suspense, gave him an ovation of several minutes.

Socialists Meet in Malaga

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 7 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Juan G. Yuste]

[Text] Malaga--A symposium on "Peace and Security in the Mediterranean," organized by the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), opened yesterday at a hotel in Fuengirola, Malaga; it is being attended by representatives of 28 socialist and progressive political organizations from 15 countries.

This is the fourth meeting of the "Socialist Conference of the Mediterranean," which previously held meetings in Barcelona, Malta and Athens. Libya's economic backing has been essential in keeping the forum alive. Before they merged in the PSOE, the Popular Socialist Party and the Federation of Socialist Parties represented Spain at the conference, which at one point was proposed as a Mediterranean alternative to the Socialist International.

After brief welcoming words from Rafael Ballesteros, the PSOE secretary general in Malaga, and Libyan Muftah Madi, from the standing secretariat of the Socialist Conference of the Mediterranean, the symposium began its work on four major topics of debate: foreign military presence in the region, conflict zones, the arms race in the Mediterranean and possible options.

The National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria, which is in power, analyzed the area's conflict zones, referring briefly to the Western Sahara problem: "The tripartite Madrid treaty, the Moroccan regime's policy of aggression against the Saharan people and the military intervention of a European power have expanded this conflict to the point of concealing its true nature as a problem of decolonization," said the Algerian representative, who saw the goals of "imperialism" in this crisis as the consolidation of the Moroccan regime, the neutralization of Algeria and the bolstering of security on the western edge of the Mediterranean.

Algeria's Conditions

The Algerian delegate called for the withdrawal of fleets, the dismantling of foreign bases in the Mediterranean and the nonexpansion of military alliances as basic conditions for peace and security in the region.

A representative of Morocco's Revolutionary Option Party demanded sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla for his country, while defending Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar and rejecting Western Sahara independence. Later, a PSOE spokesman reiterated to the Spanish press his party's official stand that these sovereign possessions were integral parts of Spain's territory, although he said that he did not wish to engage in controversy over the issue at a forum such as the Socialist Conference.

A Greek delegate from the Center of Mediterranean Studies, an organization with links to Andreas Papandreu's PASOK, said that reconciling security and development is the major task of the socialist and progressive forces in bringing about a Mediterranean renaissance. In the opinion of Greek socialists, southern Europe must balance out "Atlanticism," Europe's dependence on the United States.

8743
CSO: 3110

CURRENT STATUS OF LABOR UNION ELECTION RETURNS

Summary of Returns to Date

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 21-27 Nov 80 p 16

[Text] Things are heating up now. As of the 13th of this month, our deadline for tallying up the results of the ongoing union elections, 1,264,232 workers had voted of the close to 6 million that are expected to do so. They have already chosen 54,248 of their anticipated 330,000 delegates. These are not very gratifying statistics but they at least show that the electoral process is in full swing, though it will no doubt take much longer than anticipated.

At this juncture we can assert that the 1980 union elections will last into the first few months of 1981. The CCOO [Workers Commissions] and the UGT [General Union of Workers] had reached an agreement to elect worker representatives at all companies between 15 October and 30 November. However, all indications are and it stands to reason (as well as being perfectly legal) that just as elections have been held at a good many work centers since the beginning of the year, they will continue for several months after the deadlines. December, January and February are certainly going to be heavy voting months, after which returns will trickle in until the summer.

IMAC [Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation Institute], a branch of the Labor Ministry in charge of monitoring the election process and that had pledged to make the returns public, will only figure in the elections held between 15 March of this year, when the Workers Statute was enacted, and 30 November. But at this point, whatever the IMAC does lacks importance; its ineptitude and lack of standing are unmitigated.

The Numbers

As of 13 November, 1,264,232 workers in 18,203 companies had elected 54,248 delegates. Of this total, 21,258, representing 39 percent, belong to the CCOO; 15,521, or 29 percent, belong to the UGT; 3,221, representing 6 percent, belong to the USO [Workers Trade Union]; 6,693, representing 12 percent, belong to the nonaffiliated, and 7,555, representing 14 percent, are distributed among the rest of the union federations.

Until this week we had distinguished between the elections held from the beginning of the year to 15 March, when the Workers Statute was enacted, and from that date until the last day before each issue of our magazine went to print. Although we still make this distinction in our statistical charts, we will no longer make special mention of it because it is unimportant, since the number of workers who voted during the first period is insignificant in comparison to those who cast ballots during the second. Complete returns are what count.

(1)

(2)	(3)	(4)					(5)		(6)	
ANDALUCIA	142 549						206	3	427	6
ARAGON	31 163		501				120	9	135	10
ASTURIAS	63 397		761				73	6	86	5
CANTABRIA	10 664		346				69	6	63	5
C. NUEVA	26 977		737				64	3	68	4
C. VIEJA	19 09						108	9	62	5
CATALUÑA	207 819						261	3	666	8
EUSKADI	165						216	5	1 038	43
EXTREMADURA							188	32	32	7
GALICIA	62						122	4	202	25
I. BALEARES	21 076						63	6	55	4
I. CANARIAS	18						32	4	51	13
LEON	9						35	7	33	6
MADRID	97						97	3	314	10
MURCIA	27						252	16	83	4
PAIS VALENCIA	164						1 026	12	363	4
RIOJA	2						55	10	35	11
TOTAL	1 112 119						3 045	6	6 180	12
Total entre el (7) 1 1 80/15 3 80							170	3	1 395	25
Total desde el 1-1-80 (8)	1 264 732						3 221	6	7 655	14

Key:

1. Summary of labor union elections as of 13 November
2. Number of companies
3. Number of workers
4. Number of delegates
5. Number of members
6. Others
7. Total from 1 January 1980 to 15 March 1980
8. Total since 1 January 1980

Vote Analysis, Projected Outcome

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 22-28 Oct 80 pp 10-11

[Text] Forecasting how people might vote at the upcoming labor union elections is, logically, very difficult, for quite diverse reasons. Nevertheless, the following question was posed in a recent poll among industrial workers in the provinces of Madrid and Guadalajara*: "If elections were to be held at your company next week, what labor union would you most likely vote for?" As we can see, potential support for the UGT and CCOO is quite even, although the fact that 39.6 percent of those polled said that they were not going to vote, were undecided or did not answer, makes these numbers somewhat relative. If they hold up, after being weighted against the number of voters, between 41 and 45 percent of the workers polled will vote for CCOO and between 35 and 39 percent for the UGT.

The most important thing about these voting preferences is perhaps that the workers who were polled voted differently at the last union elections at their companies than they now say they are going to vote. Thus, 48.2 percent said that they voted for the CCOO in the previous election whereas only 22.8 percent say that they voted for the UGT.

This vote switch, which we will analyze later on, is unquestionably a fundamental criterion in making forecasts about the upcoming union elections.

The CCOO has more probable support among the young workers surveyed, whereas the opposite holds for the UGT. In addition, the UGT seems to have less support among women (more of whom say they will not vote or are undecided than men, while also being more inclined to back independent unions).

Furthermore, the CCOO's heaviest support is among lower income earners, the less educated and laborers, while the UGT has greater backing among middle income earners and technicians and supervisory personnel in general, while also enjoying major support from skilled workers.

As far as the size of the companies is concerned, the situation is quite a bit more complex. Support is practically even in companies with more than 500 workers, whereas the CCOO holds its biggest advantage in companies with between 200 and 499 workers or 20 to 49 workers; the extent of the sampling in these latter two cases does not, however, enable us to establish whether this is merely a random finding or a well-founded statistic.

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* The poll was taken from 19 June to 23 July among a representative sample of workers in industrial establishments in the Madrid metropolitan area (who make up 12 percent of these workers in all of Spain). A total of 1,548 persons were polled at more than 200 companies in different sectors and of different sizes, selected at random. With a 95.5 percent degree of reliability, the theoretical margin of error for 50/50 percent breakdowns is plus or minus 2.5 percent.

History of Union Voting and Vote Shifts

We referred above to the significant differences between how those polled voted at previous union elections and their current voting intentions. We can, in fact, see what the current voting intentions are of the workers who voted for the various unions (and who stayed away from the polls) at the previous labor elections. As we can see, the UGT commands great voter loyalty and, morever, has picked up a great many likely voters from almost all of the other union federations; more importantly, it has also gained ground among those who did not vote at the previous union elections. In almost all cases, UGT gains are greater than the CCOO's, except among those who cast their ballots for the USO, who will apparently be spreading their vote around quite evenly.

To get an overall idea of possible UGT vote gains, we need only mention that in the specific case of this poll, 60 percent more said that they plan to vote for the UGT now than said they voted for it in the previous union elections.

Shift From CCOO to UGT

We should also note that 14.9 percent of those who now plan to vote for the UGT cast their ballots for the CCOO in the previous election, whereas the reverse is true in 6.1 percent of the cases. This means that in absolute numbers the biggest vote shift is from the CCOO to the UGT.

There is a reason for this vote shift if we bear in mind that there has been a disparity so far between the union vote and the political vote of many Spanish workers. In fact, prior investigations had already demonstrated that a good many PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] voters backed the CCOO as a union. Thus, the "Base Study on the Socialist Vote," conducted in 1979 from a sampling of 5,900 citizens over age 18, disclosed that of the PSOE's 21.1 percent of the 1977 voters who were members of a union, 30.4 percent said they belonged to the CCOO, which comes to 7.2 percent of total PSOE voters. Also, Victor Perez Diaz' "Survey of Industrial Sector Wage Earners" among 4,179 workers employed in 1978, revealed that 44.7 percent of CCOO voters had voted for the PSOE at the 15 June 1977 legislative elections. Our investigation pointed up something similar, that 38.1 percent of CCOO voters at the last union balloting are PSOE voters, though this figure drops when it comes to current voting intentions (35.8 percent of CCOO voters are PSOE voters). In other words, and referring to the results of our survey, of all the workers polled who voted for the PSOE, more cast their ballots for the CCOO at the previous union election than for the UGT. Now, however, this trend has shifted somewhat, as the number of PSOE voters who plan to back the CCOO has dropped from 37.4 to 23.8 percent, with 35.1 percent saying that they voted for the UGT and no less than 30.9 percent (!) saying that they are not going to vote, are undecided or did not respond.

Based on these data, we can understand why the forecasts are for a move towards a greater balance between the two large union federations and towards greater consistency between the political and the union vote, although major uncertainties and inconsistencies still persist. Hence, the undecided vote and the

consolidation of a trend towards greater consistency between political and union voting will determine whether the upcoming union balloting sees a trend towards equilibrium between the two big federations, as noted in the results of the investigation we have been commenting on.

Collective Union Assessments

In contrast to the data that we have been talking about, the results of other facets of the investigation indicate that the new voting trends have not yet translated at the group level into a new image for the electoral strength of each union. In this instance, the CCOO is aided by the inertia of previous group images, which, appropriately orchestrated and amplified by the mass media, could serve as a major stumbling block for the consolidation of new voting trends, especially in the case of the workers who when it comes time to cast their ballot set great store in the plus of "meaningfulness" entailed in voting for a strong union, the strongest union. We must not forget that when the time comes to cast their vote, 18.7 percent of those polled feel that the most important thing is that the "union be strong and effective."

We have seen previously that in spite of the level voting trends, more of those surveyed think that the CCOO is going to win the upcoming elections; a good percentage of those who are going to vote for other union federations even feel this way. The odd thing is that many of those who voted previously for the CCOO and who now plan to vote for other unions feel this way too! What it comes down to is that almost twice as many people in the same group that plans to vote evenly for the two big unions think that the results are going to be contrary to their votes. This reveals poor information and understanding among the people polled, the causes of which (above and beyond some degree of logical inertia) must be sought in the vagueness and inconsistency of the social mechanisms that make possible the development of a collective awareness. What is happening with the mass media is especially significant in this regard, because either they are losing their audiences or their credibility or they are not succeeding (deliberately or negligently) in conveying accurate images of what is really happening in our society.

This objective advantage of the CCOO's for the upcoming union elections could be bolstered in turn by its good image among a number of those polled, who feel that the CCOO has the ability to organize certain services for its members. Thus, the CCOO holds an advantage over the UGT with regard to opinions on attorney and legal and economic advisory services, as well as organizing mass action. However, the UGT is ahead of the CCOO overall and proportionally as to opinions on the best "representative of the workers in negotiations with the government and the employers union." Some 28.5 percent feel that the UGT does this better, compared to 23.8 percent who think that the CCOO is better at it. Even 9.7 percent of the CCOO voters feel that the UGT does this better.

The strategic importance of this advantage (which logically is greater if we weight it against the support of each union) becomes all the greater if we bear in mind that it is this representative function in bargaining with the

government and the employers organization that they regard as most important in a union (33 percent cited it as number one, and 18.4 percent mentioned it number two). The other factors mentioned most by those surveyed (though somewhat behind) were: "improved working conditions (safety, occupational health, productivity, overtime, etc," 16.7 and 25.3 percent) and "seeing to it that the company does not go under so that jobs are not lost" (20.3 and 15.6 percent).

Professional considerations, bargaining ability and consistency between union and political voting will thus apparently be the three main factors influencing many workers when the time comes to cast their ballots at the upcoming union elections.

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DEVELOPING ISSUES IN INTERORGANIZATIONAL LABOR AGREEMENTS

CEOE, UGT Accord

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 20 Nov 80 p 24

[Article by Francisco Alvira Martin and Jose Garcia Lopez]

[Text] It has been just short of a year since talks began on the signing of the Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement (AMI) between the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] and the UGT [General Union of Workers], later to be joined by the USO [Workers Trade Union], to regulate collective bargaining for 2 years. Issue No 4 of "Papers on the Spanish Economy" has published the results of a survey into the opinions of workers and employers regarding the agreement.

The survey's first conclusion is that a wide majority of those polled (65 percent) had heard of the AMI, and 45 percent knew in general what it dealt with and what union federations were for or against signing it. These numbers contrast with the low percentages of people who are found to be informed by other surveys measuring what they know about general issues, and reveal concern for labor issues.

A comparison of responses for and against the AMI comes out very much in its favor. Some 53 percent of those polled think that the agreement is good for the workers and for businessmen, whereas only 15 percent feel that it is good for no one.

Breaking down this overall result discloses major differences among the responding groups polled. Supervisors and businessmen are in favor of the AMI to a greater degree, and there is a clear-cut relationship between a positive assessment of the agreement and the job category of the person polled. Administrative workers, for example, are more in favor of the AMI than manual workers, and skilled workers more than unskilled ones.

Secondly, political affiliations play a significant role. PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] voters agree more (60 percent) with the proposition "the AMI is good for everyone," whereas PCE [Spanish Communist Party] voters feel just the opposite, as only 20 percent think that it is "good for everyone."

Hence, there is significant consistency between the responses to the poll by PSOE and PCE voters and the statements made and roles assumed by the UGT and CCOO in the AMI negotiations.

Close to half of the people polled, 44 percent, anticipate that the AMI will govern the majority of agreements, as opposed to 16 percent who forecast a categorical failure for the model agreement. Another 40 percent take an intermediate view and think that the agreement will be applied to some pacts but not to others.

The survey shows that at the grass roots level a wage boost was the topic of greatest interest.

Percentages of Wage Boosts for 1980

Those Polled	Ideal	Forecasts	Actual Raise
Wage earners	17.40	12.50	13.70
Businessmen	13.00	16.00	15.00
Difference (in absolute figures)	4.40	3.50	1.30

The above table shows three different facets of average wage boosts: 1) the percentage increase that those polled regarded as fair (ideal); 2) the forecasts of those polled who had not yet signed the agreement, and 3) the wage boosts that they said they approved in their respective companies (actual raise). The gap of 4.4 percent between the ideals of the employers and the wage earners was how far they were apart before sitting down at the bargaining table. The 3 percentage point gap between the ideal and the forecasts of the employers and the 4.9 percent gap between those of the workers show that both sides were afraid that the negotiated settlements would be quite bad for their respective interests.

According to the survey, however, the settlements came close to satisfying both sides, which bodes well for labor peace. The employers granted boosts 1 point below their forecasts, and the workers got 1.2 percent above theirs.

An acceptably well-informed poll sample, the positive opinion of the majority of them, the forecasts that the AMI will regulate most pacts and a range of wage boosts acceptable to both sides certainly represented good results in improving the labor relations climate in 1980.

[illegible]riticizes CEOE Plan

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Sep 80 p 29

[Text] As expected, the CEOE's plan to combat unemployment has prompted expectations and harsh controversies. The first impression ("the CEOE is worried about the unemployed too") was followed by controversy: the CEOE is using

the unemployment problem to demand special treatment, while claiming for itself the leading role in resolving it.

Nevertheless, it would be foolish to dismiss the issue with definitions of principles. In my opinion, by trying to encompass the wide range of businesses organized under the CEOE, its plan contains contradictory elements (reflecting the most acute contradictions among groups of companies according to their size, sector, branch, etc) and even aspects that were brought up in their day by left-wing union organizations and political parties, as well as, why not, aspects that could be accepted by these same groups.

But the whole of the program shows an alarming lack of solidarity. The CEOE is asking the government to grant it advantages in many spheres (investments, credit, taxes, tariffs, labor legislation, etc), balanced only by its assertion that the improved conditions created by this favorable treatment of business will encourage them to invest.

There are many question marks, and it was not long before the right wing itself began voicing them. After reminding these staunch defenders of the free market economy that they readily forget their principles when their own pocketbooks are involved, the Economy Conditions team asked them how the government is going to finance an increase in investment and credit if tax revenues decrease. The CEOE has not answered this question, though it has asserted that it "forgets" its free market economy principles to save the patient*. That's good news, because now that they have made such assertions, it will not be easy for them to accuse us of violating the constitution when we too "forget" these principles in pursuing the same end.

It is especially timely to bring up this issue because we are going to have to plan to surmount the situation. Such planning will have positive effects only if it is marked by a high degree of democracy (agreed upon and controlled by the parties involved). Thus, it is not a question, as the CEOE would have it, of pinpointing "locomotive" sectors and waiting for them to pull the Spanish economy along, because it could derail. Our situation is not marked solely by a lack of activity; it is also marked by serious structural tensions that could make any solution not taking them into account not only ineffective but harmful as well. Hence, we have to organize the entire train.

Lastly, we must point out that the CEOE has its program out, that the arguments have begun and that the 1.5 million people without jobs demand solutions. It is not enough to find fault with the programs of others. We have to furnish our own alternatives with the rigor and the consistency that a not at all easy situation demands. We are certain that when the political and union vacation is over, we are going to see alternative programs from the union organizations, which will doubtlessly pave the way for negotiations and accomplishments that will help to resolve the issue.

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*J.L. Ceron Ayuso, "Footnotes to a Controversy," EL PAIS, 26 August 1980.

CCOO, UGT Accord

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Sep 80 p 10

[Article by Hector Mazavall]

[Text] Ever since the CCOO-UGT agreement last June on the holding of union elections, there has been a give-and-take among those who are or are not interested in seeing the elections marked by perfect democracy and clear-cut categorical results or who fear their results and thus want to intervene in the electoral process against class unionism.

Thus, the government, mainly through the Labor Ministry, is intervening in the electoral process at several levels. On the one hand, right now it is hastening the discriminatory transfer of 14 union-owned premises to the UGT, thus postponing its commitments to the CCOO; the USO is accumulating bank guarantees backed by the government; the RTVE [Directorate General of Radio Broadcasting and Television] is broadcasting costly USO advertising; RTVE news programs report in detail on even the daily meetings of the leadership bodies of some unions and ignore any CCOO Union Confederation activity, and to top it all off, in August election regulations were set forth that are clearly designed to bolster the UCD [Democratic Center Union]-oriented labor movement, to the obvious detriment of the CCOO and the class unions in general.

In their initial agreement, the CCOO and the UGT assumed that the Labor Ministry had no reason to intervene in the electoral process. Section II of the statute set forth the election procedure with relative clarity, and in any case it had to be the unions themselves that would have to reach agreement on clarifying the gaps or vague points in the statute, with the administration limited to the role of recording and publishing information through IMAC.

A series of meetings were held in IMAC at which we CCOO members defended a number of standards for pursuing the electoral process. Some of our proposals were received badly by the administration (handing in of voter lists, speeding up the drafting of standard voting records); others were rejected by the employers association (voting rights for construction, hotel and part-time workers, candidate guarantees, etc), and even the UGT was not too receptive to eliminating the delays in setting up the Provincial IMAC Commissions, which represent a guarantee that the electoral process will develop properly.

The administration stopped calling meetings through IMAC and began a solemn round of talks with the employers association and the unions on draft election regulations. We regarded the first draft as unacceptable (employer interference in the call for elections, shift of members from one union to another, no electoral guarantees, disenfranchising construction and hotel workers, nullifying elections held before the statute took effect, etc).

The CCOO's firm stand on these proposed regulations has led the Labor Ministry to substantially modify its positions (as of the time that I am writing this article), although everything has been brought to a halt by the change in government and the appointment of Perez Miyares as labor minister, a UCD member

with such strong ties to the labor movement of the past and whose intransigent attitude in connection with the Workers Statute we all remember.

We can indeed say that the UGT's scant interest in developing and pushing the initial agreement that it signed with us in June has been objectively conducive to the Labor Ministry's schemings, highlighting for the nth time that a lack of understanding, which is vital for both unions, solely benefits those who want the elections to strengthen a labor unionism that is quite different from the one practiced by the CCOO and the UGT.

Workers' Statute, Union Representation

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Sep 80 pp 6-8

[Article by Ricardo Escudero, professor of contemporary unionism at Madrid University]

[Text] The bodies representing the workers in their companies (shop committees and shop stewards) are going to be chosen over the next few months. These elections are important not only because of the eventual makeup of the bodies; furthermore, pursuant to the standards set forth in the Workers Statute for determining the representativeness of unions, they are going to have a much broader scope because they will act as a determining element in granting the status of representative unions to the ones that exceed certain percentages in the balloting and in assigning specific functions to them, which is unquestionably going to have a decided impact on union activities over the next few years.

The Workers Statute accept the notion of representative unions, in line with legislation in other European countries, but it utilizes a criterion for recognition--that of election results--that is different from the ones observed in such legislation.

Indeed, the idea of a representative or most representative union has been gradually gaining acceptance ever since the ILO Constitution established after World War I that nongovernmental delegates should be designated by the most representative professional organizations of the employers and workers. Later, various countries gradually accepted this idea in their laws, but not without resistance to its spread, because it entails granting to certain unions, based on their greater representativeness, a number of very important functions in labor union activity, including collective bargaining, a monopoly on running candidates in the first round of elections for shop committees and shop stewards, the initiative in setting up company union branches, the calling of strikes in public services and participation in certain public bodies.

In the majority of countries the recognition of the right to organize has led to the formation of many unions of varying importance. This has necessitated the development of mechanisms for selecting unions that because they meet certain requirements are regarded as more, or sufficiently, representative, which legitimizes their performance of the aforementioned functions. This is going to give rise to a hierarchy among unions, which is merely the recognition

of a de facto situation in which not all unions enjoy the same degree of representativeness, as a result of the differences in how firmly established they are, in their number of members and in their mobilization capabilities. As Moltavo* points out, the problem is not so much the notion itself as it is the requirements demanded of unions to attain such status and of the guarantees accorded unions that do not attain it.

There is actual union pluralism in the countries in which this idea of union representation is observed, which explains why it is common in France, Italy (and this aside from the not yet fully consummated attempts at union unity), Holland and Belgium, and not in the GDR, where despite the existence of differing union initials, we can speak of de facto union unity, in the United States (where only one union is recognized as the exclusive representative of the workers) or in Great Britain (where despite the frequent conflicts among rank-and-file unions, there is unity in the union upper echelons). We realize, of course, that the countries that use the concept of union representativeness do not accord such status to just one union; rather, they accept the fact that many unions can succeed in being regarded as representative.

In spite of the wideranging recognition of the concept of representative unions, the mechanisms used by various legislations to determine which unions are differ to some degree. French law has most clearly spelled out the standards to be observed, as its Labor Code contains a list of them, albeit for the purposes of collective bargaining, and not all of them are equally important. The following are the yardsticks: the number of affiliates, independence, dues (to prevent the listing of fictitious members or persons having no real ties to the union), the union's experience and age and its patriotic stand during the German occupation (a criterion directed against the unions that collaborated with the Vichy regime). Based on these criteria, a ruling was issued enumerating the representative unions (General Confederation of Labor, CFTD, Workers Force, DFTC, General Confederation of Managerial Personnel and the National Education Federation), whose representativeness is accepted in all spheres of union activity, not just collective bargaining.

The concept of union representativeness is recent in our country, having gradually gained ground since the disappearance of vertical unionism and the recognition of the right to organize. Thus, transition legislation made occasional use of it, for example, in granting sufficiently representative unions powers to call elections for shop committees and shop stewards (decree of 6 December 1977). Although it does not stipulate the mechanism for determining what unions are representative, this regulation is a clear forerunner of an acceptance of the concept, which was later observed in the 1978 collective bargaining bills. The yardstick of a 10 percent presence in representative bodies is gradually settling in as a requirement for union participation in negotiations for multicompany pacts, although the not too reliable election returns, the absence of clear-cut regulations in this area and, above all, timing considerations in each specific case have caused this yardstick to be used with great flexibility and without much rigor.

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*Jaime Montalvo Correa: "The Concept of the Most Representative Union in European Union Systems," Institute of Social Studies.

The Workers Statute accepts the notion of representative unions. For the purposes that we are analyzing here, the importance of the statute is that the mechanism used to gage the representativeness of unions is different from those in the previously mentioned bodies of legislation. In fact, the only criterion that the statute observes in gaging representativeness is electoral, in other words, the percentage of the votes garnered by each union in the elections for shop committees and shop stewards. Thus, Spanish law's solution to the problem differs substantially from that of other countries, in that it prefers an objective, percentage-based yardstick to other criteria that are harder to substantiate, such as, for example, the number of affiliates or dues-paying members in each union. The system stipulated by the statute is highly unusual because in other countries the electoral criterion is of very relative importance and takes a back seat to the other gages of representativeness. This is similar to the way of gaging political representativeness, in which the essential thing is not a party's membership or mobilization capabilities but its degree of influence as reflected in the votes it gets.

The immediate consequence of the option selected by the Workers Statute is that the results of the elections are of prime importance, inasmuch as they establish the degree of representativeness of each union, the balance of power among them and the degree to which their policies are backed by the workers; furthermore, they ultimately have a clear-cut multiplier effect the repercussions of which will affect the various spheres in which union activities are carried on.

The statute refers several times to representative, or the most representative, unions, but it quantifies the requirements for such status on only two occasions: in collective bargaining below the company level (Article 87) and in representing the general interests of the workers (Additional Provision 6). In both cases it requires the same percentage of representativeness, 10 percent of the members of the shop committees and the shop stewards and 15 percent of the members for the Autonomous Community unions.

Therefore, all collective bargaining conducted under the statute, in other words, the bargaining that applies to all workers, is conditioned by the election results, inasmuch as not only is the 10 percent level required for a presence on the negotiating committee, but also the majority needed for its makeup to be valid in collective bargaining above the company level applies as well to the shop committees and shop stewards (Article 88.1, Paragraph 2), and the majority that the "union delegations" must command to negotiate company contracts affecting all workers in the company is precisely a majority of the committee members (Article 87.1, Paragraph 2).

In short, the union election results are going to have a profound bearing on the direction and scope of collective bargaining, since the balloting percentages are the foundation for the entire system of legitimizing union presence on the negotiating committee, whose makeup, furthermore, is supposed to be proportional to the results, a point on which the statute is mute but which logically must be applied.

Now then, even though the mechanism for determining the representative unions is not spelled out more clearly than we have outlined above and even though an overview of the issue is lacking, we can surmise that the results of the elections are going to be decisive in all of the instances in which the Workers Statute refers to the representative unions. This is logical for two reasons: first, by analogy with the criterion used by the statute for collective bargaining and institutional representation, and second, because the absence of an objective criterion would entail an unacceptable degree of discretionary power on the administration's part when the time comes to assign the functions that the statute recognizes for representative unions and which we take a look at later.

The importance of the shop committees and shop stewards elections is based on the statute's detailed regulations governing the election procedure. On the one hand, it aims at a clear identification of the unions to which candidates belong or that run candidates (or, as the case may be, their nonaffiliation or the group of workers sponsoring them), so that their true electoral representativeness can be gaged, thus avoiding the confusion that arose in this regard at prior elections. On the other, it regulates in detail the election system and procedure, as well as the resolution of potential incidents that could crop up at any time during the election.

Leaving aside the responsibilities of shop committees and shop stewards, whose direction and scope are going to depend on the election results, we know that our legislation recognizes the following responsibilities of representative unions:

1. The aforementioned responsibilities in connection with collective bargaining and the agreements on sector revampings.

2. Representing the general interests of the workers in dealing with the nationwide public institutions that provide for such representation. In this regard, I should mention that several ordinances prior to the statute have provided for the participation of representative unions in public bodies: in the institutional management bodies of Social Security, in the INEM, in the advisory councils of Spanish National Radio, the Spanish Radio Network and Spanish Television (TVE). In addition, the Catalan and Basque Autonomous Communities have provided for their participation in Labor Councils, making specific mention of the percentages obtained in the elections in question. Furthermore, certain laws provide for union presence in several bodies, for example, the national consulting commission for collective bargaining, which the statute envisions, IMAC, the Spanish Emigration Institute, the Social Institute of Free Time, the Superior Pricing Board, and the Fund for the Regulation and Management of the Fish and Seafood Market, among others. Although no mention is made of how the unions with input in them are to be selected, the yardstick is, no doubt, election results. Lastly, representation in international organizations will also revolve around this criterion, based on the provisions of the ILO Constitution.

3. Consultation prior to government regulation in certain areas: prohibited jobs for those under age 18, employment promotion measures, setting the minimum wage across professions, reducing or increasing the workday, and the regulations on the workday, breaks and range covered in the transportation sector.

4. The issuance of prior reports (not compulsory) on certain areas: extension of labor union contracts, and the partial or total revocation of labor regulations.

To these responsibilities should be added others that are assigned in the statute to unions as a group but which because they are similar to some of the ones outlined above, will foreseeably be performed by the representative unions. For example, the government can hold talks before approving the regulations governing the bodies representing the workers in companies with special characteristics, or it can hold them before regulating the working conditions in a branch of activity in the absence of a labor union contract. This is certainly not a complete list of responsibilities, because we can expect that the new laws will expand the sphere of activity of the representative unions.

Moreover, there is a high degree of acceptance among unions and employers of the concept of representative unions based on the election yardstick, as demonstrated by the fact that the unions have endorsed it in certain instances. For example, it was used as a reference standard in integrating the personnel of the USO's socialist, self-management faction into the CCOO when the former merged with the latter, and the AMI signed by the UGT and the CEOE made use of the concept of a well-established or high-membership union, as well as the specific 10 percent yardstick to determine which unions could negotiate a labor union contract. Lastly, many labor union contracts have also endorsed the concept of union representativeness and the electoral yardstick for determining it.

In short, the scope of the upcoming elections goes far beyond the mere makeup of shop committees and who the stewards are; indeed, it will have repercussions on the much broader area of general union representativeness.

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SUMMARY OF REGIONAL CCOO LABOR UNION DEVELOPMENTS

Catalonia Employment Fund

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Sep 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Sebastian Vives]

[Text] A short while ago, Trias Fargas, the finance adviser of the Catalan Legislative Assembly, remarked to the mass media that we did not have to get used to living with the existing unemployment rate. At the same time, the same government's labor adviser was making public a plan to combat joblessness.

The new twist in the current situation is that today everyone, both in Catalonia and in Spain as a whole, regards the extraordinary rise in unemployment as the nation's number one concern. The squabbling between the Labor Ministry and the INE, and the criticism by the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks show that everyone's basic concern today is unemployment. We are naturally pleased about this, because we in the CCOO [Workers Commissions] have been saying for years that this was a paramount issue. The capitalist development model and the system itself are in a deep crisis, and therefore, today more than ever, we need a revolutionary change to secure major social gains and to eradicate the causes of the crisis.

The unemployment figures for Catalonia are extraordinarily serious: 225,000 workers are counted among the jobless. The figure is up 50,000 over the last 12 months. The goal of the PEG [Government Economic Program] to tailor the economy's structure to the will of the multinationals is being carried out to the letter. The attempt to switch from the public sector to the multinationals (SEAT [Spanish Passenger Car Company, Inc], RAM, etc), the shutdown of thousands of small and intermediate businesses and zero government investment are daily realities in Catalonia.

Under the provisions of the 8/80 Law (the ill-termed Workers Statute) and the IMAC, etc, more than 125 jobs are lost each day in Catalonia.

More than a year ago, the CONC [Catalonia National Workers Commission] drafted an emergency program at a national conference as the alternative put forward by the CCOO of Catalonia within our home rule framework to tackle the unemployment

problem. With the formation of the Catalan Legislative Assembly's Labor Council, we stated, some time ago, that it was absolutely necessary for all sectors of society to hammer out, on a priority basis, a collective agreement aimed at combatting the most serious specific causes of rising joblessness. Our approach has always been that a clear-cut political decision by the Legislative Assembly to coordinate efforts and press for a solution to unemployment could be very constructive.

In this connection, the provisional Legislative Assembly extended itself little: a few sessions on unemployment that came and went without glory or grief, and some efforts by the former adviser to get the municipal governments and the CCOO to raise funds so that each municipality could take care of its most pressing problems. These efforts yielded no results.

The Catalan Legislative Assembly that emerged from the elections is controlled by the nationalist right and feels the pressure of social needs, the pressure by unions, and is perhaps also afraid of losing the initiative, which the UCD [Democratic Center Union] would like to compete for in this sphere. Thus, it has proposed the creation of "an employment fund to combat joblessness."

The CDC [Democratic Convergence of Catalonia] ties this proposal to a Catalonia-wide wage agreement and to obtaining the funds from a 0.5 percent wage cut and a 0.5 percent employer contribution, all of this linked to collective bargaining. This is clearly an attempt to have the contributions to this fund come solely from wage-earning workers. According to the labor adviser himself, this is just the first part of a three-stage plan that is going to develop a social pact in Catalonia.

Under the Legislative Assembly's bill, most of these funds would go to defray the Social Security payments of companies that created jobs during the year before the agreement. In other words, companies would benefit doubly at the expense of part of the workers' wages.

While the employers' association (National Jobs Promotion), dominated by the Catalan business groups that are most opposed to home rule, has said no, refusing even to undertake negotiations within the autonomy framework, and while the UGT [General Union of Workers] for the moment has not voiced its view, though for some time now it has been trying to begin separate negotiations with the employers' association, the CONC's CE has agreed to begin negotiations within the framework of the Labor Council, as long as each of the parties brings its own proposals to the bargaining table.

The Catalonia CCOO cannot conceive of a true Catalan policy to combat unemployment that is not linked to a full transfer of powers to the Legislative Assembly, especially with regard to emergency measures and the national jobless funds, and that is not linked to the economic program that the Legislative Assembly is going to submit next year.

It makes no sense to merely create a "fund" without taking into account all of the components involved in developing an employment policy.

In our view, an employment policy revolves around three basic pivots:

--Staving off the loss of job posts through negotiated sector overhauls, greater union involvement in regulatory measures, union involvement in mediation, arbitration and settlement agencies, and the establishment of credit lines for the PYME's [Small and Medium Businesses], as well as the promotion of personal loans for the purchase of housing.

--Maintaining new job posts, through real reductions in the workday, early retirement, combatting hiring fraud, the elimination of overtime and moonlighting, and basically through public investment, both from the Federal Government and from the home rule government.

--Thirdly, for the protection of unemployed workers the recently passed "Basic Employment Law" must be repealed, since it is going to prompt onerous social problems.

We feel that a special fund not linked to collective bargaining and not affecting the buying power of wages could help to further this policy to combat joblessness. In other words, the fund, controlled by the union federations, could consist of nationwide contributions, with a progressively greater burden on the highest income-earners.

Under no circumstances should the money in this fund be linked to collective bargaining developments; it should instead be linked to various compulsory measures directed at higher-income sectors.

Therefore, along with an extension of the jurisdictions of the statute [Estatut], the fund should, in our view, be based on:

1. The creation of a progressive tax to supplement the income tax.

2. The issuance of public debt by the Catalan Legislative Assembly.

3. The economic involvement of banking institutions. and

4 Funds from the FNPT [National Fund for the Protection of Labor].

All of these issues are going to be addressed in negotiations that will be undertaken in Catalonia; how they develop and what results they yield could be an important experience for the entire country.

Creation of the Catalonia Employment Fund

Article 1. The undersigned parties to this agreement hereby decide to create the "Catalonia Employment Fund" within the framework of an Inter-Professional Agreement of the Autonomous Community, under Article 83.2 of Law 8/1980 (March), the Workers Statute.

Article 2. The objective of the Catalonia Employment Fund is to promote the creation of job posts, based on the approach of community service programs geared to an economic recovery and, at the same time, to civic and social interests. A policy of subsidies is explicitly ruled out, because it is considered contradictory to the necessary incentives for economic activity.

Article 3. The agreement to create the Catalonia Employment Fund must be included in the pacts signed by hiring units smaller than those in this Inter-Professional Agreement. Only what is expressly stipulated in Article 5 can be negotiated in other frameworks.

Article 4. The programs of the Catalonia Employment Fund will have the same duration as the Inter-Professional Agreement of the Autonomous Community, in other words, from 1,1...1980 to 1,1...1981.

Article 5. The fund will consist of contributions from the employers and the workers in accordance with the criterion detailed in the fund's regulations. The collection system and procedures will be reconciled with the limits provided for in the current wage agreement. Adjustments to one of the collection methods stipulated in the Regulations of the Catalonia Employment Fund can be made in pacts of lesser scope than this Inter-Professional Agreement. In any case, once the method of collection is determined, it will be universal and obligatory, because of the applicability of both the present charter agreement and the nature of the regulations for enforcing it.

Article 6. The undersigned union federations accept the approaches for resolving labor conflicts contained in the supplementary pacts to the Inter-Professional Agreement, approaches worked out in accordance with the guidelines of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Labor Council and set forth in the paragraph entitled "Procedures for Resolving Labor Conflicts" in Section X, Articles X to 1,X of the agreement.

Article 7. The undersigned employers' associations also accept the approaches mentioned in Article 6, as contained in the supplementary pacts to the Inter-Professional Agreement, with the understanding that these approaches entail the acceptance of the paragraph entitled "Procedures for Resolving Labor Conflicts" in Section X, Articles X to 1,X of the agreement. In order for these procedures to be complied with, the employer associations pledge to accept union presence in the company, which will be achieved by facilitating the union activities of the most representative federations jointly signing these pacts.

Article 8. Although the wage increases and the contributions to the fund cannot exceed the limits stipulated in the general wage agreement, periodic revisions can be made to boost wages if real, matching increases in productivity are verified. In the event that there is disagreement on whether there have been real productivity increases, the parties agree to submit the dispute to the Productivity Section of the Labor Office of the Catalan Legislative Assembly, which will issue a ruling that the parties must accept.

Article 9. The undersigned union federations and employer associations entrust the Labor Office with drafting detailed regulations for the Catalonia Employment Fund. These regulations, which will be binding on the parties, will provide for a tripartite monitoring and control agency.

Second CCOO Valencia Congress

Madrid CACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Sep 80 pp 37-38

[Article by Pere Beneyto]

[Text] The Second Congress of the CCOO Union Confederation of Valencia was held over the last weekend in July in Bunol, a city in the interior of the country with a longstanding tradition as a progressive, labor union center. It was attended by 600 delegates representing the 80,000 affiliates whose dues are paid up.

Both the preparatory discussions and the congress itself (plenary sessions, delegations and working committees) were profoundly democratic and at times marked by tension. The debate at the congress logically centered on two basic and closely interrelated issues: on the one hand, an analysis of and solutions to the crisis and how to implement them in Valencia, and on the other, the organizational bolstering of the union by heightening our ability to take social action to defend the interests of the workers in aiming for a progressive solution to the economic crisis. This was the thread running through both the position papers presented (program, bylaws and organization and finances) and the general report of the outgoing Executive Committee itself, which was read by Comrade Montalban (who was reelected secretary general) and passed by a vote of 355 for, 82 against and 91 abstentions.

Socialist Faction

I should also emphasize that of the 58 votes taken at the plenary sessions of the Second Congress, only one was unanimous: the vote to recognize the socialist, self-management faction, under the provisions of Article 7, Paragraph d of the approved bylaws. The proposal was submitted by Comrade Nicolas David, the former secretary general of the Valencia USO [Workers Trade Union], an organization most of which has merged with the CCOO. In the words of Antonio Montalban, this recognition signifies "a reunion of two major union movements and the broadening of the avenues of participation for Spain's workers in the prospects for unity. The incorporation of the socialist faction, which has 20 percent representation on the new Executive Committee, represents a strengthening of the class unionism that the CCOO embodies today, an enrichment of pluralism and a major gain in the move towards unity."

Combatting the Crisis

The General Report, on which part of the debate at the congress focused, stressed that "all progressive forces and in this case, we, have a three-pronged historical challenge facing us: to become aware of the depth and magnitude of the

crisis in all its manifestations, by abandoning simplistic, outline approaches that lead nowhere; to delve more deeply into a collective study and discussion of the alternatives and strategies for forcing through a progressive solution, a change in the socioeconomic model, and in line with all of the above, to gradually establish the program groundwork and the organizational alliances to make this progressive solution a reality. Parallel to this, we must be able to place our daily union activities within the general framework of progress towards a negotiated solution to the crisis. To this end, we must coordinate the specific with the general in a dialectic manner and utilize practical teaching methods so that all workers feel that they are active leading figures, not just spectators, in this debate, in this collective analysis that will lead us forward."

Special attention was devoted to the impact of the crisis on Valencia and to specific solutions for it, with emphasis on Valencia's agricultural problems, the folding of increasing numbers of small and medium businesses, inequalities among districts, and the alarming increase in unemployment (already more than 180,000 Valencian workers) and in crisis layoff notices. In this connection, according to a report drafted by the technical services of the confederation, an average of eight job regulation notices a day are issued in Valencia. Over the last 1½ years 3,223 have been issued, affecting a total of 82,445 workers (8 percent of the region's working population), 14,858 of whom joined the ranks of the unemployed, while the rest had their workday cut or their jobs temporarily suspended.

Therefore, the congress confirmed the urgent need to negotiate and draft, together with the social and economic forces in attendance, a comprehensive program to save Valencia's economy with a national solidarity and class approach, since otherwise the reshaping of the market in accordance with the logic and guidelines of transnational capital could cause the total ruin of basic sectors of our economy (footwear, lumber, textiles, ceramics, etc).

Finally, in this brief summary of the discussions and conclusions of the congress we must stress that "our solution to the crisis necessarily entails a considerable strengthening of the organization and the contractual and representative authority of class unions, especially the CCOO, and on the other hand, a renewed unity of action with the UGT, despite the real differences that might separate us today, because the task before us and our historic responsibility is to stave off separationist trends and to offer valid alternatives to the entire working class."

Winning the Union Elections

In addition, according to the accurate comments by a congress participant, it is not enough to be in the right; we must also secure suitable solutions. In this regard, we need strength to put them into practice, and among other things, this entails winning the upcoming union elections.

At the time of this Second Congress we still had fresh in our minds the major victories of our candidates in Valencia's biggest companies (Ford, Altos Hornos del Mediterraneo, etc), as well as our sizable lead in the few elections held in small companies. The congress made a formal pledge to place the entire organization on alert, by making full use of available manpower, to make the elections as widespread as possible and to win them for our class, unified unionism.

This will not be at all easy if we bear in mind that 599,101 workers in 20,916 companies are eligible to vote, under the statute, in Valencia, which would mean a total of 37,749 elected delegates. The slanted reporting /infundismo/ that business traditionally practices in Valencia further complicates matters, because of the aforementioned total number of companies, 18,942 have a payroll of between 6 and 50 workers, and they will be electing almost two-thirds of the delegates (exactly 23,340).

This is the challenge now before us and which the entire organization is taking up with renewed enthusiasm, because far from ending on 6 July, the congress is being prolonged in our daily union activities throughout the length and breadth of Valencia.

The New Executive Committee

Antonio Montalban, Julian Cudero, Miguel Pascual, Miguel Segarra, Cesar Llorca, Juan Vicente Vilar, Manolo Moret, Nicolas David, Domingo Malea, Manolo Cardos, Charo Manjon, Pedro Torres, Rafael Picana, Cesar Manas, Alfredo Garcia, Antonio Moya, Andreu Mas, Jose Moran, Nuria Espi, Pascual Furundarena, Julian Izquierdo, Reinaldo Simon, Justo Linde, Paco Valor, Dionisio Vacas, Fernando Casado, Jose Belmonte, Jesus Pols, Jose Montalt, Enrique Palencia, Antonio Castano, Enric Play, Alfredo Botella, Maria Jose Reyes, Antonio Martinez Revert, Nicolas Lorente, Martin Carpena, Jose Aceituno, Juan Gil, Cristina Piris, Marilo Pla, Pepe Juarez.

Asturias Third Regional Congress

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Sep 80 pp 35-36

[Text] Two-hundred and ninety delegates took part in the Third Regional Congress of the Asturias Labor Union, which was held in Felguera last 28 and 29 June. In addition to discussions in the resolutions, candidacies and credentials committees, there was wideranging debate on the Organization and Finances position papers and the General Report, which was approved by the leadership bodies. Francisco Javier Suarez was reelected secretary general, and a new 21-member Executive Committee was selected.

The General Report examined organizational aspects, union activities and finances since the Second Congress and then addressed the current economic crisis and its specific characteristics in Asturias.

"The Asturian economy is marked, among other things, by industry's zero job-generating capacity, an eloquent illustration of which is the fact that it increased by 0.13 percent from 1955 to 1975, compared to 11.5 percent for Spain as a whole, and is suffering even more brutally, if that is possible, the consequences of the overall situation, compounded by those of its already longstanding historical crisis."

The Working Class and Autonomy

Our stands on the regional crisis call for a renewed momentum within our society. The Autonomy Statute and the formation of a true political community in our region are indispensable pillars. This goal cannot be achieved if it is not pursued on the basis of deep-seated regionalist sentiments entailing the recovery of our people's personality and the development of all the facets of their identity. Moreover, an indispensable condition for Asturian society, which is marked by a high degree of proletarianization, to achieve this momentum towards consistent regionalism is that this task must be taken up by the working class.

"In short, the consolidation of a strong regionalist movement, one of whose immediate and fundamental objectives is an Autonomy Statute, depends today on the working class and its organizations. This statute must contain various instruments, without which it can hardly be valid in broaching the region's core problems.

"Thus, Asturias must be given its own political institutions, a parliament, regional government, etc; tools and jurisdictions with regard to our involvement in management and control of public enterprise, regional savings, territorial planning, as well as the chance to spur the development of new industrial sectors in the region through the aforementioned financial control, regional public sector, support for the development of PYME, etc.

"The current draft statute provides for all these possibilities, and it is a central task of Asturian society and the labor movement to get it quickly passed and implemented.

"This Third Congress ought to draft a specific resolution on this issue. Also, it would be a good idea for the new regional leadership to organize throughout Asturias wideranging campaigns on home rule and unionism, in which aside from our own studies we would include the major work that the Confederation Council recently did on this issue."

The General Report also addresses the sociopolitical and union situation and then the kind of union activities that this situation requires.

Union Activities Today

"Union activities in situations like the one that we have described must take into account the phenomena that we noted above, phenomena that are a major stumbling block to mass action and that spark trends towards radicalism and vanguardism among the most combative minorities. A move towards such approaches

would isolate us from the workers by reducing us to an organization of combative personnel whom the country's 12 million workers would, however, look upon with misgivings. The CCOO cannot merely uphold consistent positions; this is not enough if we lose our influence among the masses and, therefore, are incapable of putting our solutions into practice. It is not the role of the vanguard to be the savior of the class; rather, its role is to lead the class without ever becoming divorced from it, with the conviction that only the action of the class as a whole is a valid means in our society of achieving the social transformations that we advocate.

"This is the way; these are our roots, and this and a tireless struggle for unity are the essential characteristics of our unionism. Therefore, we must combat and uproot certain practices among us that will eventually isolate us. By losing sight of the prospects for our struggle, our main objectives turn battles into wars, and we would be hopelessly engaged in practices that here and today, in spite of their revolutionary look, would merely weaken class unionism and strengthen the positions of surrender by isolating us from the majority."

Elections

"The outcome of the union elections is another essential factor in progress towards unified action and class union practices. The type of unionism and union practices pursued at work centers, as well as continued CCOO hegemony, depend to a great extent on this outcome. The election results are going to be decisive in thawing the situation relating to unified action with the UGT, so that the shift can be made to positions more in keeping with class interests.

"As far as the CCOO is concerned, the union elections should not just be a face-off among initials, but rather a means by which the workers elect or reelect unified, democratic representatives, representatives who ought to encourage union activities in the companies that are of the same nature. Nor should the CCOO fall into the trap of putting the electoral contest on a political plane, much less of making it a choice between a responsible union and a radical union, the simplistic basis of the UGT campaign in the elections so far."

Finally, emphasis was placed on the historic importance of the USO socialist faction merging with the CCOO. "This is a legitimate union faction with a lengthy history, and it preserves the principles of class, autonomy and unity of the traditional USO. Its merger with the CCOO is going to heighten the latter's unified and pluralist nature. It merged after it realized that it would be impossible to uphold and develop these principles in Zaguirre's USO. It thus joined the CCOO, convinced that this is the organization that today practices a class unionism that is in keeping with broad influence among the working class, as well as the most democratic and pluralist one."

Organization and Finances

The points relating to organization and finances that were addressed in the report were analyzed at length in the Organization and Finances position paper,

to the extent that this debate on organization was one of the major ones at the Third Congress.

Leadership bodies, labor unions, the organization and affiliation of the unemployed, union sections...were analyzed and debated exhaustively and in detail. The second part of the paper took a detailed look at the economic and financial situation and proposed clear and practical measures.

"This entire paper has one fundamental purpose: to facilitate the involvement of members and affiliates in CCOO unionism.

"In turn, this objective means that the entire CCOO has to take up the task of creating, developing and strengthening unions and union sections. If because of inertia, inaction or a lack of understanding, we do not succeed in carrying out this organizational task in a relatively short period, not only could the CCOO's roots among the workers be adversely affected, but in addition the type of unionism that the labor movement needs to pursue to effectively champion the workers' grievances and so that the CCOO's overall union activities help to achieve the goal of social transformations set forth in its principles."

The Executive Committee

Emilio Huerta Rodriguez, Simon Gonzalez Sanchez, Jose Indalecio Estrada Alvarez, Carmelo Alonso Serrano, Alberto Muniz Alvarez, Jose Luis Perez Amato, Antonio Gonzalez Hevia, Francisco Javier Suarez Suarez, Manuel Alonso Rodriguez, Angel Ignacio Gonzalez Garcia, Jose Antonio Garcia Rodriguez, Luis Redondo Alvarez, Alberto Hevia de los Rios, Ana Garcia Carpintero, Emilio Martinez Morala, Manuel Trigo Bermejo, Aladino Tresguerras Menendez, Alberto Rubio Muniz, Godofredo Gonzalez Torre, Ana Nunez R-Arango, Julio Irazabal Juez.

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CCOO-SPONSORED NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT, CRISIS SOLIDARITY PLAN

Summary of Plan

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 10-16 Oct 80 p 15

[Text] The measures proposed by the Workers Commissions [CCOO] in the "National Solidarity Plan Against Unemployment and Crisis," which will soon be introduced to the public, may be summarized as follows:

1. Measures aimed at curbing the increase in unemployment. It is proposed to reverse the trend that exists on the job market, through investment and planning in the state economic administration, based on employment and indicative action on private enterprise.

For this purpose, a public investment plan is proposed, pertaining mainly to sectors with low investment/employment coefficients (construction, agriculture, services, etc.), and others of special strategic importance to our economy, associated with its competitive affiliation with EEC, and the world. This investment effort must be directed primarily toward providing social services, acting in the twofold area of combating unemployment and meeting the deficit in social benefits, factors which often, and not by chance, coincide in the same realm. These public investments must be supplemented by indicative action on private enterprise.

It is also proposed to fully negotiate the reorganization of sectors in a state of crisis, eliminating the current situation, which we might describe as one of "brutal reorganizations" and which entails such a high social and economic cost. These reorganizations must be supplemented by zonal and regional plans aimed at absorbing the unemployment that has been generated.

With respect to the business firms in a state of crisis, the necessary legal reforms are proposed to do away with the abuses that are occurring at present, and to be able to resolve these situations within the context of negotiation. As part of this plan, the Workers Commissions think that an effort should be made by the government credit entity to support the PYME [Small and Medium-Sized Businesses], and that special treatment should be given when the customer of the latter is the public sector, either potentially or actually.

2. Measures aimed at mitigating the effects of unemployment on the job market. The Workers Commissions proposes the use of the best known methods for distributing employment, introducing them not in an abrupt, but rather in a continuous fashion. The plan

calls for concrete action in connection with the shortening of the work day, the treatment of "overtime" and multiemployment, retirement, with special emphasis on early retirement, with replacement of the retired person, etc. In view of the fact that large labor sectors in Spain have been harder hit by the crisis than others, and that the same thing holds true in the regions of Spain, we propose the continuation of employment programs, but with the introduction of substantial changes that will lend them a higher degree of efficacy and will avoid the flagrant injustices committed in their implementation. We also deem it necessary to make a considerable increase in the participation of the INEM's General Council in the preparation and followup of these programs. Community employment would be treated in the same way.

3. Protection for the unemployed. The Workers Commissions will make a counterproposal, an alternative to the Employment Law, attempting to reduce its most retrogressive aspects and to provide for the unprotected areas which that law will produce.

In any event, and after the passage of the law, we shall uphold our alternative proposal; but we shall engage in negotiating its development, particularly in areas that are detrimental to the unemployed. We also propose the creation of Agrarian Unemployment Insurance, the features of which we describe in the plan.

The aforementioned points are supplemented by positions regarding collective bargaining.

Additional Details

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Oct 80 pp 49-50

[Excerpts] At the Conference of Union Action an analysis was made of the report on the Solidarity Plan prepared by a commission created for that purpose. This report was divided into three parts: objectives and features, measures against unemployment and financing. After the debate the commission was assigned to introduce the changes that resulted and to prepare the final plan. By way of orientation, and to supplement the information on other pages of this issue, we are publishing a general outline of the features of the plan, which will be published in its entirety at the appropriate time.

The "National Solidarity Plan Against Unemployment and Crisis" which the Workers Commissions will soon submit is based on the principle that the current economic and social crisis that Spain is experiencing can hardly be surmounted without expending a combined effort on the part of the society as a whole with those who are in worse circumstances, and essentially the unemployed.

This plan is a negotiable proposal submitted to social and political organizations, and to the government itself.

Generally speaking, the proposed measures are as follows: [The list is repeated here.]

The aforementioned points are supplemented by positions relating to collective wage bargaining, productivity and investment, attempting to gear it to the negotiation and implementation of the plan and, in particular, taking into account the fact that

efficiency and productivity are inseparable from the participation of the workers, and the democratization of the economy.

Finally, the Workers Commissions propose a financing plan based on the creation of a National Solidarity Fund, which rejects the notion that only the workers should pay for the crisis, as the government maintains, and which extends the effort for austerity to obtaining funds to be used to generate employment for the society as a whole. This proposal for financing is supplemented by suggestions relating to the social and democratic control of the use and results of the funds thereby accrued.

The implementation of a plan of this type demands a thorough reform of the institutional participation, particularly that related to INEM and INSS [National Social Security Institute]. Unless the presence of the union organizations in these institutes is given real substance, progress can hardly be made either in implementing the plan submitted by us or in implementing any other proposal for a negotiated solution to the crisis.

Principal Areas of Debate

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Oct 80 pp 21-22

[Text] From 4 to 6 October, the First Conference on Union Action took place, attended by the members of the Confederal Council, as well as the secretaries of union action and employment, and cadres from all the federations and territories. As everyone knows, the delay in the holding of the Second Congress made this conference inevitable. Its decisions, approved by the Confederal Council, had to establish the line of the Confederation until the aforementioned congress. The extensive list of topics was divided into three major sections: "On the Crisis and the CCOO Strategy," "Collective Bargaining," and a report on a "Plan of Solidarity Against Unemployment." Three commissions debated these subjects in depth, before they were submitted to the plenum of the Confederal Council.

In subsequent issues we shall publish the various resolutions from this conference. Now, we are merely outlining the essential features of one of the most serious debates that the Confederation held on the aforementioned topics.

The solidarity plan, owing to its obvious significance, is discussed in a separate article by Jose Maria Corell.

Collective Bargaining

In the assessment of the bargaining, an analysis was made of the deep-seated difference between bargaining in 1979 and in 1980. The latter year was marked by the widespread offensive of the economic and political right wing, materialized in the PEG, the Workers Statute, the Employment Law, etc. Management, unlike its conduct in other years, has not confined itself to assuming a more or less hard-line position in negotiating the contracts, but has introduced its own demands. The latter could result in reduced costs of layoffs and labor, flexibility and mobility among personnel and certain reductions in trade union rights.

The standard agreement between UGT [General Union of Workers] and CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] has represented, among other things, the

acceptance of the dynamics of labor relations advocated by CEOE. During these work sessions emphasis was placed on the disunifying nature of this agreement, which excluded large groups of workers, such as those in business firms in a state of crisis, workers in the public sector, the unemployed, etc.

It may be said that 1980 has represented a break from the previous bargaining system. From a contract bargaining system that was generally effective, it has changed to the signing of agreements between parties, and sometimes between trade unions that are not representative. Essentially, as has been said so often, an attempt has been made to establish a bargaining system from above, eliminating the workers' participation.

The evaluation of the bargaining cited, in addition to the general features, the various types of conduct in PYMES, public enterprise, multinationals, etc. For example, in Albacete and Segovia they were about to sign a contract that affected the province's business firms (most of which are medium and small-sized), which the CEOE's interference did not allow.

The administration has been typified by its harshness. This has been on two levels, exemplified by the contracts of public enterprise as opposed to private enterprise, and assuming an attitude of inhibition, disguised as false liberalism, toward many conflicts or accusations that generally hurt the workers.

Bargaining With a View Toward 1981

After the parliamentary debate on the motion for confidence, new elements were introduced into the prospects for the next bargaining. The government's instructions in the wage area (apart from the fact that they do not require the status of a decree) must necessarily affect the position of the business firms (even that of the ones which were willing to negotiate wages in accordance with the CPI), the AMI [Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement] and, in general, the entire labor relations situation.

The standard agreement has been "deeply affected" by the government's economic proposals. However, the interest of UGT and CEOE (assisted, in turn, by the administration) in renegotiating the AMI is obvious, even though it may only be for the sake of not coming out badly, from the standpoint of UGT. Regardless of how difficult it may be for UGT to renegotiate the standard agreement, there is every indication that it will end up being signed, as a political necessity for the parties interested in it.

The results of the trade union elections are another decisive element. There is every indication that, after the elections, the status of the various trade union positions will not undergo any great changes. The Workers Commissions will win, and virtually the same correlations of forces will be maintained.

The administration's stance toward collective bargaining seems to be the same as in 1979: to be inhibited in many instances and, of course, not to comply with Title III of the Statute insofar as representative status is concerned.

In view of this outlook, the conference proposed a series of objectives, the focal point of which may be established on the recovery of the general efficacy of the contracts. This recovery entails the maximum participation of the workers in the

bargaining process and unified agreements on contracts and specific points. The diversification of the CCOO Union Action was another major topic daicussed, one that must be considered before embarking on the concrete demands planned for 1981.

This diversification of Union Action must be proposed on various levels. On the one hand, not all the Union Action is exhausted in collective bargaining. New areas of negotiation have been opened up (for example, taxes, social security); and, within the company and apart from the collective contract, there is a series of points or areas as well (making the personnel flexible, subcontracting of labor outside of the company, possible contracts, etc.). Hence, there must be a probing of an entire series of concrete fronts involved in the direct or deferred wage of the worker, such as the tax withholding table, social security, etc. In both the area above the company and in the company itself, there is a series of specific points that could help to restore the efficacy of the contracts.

On the topic of wages, the conference reaffirmed the maintenance of the purchasing power of wages, based on the rise in the CPI in 1980, without discounting the hike in oil prices or indirect taxes.

Union rights were brought up on the basis of two major assumptions: on the one hand, that the workers assume the increase in labor power as something of their own; and, on the other, that a qualitative improvement be made in union activity in business firms, so that the workers' representatives (committees, delegates and union locals) and the workers themselves "may enhance their understanding of the means of production and the progress of the company, the investment policy, etc."

The conference cited the consolidation of the present rights of unions and the elimination of the retrogressive features of the Workers Statute, as well as keeping in effect the demands of the Second Sessions of Union Action (recognition of union locals, right of assembly, payroll discount, etc.).

Insofar as productivity is concerned, it is obvious that it must be increased; but it should be noted that the increases in productivity in this country are being made almost exclusively through a reduction in employment. We lead the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries in increased productivity, and this is due more to the disappearance of jobs than to growth in the gross domestic product. Hence, to negotiate the matter of productivity, as well as that of absenteeism, is definitely necessary in this situation.

Crisis and CCOO

The document put to a debate by this commission proposes the analysis of the crisis, "not to dwell on it, but rather to work for its progressive elimination with an appropriate policy."

The document describes the fundamental features of the crisis on the international scale, the crisis in Spain and the strategy of the capital.

Under the heading "CCOO Views the Crisis," two aspects are cited prior to the conclusions of the document:

"The trade unions, although they cannot, as such, devise nor be the exclusive proponents of the popular classes' overall alternative to the crisis, must indeed play a decisive role, with initiatives and mobilization of their own.

"In any event, the solution to the crisis will come over the medium term, with contradictions, stalling, progress and setbacks; there is no 'D-day' for the solution to the crisis. At the present time, while we trade unions must help to make the progressive solution viable, we cannot fail to act in response to the everyday problems that the crisis poses for the working class."

Nevertheless, the major issue in the commission's debate was the solution of the crisis. We are reprinting the entire text of one of the most debated paragraphs:

"The crisis, when viewed from the standpoint of the present reality, has only two possible alternatives: one, personified by international capital, although without showing its complete features now, which we would describe as deeply authoritarian in the political realm, and reactionary in the socioeconomic realm; and another, which we would term a unified, democratic solution, entailing elements of social, trade union and political pressure to make the negotiation that this solution requires possible."

With respect to this alternative, some comrades, at times in complete disagreement with the document being debated, cited the impossibility of a negotiated solution to the crisis.

"A negotiated solution is only possible if there is a leftist government." Between the position taken in the document and that summarized in this comment there were many nuances, a large number of which had to be included in the document later, after its approval in the plenum.

The debate continued. Another comment pointed out that the negotiated solution introduces an overall, uniform view, which could end up reducing concrete proposals that might constitute success for the labor movement on a more modest level.

As opposed to the negotiated solution (which could mean embarking on the rationalization of the capitalist system), a policy of resistance which, through partial struggles and mobilization, would make it possible to regroup forces, might be proposed as a strategy.

In response to the latter position, in other remarks an analysis was made of the significance, as well as the very concept and dynamics of negotiation.

"It is not a matter of dwelling on the logic of the crisis, but rather of negotiating the combating thereof." The reorganization of sectors, and the more or less partial solutions which must have an effect on the nation's economy, the workers and the entire society, will occur. "The conditions must be created that will enable us to negotiate;" in other words, to influence that process which is under way, and which will surely have its features exacerbated to the detriment of the workers.

Objectives, Strategy

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Oct 80 pp 45-47

[Article by Jose Maria Corell: "The Solidarity Plan Against Unemployment"]

[Text] It seems quite clear, from the standpoint of class, that the surmounting of a crisis in capitalism must be aimed at destroying some of its structures, in order to make progress toward the definitive transformation of the system. No effort would be legitimate for the workers' interests if it were to result in another readaptation or rebuilding of capital, and if the latter were to become the winner in its crises and contradictions.

This serves as a reminder that:

a. A trade union confederation can by no means become committed to solving the crisis by means of the new collaborationism. The workers need not deal with any assets other than their own.

b. A trade union participation confined to merely defensive positions would not even be acceptable, unless the historical circumstances were completely adverse.

We do not think that the present situation conforms to that type of circumstances, although any alternative must combine these three essential elements:

1. The progressive stengthening of big management, backed by the economic policy of the UCD government (PEG, PEN [National Energy Plan], Workers Statute, Employment Law, political declaration regarding the issue of confidence).

2. The retreat and confusion of the working class, which is suffering the social damage from the crisis.

3. The trade union confederations' loss of credibility, among other reasons, because of their division.

These indicators warn us of the impracticability of any alternative that seeks to impose victorious solutions on big capital. However, the urgent need to counter such a high and still rising unemployment rate necessitates the search for solutions negotiated with big management and the government itself (by government and by management); but it by no means necessitates a purely defensive negotiation.

The class trade union confederations must assume the position of rediscovering a strategy for trade union action that will revitalize the potential (at times expressed and restrained) capacity for struggle of the workers.

By recovering that capacity for mobilization, and that express awareness that the working class (even though only certain sectors have always acted as a spearhead) has in itself and its force, the trade union confederations and all the leftist organizations on their respective levels can embark upon negotiations which will reap considerably more than failures. Thus, the solution to the crisis will assume dynamics of mobilization-negotiation, and it is precisely in this logical, chronological order, that it could achieve a break in the new phase of capitalist growth.

This strategy necessarily entails:

Assuming that the battle will not be resolved over the short term, not even big capital is optimistic about an outlook of under 5 years, and the recovery of the mobilizing capacity could probably begin to be observed in the collective bargaining next winter; and for this purpose there will have to be a change in the pessimistic attitudes which sometimes anticipate risks of destabilization.

The mobilization and pressure of any kind, in each sector, businss firm and zone, must be proposed for very concrete and specific goals, so as to prevent any confusion among the workers. It will be a mission of the trade union movement to lend force to the coinciding, in time, of a group of mobilizations in different sections of the country and among different sectors, even though each one of them is pursuing different goals, which are not contradictory, but capable of spurring on workers from different sectors and geographical areas.

And all these battles and mobilizations must be a part, not only of the trade union's overall strategic objectives, but also, and essentially, of the plans and alternatives for the various problems, so that each one of the concrete demands and mobilizations will be related to more general perspectives, thereby achieving a solution to the concrete problem or demand and, at the same time, making progress with the pressure and mobilization so as to attain the alternative plan and more general objectives.

To repeat, at the present time, a pact or negotiations such as the Moncloa or AMI, could mean paralysis of the trade union movement for years. Negotiations which are essentially based on the leadership of one confederation or another, or which the trade union confederations do not lead with instruments to control the agreements, counting on the workers to assume responsibility, will inevitably lead the the latter's displacement or the subordination of their interests, with the subsequent results for the labor and trade union movement.

Finally, and as a result of all the foregoing, this negotiated alternative requires the fortitude and unity of the workers. This objective, which in itself constitutes a class demand, is particularly necessary at present; and it is an essential historical responsibility of the class trade unions, and the leftist parties, each in its own area, toward the demands of the working class.

It is from this standpoint that we must view the solidarity plan against unemployment which, as the title of the article states, must be a "proposal and instrument for mobilization and negotiation."

1. In the first place, it must be a proposal open to all workers and class trade unions, based on a desire to retrieve and discover a strategy for union action that will make the issue of unemployment the main issue, and that will revitalize and update the workers potential capacity for struggle. It is also a proposal open to the leftist parties and the popular classes.

2. The solidarity plan against unemployment must be an instrument for unity and solidarity.

On the basis of their content, the very concrete and keenly felt demands of the workers can and should be an instrument that will unite the unemployed workers and the workers with jobs, essentially as a result of their class solidarity.

Although many of the measures in the plan are defensive, they expose the contradictions in the system and the impossibility of resolving them with the present attitude and position of the government and management. Other measures would entail qualitative changes in the model for economic growth, without involving a substantial change in the model.

But, owing to the type and the combination of measures, as well as the manner in which they are proposed, the plan could, as we have said, be an offensive instrument for:

Mobilizing the workers, and combining those mobilizations.

Achieving unity of action among the trade unions, based on concrete problems, and having the workers, essentially, be the ones who will lead and who will demand, from the standpoint of concrete reality, that necessary unity of action.

Having the leftist parties, in view of the worsening of the results of the crisis, assume their responsibilities toward the workers and the popular classes.

3. From this standpoint, and in logical, chronological order, as I have said before, this plan could and should be an instrument for negotiation and, if that is achieved, for national solidarity; because we are willing to propose and to ask of the workers certain sacrifices, as an expression of class solidarity, in exchange for keeping rights that have been won, and winning others, involving, in the economic realm, a greater rationality and democratization, and a greater participation by the workers.

2909
CSO: 3110

COMMUNIST-DOMINATED CCOO LABOR UNION OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES

Statement of Objectives

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Sep 80 pp 7-9

[Excerpt] How Have CCOO [Workers Commissions] Acted in This Situation?

Our starting point has been the need to act in a responsible, steadfast way. The CCOO have demonstrated this responsibility and steadfastness in pressuring for a Workers Statute that will bring democracy to the business firms, that will increase the rights of the workers, that will strengthen the role of the committees and delegates and that will recognize the organization of trade unions in work centers. We have been opposed to the Statute because none of this has been included. On the contrary, it facilitates layoffs, makes them cheaper, curtails rights and benefits the business owners.

We have also demonstrated responsibility and steadfastness when we negotiated the Framework Bargaining Agreement. We attempted to protect the purchasing power of wages, to facilitate collective bargaining, to contribute to the battle against unemployment, and to increase the solidarity among the workers. But we did not sign it because, what was finally left had more negative aspects than positive ones. No measures were introduced against unemployment; on the contrary, the clauses on productivity and absenteeism, as they stood, may even have helped to increase the number of unemployed. The purchasing power of large sectors of workers was reduced, fostering lack of solidarity among those in business firms with economic problems and those in firms without them. A genuine wage revision for the workers was eliminated, and a confrontation among the trade unions was fostered.

In accordance with this policy of responsibility, we have negotiated and pressured for improved conditions for the workers.

In the business firms: Backing the company committees and personnel delegates, as organs representing all workers, so that they might negotiate good contracts, curb the causes of the crisis, obtain improvements for the workers and take action with respect to everyday problems: penalties, payroll, safety, health, etc.

Outside of the business firms: Negotiating and signing sectorial collective contracts that would improve the offers from management and benefit the workers.

Negotiating reorganization plans, such as the one for ship construction; protecting jobs and wages.

In the institutional agencies: National Employment Institute, National Social Security Institute, the emigration entity, etc., so as to protect in them the immediate interests of the most unprotected sectors of workers (the unemployed, pensioners and emigrants), and the indirect wages of all workers.

On the international scale:

Intensifying the CCOO's contribution to the unification of the struggle for demands on the European level to surmount the crisis, because the problems which it poses for Spanish workers have international dimensions that require the cooperation and joint action of all the representative trade unions.

We believe that this necessary unification of the European struggle for demands can be carried out in an organized fashion by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), through the implementation of its program. However, in order to fulfill these goals effectively, ETUC must increase its representative status and reinforce its authority, through the incorporation of the trade unions with a broad majority in Western Eruope, which have requested membership, as in the case of the CS of CCOO in Spain.

Upholding Spain's incorporation into EEC, the democratization of its institutions with the actual participation of the trade unions, and the establishment of new relations with the Third World countries, based on cooperation and independence of the parties involved.

Maintaining relations with the representative trade unions of all countries, without preestablished ideological criteria, based on united action toward mutual problems; and taking action, from our position of nonalinement and independence, for the reform of the world trade union movement, eliminating the division that currently exists.

What We CCOO Are Committed To

A trade union, even though it may be the leading one in a country, as CCOO is, cannot of itself solve all the workers' problems. What it can do, and is doing, is to exert pressure and cooperation to solve them.

What is the main, and most urgently required action?

The main action is to solve the unemployment problem, and in various respects: one, to maintain the present jobs; another, to create jobs for those now unemployed; and third, to obtain a decent unemployment insurance for the unemployed workers.

At the same time, we shall continue to act for the improvement of working conditions in business firms, and of the rights of workers outside of them.

In this direction, CCOO will strive to achieve the following:

I. Against Unemployment and for the Creation of Jobs

The country's efforts and resources should be directed, in a unified manner, toward the maintenance and creation of employment. As a concrete contribution, they must be directed toward:

A reduction in the work day. We are trying to obtain reductions in the work day so that the hours that are not worked may be covered by new workers.

A reduction in the retirement age. A reduction in the retirement age would mean that a large number of workers would start receiving pensions, while their jobs could be taken by unemployed workers.

A reduction in overtime. The elimination of the usual overtime, and its replacement by jobs.

The elimination of multiemployment. It is true that many workers cannot, with a very low wage, meet their needs and have had to resort to another job; but this is not true in all instances.

CCOO will advocate that, along with these measures, public investment programs be carried out, with the intensification of private investment, as well as special programs for sectors and areas that are severely hit by unemployment, etc.

At the same time, CCOO will continue striving to achieve a plan of solidarity on behalf of employment and against crisis. This plan of solidarity must be based on the commitment of all sectors and forces concerned with extricating our country from the crisis.

II. Maintaining the Purchasing Power of Wages

Wage demands will continue to be an important element in our union action. CCOO will demand, in the contracts that we negotiate in 1981, that the purchasing power of wages be maintained on the basis of the rise in the cost of living (CPI) in 1980. We shall also uphold an appropriate monthly revision that will allow for such maintenance.

III. Improving Working Conditions

Work organization. We shall propose that the committees demand their right to discuss with the business owners everything related to work organization, improvements therein, the technology to be used, etc.

Productivity. CCOO is willing to discuss productivity, because CCOO is aware that the improvement in productivity, under certain conditions, is good for the workers and the country. But what are those conditions?

That the increases in productivity that are agreed upon are not based exclusively on increased production rates, but rather on a group of measures that might include: modification of the technology (machinery, processes, etc.), changes in work organization, and improvements in administrative or managerial action; all of this with the workers' participation and agreement.

We CCOO think that any negotiation concerning productivity that is not established on these bases will end with increased exploitation of some of the workers in a business establishment, while the others will swell the ranks of the unemployed.

Work safety, sanitation and health. CCOO will continue to strive for compliance with the laws on job safety and sanitation, so that the committees will have real authority to stop production in the event of danger.

IV. Reinforcing and Increasing the Rights of the Committees and Delegates

The committees and delegates should have the following prerogatives, among others:

Ability to negotiate the collective contracts within the business firm.

Certification and control of the work contracts and settling of accounts.

Negotiation and control of the systems for earnings, and work organization and methods.

Actual control and overseeing of safety and sanitary conditions, apprenticeship, occupational training, promotion and raises, overtime and obligations with regard to social security.

Prior information before the adoption of disciplinary measures.

Right to establish a local in business firms with over 50 workers.

For the delegates and committee members, 40 hours with pay, on a cumulative basis, per month, to discharge their union functions.

V. Full Recognition of the Rights of Trade Unions in Business Firms

CCOO demands for the unions:

The right to set up union locals in business firms when 10 percent of the workers on the payroll would be members.

Recognition of the union delegate as representative of the union local, with 40 hours, with pay, each month, to discharge his union functions.

In business firms with over 250 workers, free provision of suitable premises for the union locals.

The right to disseminate publications and any type of trade union information inside the business firm.

Discount of union dues from the payroll where it is requested.

Recognition for an hour per month with pay for the effective exercise of the right of the workers in the business firm to hold a meeting.

VI. Insuring the Workers' Rights Outside of the Business Firm

By introducing the foregoing demands in the sectorial or branch collective contracts.

In the reorganizations of sectors. CCOO realizes that the reconversion of our industry is necessary if it is to survive under the present conditions marked by crisis and increased competition.

We CCOO want a modernized, competitive and profitable industry.

But we do not want the reorganization to be carried out in a brutal fashion; that is, so that the weakest businesses will close their doors, giving way to the stronger ones and at the cost of employemnt.

In the inst'tutional agencies. In the institutes wherein the unions participate, CCOO is working on the following lines:

Attempting to adopt mutual criteria with other trade unions, especially UGT [General Union of Workers].

Expanding the earnings controlled by the unions.

Preparing valid, concrete alternatives for the problems that have been cropping up, especially in the areas of social security, employment, etc.

In improving the quality of life of the workers. Demanding: decent housing with low rent; equipment in the districts, towns and rural areas; public schools; health assistance; and day care centers compatible with working schedules, among others.

Collective Bargaining Strategy

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 21-27 Nov 80 pp 14-15

[Text] With the union electoral process already under way, a large number of business firms have already held the elections and are ready to negotiate the 1981 contract. At the Conference on Union Action held recently by CCOO, the negotiating strategy to be pursued was established, which we have summarized in this article. Subsequently, we shall published the platform of demands to be upheld.

Collective bargaining, with its components, is still an essential element in the union's activity as a whole, and includes broader aspects than the negotiation of contracts.

It is essential that the unions continue diversifying and gaining new areas for negotiation as a reflection that the unions' power of intervention is increasing; because negotiation in itself is already a conquest of the union. What is signed, which may be positive or negative, is something else.

In the next collective bargaining, certain elements that must be taken into consideration will be operating:

The new political situation created after the formation of the new UCD government, and the lines of the program proposed in the vote of confidence, particularly in the economic realm: wage control, reorganization of sectors....

The Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement (AMI) must be renegotiated, and all the information indicates that both UGR and CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] are ready to continue along the same lines this year.

It is quite possible that the present union spectrum will be maintained, basically, after the union elections.

The Labor Administration does not appear willing to eliminate the legal confusion about the collective contracts, particularly with regard to their general effectiveness and the fulfillment of the necessary requirements.

The signers of the AMI will most likely attempt not to implement Title III of the Workers Statute, opting for relatively effective contracts which would later become more widespread in practice.

CCOO Objectives

We CCOO, in dealing with collective bargaining, must, in addition to fulfilling the workers' demands, propose a group of general medium and long-term objectives.

To keep increasing the workers' participation in collective bargaining, based on the average level of consciousness that really exists.

To strengthen the company committees and their role as negotiators and unifiers of the workers as a whole.

To restore the unity of action of the unions, especially with UGT.

To interconnect the collective bargaining, and expand the areas of contracting (state contracts), so that the working class may play an increasing role in the current economic crisis.

To uphold the overall effectiveness of the collective contracts, as stipulated in Title III of the Workers Statute.

Company Contracts

The sizable number of large business firms is in a state of more or less serious crisis. It is advisable to treat the matter of collective contracts within the context of the reorganization plans that will provide solutions for the company crises.

It is essential to uphold the role of the company committee as a key element in negotiation.

In this regard, it is not necessary to accept the terms of the Workers Statute (Article 87) whereby the SSE negotiate if a union has more than 50 percent of the

committee or, in any event, if the contract does not affect the entire personnel. The large business firms should play a more important role in collective bargaining generally, so that they may serve as a reference point for other business firms in the area and the sector.

Sectorial Contracts With General Effectiveness

There are contracts signed as a rule in a unified manner.

The CCOO's objective with regard to such contracts is to retain their features of general effectiveness and unity achieved years ago, as a guarantee for obtaining better demands and preventing the breaking of the contract and its deterioration into an agreement between nonrepresentative parties.

Sectorial Contracts With Limited Effectiveness

These are usually contracts signed unilaterally by one (or more) unions, without sufficient representative status.

Here, the objective is to restore the general effectiveness of the contract as promptly as possible.

From a legal standpoint, the contracts with limited effectiveness signed in 1980 are not regulated by Title III of the Workers Statute, and therefore it cannot be claimed that their existence (competition) precludes the negotiation of another contract with general effectiveness in the same area. Hence, if we have an absolute majority (alone, or with another union concerned) in the union elections, we can demand the opening of negotiations with a view toward arriving at a contract with general effectiveness.

As for the revision of the economic aspects of the 2-year contracts that we have not signed, it must be taken into consideration that, in virtually all instances, management and the UGT will require that we assume the contract if we want to participate in the wage revision, something that we can reject in every respect.

If the foregoing is impossible in 1980, we must resolutely proceed to diversify the collective bargaining, interpreted in the broad sense and not relating solely to contracts.

This diversification would be both in areas and in content. In areas: exerting pressure for negotiation in the business firms, based on a certain average size (for example, based on 250 workers), and in all locations where we have sufficient organization and capacity for pressure; opening up new areas for negotiation, where the correlation of forces is favorable and the union's economic situation, the capital structure and crisis make it advisable (for example, in homogeneous sectors that do not have a contract now: iron and steel, automobile); in provinces and among nationalities that came under a state contract previously; and in localities or countries of a provinces. In content: expanding the subjects of negotiation, both within and outside of the collective contracts.

Planning Union Action

When the collective bargaining system undergoes a crisis, this cannot be dealt with in a centralized manner (with a common platform and tactics), but rather in a decentralized manner, by sectors, after a thorough study has been made of the concrete economic, union and contract status of each sector and subsector.

So as not to succumb to different lines of union action, and to avoid centrifugal disunifying and corporative tendencies that might cause greater diversification in the negotiations and the preeminence of the company contracts among the sectors wherein the general effectiveness has been destroyed, the unions must carefully plan the followup and development of union action and the negotiation of contracts.

This planning, which has begun with the Conference on Union Action itself, must be continued at the meetings held by the federations and zones aimed at making working and wage conditions homogeneous....

The Union-Worker Relationship

The channels of communication between unions and workers are not fixed and immutable, but rather vary with time, concrete circumstances, degree of organization, and the socio-labor atmosphere....

Depending on the type of question that is to be debated or decided upon, priority must be given to one type of another, taking care that there is no disproportion between the content and methods of consultation. For example, the assembly is not always the best method, nor of course the only one.

The union cannot be content to establish a relationship with its own cadres and even its own members. The union's spokesman is all the workers.

In every process of negotiation and pressure, the workers must be consulted on concrete issues.

How can an effective consultation be achieved, that is, a consultation which will involve what the workers really want, one whereby a unified desire can be constructed?

All the workers must be consulted, and the union cannot be satisfied to reach only the members, much less the cadres.

A timely consultation of the workers is an extensive union operation. It cannot be improvised, because in the long run that would foster inhibition. Therefore, before any negotiation and pressure process, mechanisms for consultation must be planned.

The Types of Pressure

With respect to the matter of action related to pressure, a series of key aspects must be borne in mind.

There must be an expansion and diversification of the types of pressure, not confining t[illegible] o strikes exclusively.

The fundamental objective of strikes is the effectiveness that is achieved. For this purpose, it is necessary to be amply provided with the reasons and the righteousness of the causes that make the strike necessary, both in the eyes of the workers and those of the public; and to hold a thorough process of discussion and decision-making before deciding, not succumbing to summonses "from above."

The calling of a strike may be a natural, logical event in a negotiating process, but on the contrary an incomprehensible act to large sectors of workers, if the latter have not participated in the previous phase.

Strikes must be held in an organized, controlled manner. Indefinite terms must be avoided, setting the dates for entrance and exit, and not succumbing to the summoning of an eruption of strikes. The attitude of the workers must be monitored day by day, through the channels of participation that facilitate discussion and decision-making, avoiding crowded assemblies for making decisions.

There must be active, categorical opposition to the violent, antidemocratic action such as aggressive picketing, and the kidnapping of business owners and technicians.

All the foregoing instructions must be taken to extremes in the event of a strike in public services.

Labor Leader Defines Strategy

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 10-16 Oct 80 pp 13-15

[Interview with CCOO labor leader Agustin Moreno, by Francisco Herrera; date and place not given]

[Text] Some 250 delegates from Workers Commissions met last weekend at a Madrid hotel to make an assessment of the collective bargaining which took place in 1980, and to determine the strategy for 1981, to study the economic crisis and its most direct effects on the workers, as well as possible alternatives, and to discuss the content of the National Solidarity Plan Against Crisis and Unemployment, which the CCOO will soon submit to the country's political, trade union and social forces as a whole. The maintenance of the purchasing power of wages, the protection of jobs, especially in the sectors in a state of crisis, the creation of employment through the implementation of concrete measures cited in the Solidarity Plan and, in general, the upholding of its content, contract by contract, and the need for the unions to diversify their areas of negotiation and the content of the platforms, are the most important conclusions drawn. To expand upon them, MUNDO OBRERO talked with Agustin Moreno, in charge of Union Action in the CCOO state directorate and leading promoter of these "Meetings for Action on Demands," as they have been called.

[Question] Could you explain briefly the conclusions arrived at regarding the collective bargaining carried out during the year now ending?

[Answer] From a quantitative standpoint, for a total of 6,237,608 workers who signed contracts, including civil servants, an average overall wage increment of 14.1 percent was achieved; which represents a loss of purchasing power in the wages, because the CPI, that is, the cost of living, increased 15.6 percent during 1979. In each

year's collective bargaining, action is always taken based on the previous year's CPI, which is the closest reference point available.

In this connection, it may be pointed out that the loss of purchasing power was greater in the company contracts than in the sectorial contracts.

I consider it important to stress that the increases were larger where contracts were signed with management underwritten jointly by CCOO and UGT, which were also contracts with general effectiveness; in other words, they applied to the entire area. Moreover, they did not, on the whole, contain the more negative aspects of the Standard Agreement, such as leaving the companies in suspension and others, which have been included in the contracts signed unilaterally by UGT.

[Question] Have you assessed the effect that the signing of the Interconfederal Standard Agreement by management and UGT has had on this entire process?

[Answer] Yes, and it has been deemed quite negative. In the first place, a sizable number of contracts were signed wherein their general effectiveness feature was destroyed, contracts which have only affected the parties that signed them, since the latter lacked sufficient representative status, considering the areas in which they operated.

Secondly, the Standard Agreement has introduced a series of dreadfully negative elements into the contracts. I am referring to the treatment given to the matter of productivity, with a heavily antiworker essence, the retrogressive proposal relating to the issue of absenteeism, the fact that they are in effect for 2 years, the suspension of companies and, in short, a series of aspects which are present therein and which we have discussed many times.

And then, of course, there is the entire matter of the philosophy introduced by the Standard Agreement, which is perhaps the most serious aspect. We have cited as especially undesirable points the nonunifying nature of the Standard Agreement, the limited area of its implementation, since it does not apply to large groups of workers, such as civil servants, retirees or the unemployed...and the violation of the minimal norms for trade union democracy, since it has opened a door for unions without sufficient representative status to negotiate agreements with management, with all that this implies.

The Collective Bargaining in 1981

[Question] With respect to the collective bargaining for 1981 and that already begun during November and December of this year, what are the general lines of the strategy that you have approved?

[Answer] For 1981, we have started from a series of preliminary hypotheses on which to operate. First, we believe that the signing of the Standard Agreement by UGT and management will be renewed for another year, because it is a political necessity for both organizations. Second, the same trade union spectrum will be maintained after the elections which begin on 15 October, with the supremacy of CCOO. Third, the relative weakness of the trade unions will continue during this next period in our country. And, fourth, the government's policy toward the labor and trade union world will continue to be as completely confused as it is now. We have determined our strategy for collective bargaining on these premises.

[Question] We could take it step by step. What are the objectives of a general nature?

[Answer] Yes, the overall objectives for the Workers Commissions will be to achieve maximum participation by the workers, to restore unity of action among concrete sectors and business firms, maintain the general effectiveness of the contracts and, in short, lay the groundwork so that the type of interconnected negotiation that the union has may become a reality in the not too distant future.

[Question] What about the union's type of work?

[Answer] As for the union's lines for work, we believe that there must be an effort on the part of all the leadership organs on all levels to diversify our action. We must be capable of developing and seeking new areas of negotiations, especially among the sectors in a state of crisis, and of holding decentralized negotiations where contracts with limited effectiveness have been signed, so as to prevent the suspension of companies, as well as diversifying the content of the platforms.

A strategy of this kind has its dangers; if we are not prepared, corporative and even nonunifying sentiments may be fostered. We think that the way to correct this is by planning that diversification.

[Question] What instruments do you have for attaining this objective?

[Answer] The first step in this direction is the holding of these "work sessions." That must be backed by meetings on the level of federations, unions and territories; and then there is the "National Solidarity Plan Against Unemployment and Crisis"as a fundamental unifying factor.

Most Important Demands

[Question] And finally, what will be the main demands, overall, apart from those to be added in this process of decentralized discussion that you mentioned?

[Answer] With regard to the wage issue, in a serious crisis situation such as the one at present, it is our objective to maintain the purchasing power of wages and to diversify the wage policy on the basis of each sector or business firm. In the sectors or business firms in a state of crisis, the matter of wages becomes secondary, and the fundamental thing is maintaining jobs.

As for the employment issue, all the proposed measures are covered by what the "National Solidarity Plan Against Unemployment and Crisis" will propose, placing special emphasis on measures for the distribution of work, a reduction in the work day of 1 hour per week, establishing the maximum legal limit at 1,930 hours per year, and the introduction of measures to curb the proliferation of seasonal work, which has reached percentages of 5 percent in many business firms.

In the area of union rights, we shall seriously propose maximum use of the existing rights, so as to make a qualitative gain in union action in the business firms.

In the matter of productivity, the Workers Commissions reaffirm their position that it is important and necessary to negotiate productivity, and that it must be increased, as the productivity of business firms must be increased; but we have noted that last year productivity increased at a rate of 4 percent, thereby placing us at the top of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, through the increase in seasonal work, the rise in the number of occasional jobs, and the introduction of part-time work. All this makes it virtually impossible to hold complete negotiations on the matter of productivity. This issue will be dealt with in each concrete instance.



Agustin Moreno, head of the Workers Commissions' Union Action

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CCOO FOSTERS RELATIONSHIP WITH PRC LABOR UNIONS

Madrid GACETA SINDICAL in Spanish Oct 80 pp 45-47

[Article by Antonio Gutierrez: "The Four Modernizations"]

[Excerpts] Establishing relations with the trade unions of China pertains naturally to our concept of international trade union policy and our usual practice of maintaining bilateral relations with all the unions in the world, to foster unity and cooperation among all workers.

However, the features of a country such as China, with 980 million inhabitants and an area similar to that of all Europe, as well as the time at which the visit took place, coinciding with the sessions of the Fifth National People's Assembly, lend a unique significance to the relations between CCOO [Workers Commissions] and the Federation of Trade Unions of China.

A few hours after arriving in Peking, the CCOO delegation was able to attend the third session of the National People's Assembly, in its fifth legislature. An entire compendium of laws and regulations was approved, covering virtually all of the realms of the nation's existence: from the amendment of the marriage law to the laws regulating the establishment of joint enterprises with foreign and Chinese capital, and including the tax system on the income of individuals, the separation of powers between the party and state, etc. Finally, a basic legal foundation for the implementation and development of the "four modernizations" was devised, which attempts to attend to the current needs of development, in the following order: agriculture, light industry, science and technology, and the armed forces.

A Time of Changes

It is, therefore, a time of changes, which goes beyond the mere replacement of some leaders by others. After a 4-year transition period, China has progressed from the policy of the Cultural Revolution which has inspired the nation's entire life for 10 years, typified by the present leaders with "serious leftist deviation," to this different orientation of economic, social and political development that is intended to convert China into a "modern socialist country" within the space of 20 years.

A great deal has been written lately about the process that this immense country is currently undergoing. From the most diverse and even opposing ideological positions, there has been speculation on the possible "deviations" entailed in the new

China policy. The complexity of its historical experience and its problems, as well as the specific trade union nature and brevity of our visit, do not qualify us to make overall judgments and evaluations of the scope of the new course of action in China.

What is, indeed, obvious is that a country of such dimensions, not only geographical, but cultural and economic as well, could not continue to be isolated from the world and in a state of permanent stagnation.

It has a role to play in the world, and needs a development policy that will enable it to play that role, with the logical aspirations of doing so under the best of circumstances. Whether this is the most fitting policy, and whether it will contribute to the peace and progress of mankind, is a debatable point at present, which will only turn out in one way or another as a result of the practical implementation of the policy and also depending on the attitude of the great powers toward China, and the course of international events.

New Plans

However, it is only fair to acknowledge the fact that the CCOO delegation found great receptiveness on the part of the heads of both the enterprises and the National Federation of Trade Unions toward the various critical views that were expressed to them. In fact, they admitted to many of these views, and said that a new trade union law was being studied, which was intended to give an impetus to union leadership. This new law, together with others which apply to all state institutions, such as the one separating the party and state administration, will stipulate incompatibility between state offices and those in other institutions, as well as the termination of lifelong positions (this regulation has already been approved in the Fifth Assembly), and the establishment of a maximum ceiling of three congresses to reelect the leadership organs (a congress is held every 5 years). The right to strike has been recognized in this legislature of the National People's Assembly, and in the same Article 45 of the Constitution in which the "dazhibaos" (anonymous billboards) are abolished, there are included the right to demonstrate, and new regulations on freedom of speech.

In short, we have visited a country with enormous potential during an intense period of changes. Although it is too soon to judge them precisely and seriously, the fact is that they are in motion and, owing to their potentiality, they will deserve special attention. For our part, we can be gratified to have fufilled during this first visit the objectives which the CS [Union Confederation] of CCOO established upon accepting the invitation from the comrades in the Federation of Trade Unions of China.

As was stated in the joint communique, the CS of the CCOO has established friendly bilateral relations with the trade unions of the People's Republic of China which, in addition to being far distant, were very unfamiliar to us; and we have observed that there are actually agreements and differences between our positions. But, at the same time, with these new relations, we can contribute to the search for new means of international cooperation and solidarity among the workers, regardless of the distance. If we succeed in making the interest of peoples in developing independently run parallel to the progress along the path of unity among all the workers of the world, we shall be contributing a decisive factor to adapt the peoples'

aspirations for progress and the foreign policy of their governments on behalf of peace and the development of democracy which, unfortunately, as a rule (including China), do not proceed in harmony.

"At the invitation of the Federation of Trade Unions of China, the delegation from the CS of the CCOO, led by its secretary general, Marcelino Camacho, paid a friendly visit to the People's Republic of China from 2 to 16 September.

"The CCOO delegation attended a plenary session of the Fifth National Peoples Assembly, following its activity with great interest. During their stay in China, the CCOO delegates visited Peking, Shanghai and Hangchow, where they toured several factories, rural people's communes, and workers and fishermen's dwellings, as well as various social welfare facilities. In these locations, the CCOO representatives made contacts with workers and union cadres.

"During the course of their visit, they held extensive talks with a delegation from the Federation of Trade Unions of China, headed by its chairman, Ni Zhifu, exchanging information and views on the trade union situation and the problems affecting the workers in the respective countries. In an atmosphere of cordiality, both parties expressed their individual opinions, agreeing in many instances, and differing in others, with respect to the course of international events and the status of the international trade union movement.

"Both unions agree in assessing the talks that were held as positive and fruitful, as a means of establishing friendly bilateral relations, and increasing the mutual understanding and friendship, based on complete equality, mutual respect and reciprocal noninterference.

"These relations are not only associated with the mutual desires and interests of the workers of Spain and China, but are also advantageous for fostering cooperation among the workers and trade unions all over the world, and for giving an impetus to the development of the international trade union movement.

"In their discussions, the two trade union confederations also expressed the desire to develop their friendly cooperation more intensively, and to expend mutual efforts on behalf of the solidarity and unity of the international working class, to preserve world peace, to establish a new international economic order and to promote the progress of all mankind.

"Finally, the Federation of Trade Unions of China has accepted an invitation from the CS of the CCOO to visit Spain next year."

Signed: Federation of Trade Unions of China.

Union Confederation of Workers Commissions.

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SHARP DECLINE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN BASQUE PROVINCES

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 3 Dec 80 pp 22, 23

[Article by Mikel Orrantia]

[Excerpts] "The situation requires the cooperation and efforts of all; otherwise, we will all break up in confusion...The outlook is serious enough to consider declaring a state of emergency in the Basque Country. Spain must bear in mind that this industrial zone is basic to the entire country."

This was what a prominent Basque labor leader told this magazine, stating that he was "not exaggerating one bit" and adding that "the numbers tell the story clearly and are, unfortunately, coldly eloquent."

The fact is that a report recently drawn up by the Labor Council of the Autonomous Basque Government came up with the same sort of conclusions and numbers as other economic or labor reports issued in recent weeks by public and private institutions or enterprises.

Unemployment

People have spoken out on several occasions about the sharp differences that result when the total number of unemployed are calculated according to different methods.

In any case, unemployment, which used to be a marginal problem in Basque society in the late 1960's, has become its number one worry, because in addition to the enormous human problem that it entails in terms of both economic poverty and social disenfranchisement, it is a clear economic indicator, based on certain limits that have been easily exceeded, of the falloff in business activity and productivity.

The 116,800 people without jobs in the Autonomous Community and Navarra, who make up 11.8 percent of the economically active population, have brought with them four authentic "horsemen of the apocalypse" for the economy, destroying the weakest companies and curtailing the prospects for the businesses least affected by the crisis. The underutilization of personnel, the resulting low output and productivity, the rise in costs and the absence of new hirings help

intensify the infernal spiral called joblessness, thus accentuating the defeatist psychosis of the widespread crisis, which makes it so difficult to move towards a consolidation of a truly participatory democracy in the geopolitical area of the Spanish State.

Although it has been commonplace to talk about Basque "industrial reconversion" and the urgent need for it, it is still a fact that as the years go by, nobody knows for certain when, how or in what direction this hypothetical "reconversion" is going to be carried out or what it is going to consist of. The only noticeable development in this regard is the ongoing expansion of the crisis, which is turning the Basque economic area into an emigration zone, both of human and financial and industrial resources. "Naturally," a Vizcaya industrialist told us, "the atmosphere of political tension and violence is not at all conducive to the hypothetical 'reconversion.' Citizen dissatisfaction over centralist hardheadedness is not the best ally against violent approaches either...Then add in the hunger already being felt in a good number of families without either jobs or income..."

Filings

From January to October 1979, 1,713 business restructuring requests were filed with the Vizcaya Labor Delegation. This province contains about half of the total population of the Basque Country and has the region's highest unemployment rate, 12.8 percent. During 1979 in this province 35 companies declared a suspension of payments, a 100 percent increase over 1978, while during the same period 9 companies decided to declare bankruptcy. Average quarterly crisis filings rose from 70 in 1976 to 288 in 1979. On everyone's mind were the billions of pesetas involved in the payments suspensions that were the most talked about because of the labor and political conflicts that they triggered in their day: Nervacero, Letasa, and today Olarra. People are commenting that tomorrow it could be the Basque iron and steel giant Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, which is badly in need of updating its installations, which would cost more than 100 billion pesetas.

A report recently made public by the People's Labor Fund (which comprises the economically important Basque cooperative sector) said in reference to 1979 that "industrial production, which marks the pace of our economic activity, rose by 1 percent, and investment, the other barometer of economic activity, fell by 4.5 percent. Steel consumption, which is basic to an economy such as the Basque Country's and an essential input in its metal processing sector, fell 2.1 percent. Cement consumption, a yardstick for the construction sector, which in itself is an indicator of the falloff in investment because it accounts for 60 percent of gross fixed capital formation, was off 24.5 percent. And the labor force, the number of people with jobs, which is basic to output and industrial activity, fell by 5.1 percent. All of these numbers indicate that the sharp decline in the Basque economy is a fact."

Between 1955 and 1975 the Basque Country recorded a 35.6 percent increase in its economically active population and a 2.95 percent jobless rate. A comparison with the 1975-79 period, with a drop of 0.2 percent and an unemployment rate of around 12 percent, speaks with an icy eloquence that it would be

suicidal to lose sight of, all the more so if we bear in mind that of the 116,800 people without jobs, only 35,527 received unemployment benefits in 1979. What repercussions will hunger have on social attitudes?

We should point out, nevertheless, that there are several moderately optimistic notes. A number of specialists consulted by EL SOCIALISTA said that "we will be bottoming out of the crisis by late 1982. Then the upswing will start. The recovery will require at least 5 years to lay a solid groundwork for forecasting and planning before we can again chart a course with a minimum of guarantees vis-a-vis a strongly competitive future international market." I should stress that no one here has described the social picture that will characterize this hypothetical future.

DATOS SOBRE POBLACION ACTIVA Y EN PARO (1)

Zona (2)	Poblacion activa (3)			Poblacion en paro (4)			Segundo cuatrimestre de 1980 (8)
	Total (5)	Varones (6)	Mujeres (7)	Total (5)	Varones (6)	Mujeres (7)	Total % (5)
Alava	98.600	69.900	29.000	6.800	3.500	3.300	6,9
Guipuzcoa	265.400	191.300	74.100	31.100	18.300	12.800	11,7
Navarra	179.800	128.200	51.700	21.400	11.800	9.600	11,9
Vizcaya	448.400	315.700	132.800	57.500	34.400	23.100	12,8
Euskadi (9)	992.300	704.800	287.400	116.800	68.000	48.400	11,8
Estado español (10)	13.117.000	9.281.000	3.836.000	1.471.000	987.000	484.000	11,2

Fuente: Consejeria de Trabajo del Gobierno vasco. (11)

Key:

1. Labor force and unemployment statistics
2. Zone
3. Labor force
4. Unemployment
5. Total
6. Men
7. Women
8. Second third of 1980
9. Basque Country
10. Nationwide
11. Source: Labor Council of the Basque Government

8743
CSO: 3110

BRIEFS

FOUR SUBMARINES EXPECTED--Sweden's Kockum and Karlskronavarvet shipyards are expected to receive from their owners--the state--an order worth 800 million kroner in 1981. Design work on the navy's new attack submarine, the A-17, has now been completed, and the defense forces' materiel administration expects to be able to build at least four submarines of the new class, the Swedish metal trades employers association magazine VERKSTADSERNA reported. The A-17 will have more or less the same dimensions as the navy's most recent submarine class, the Nacken. It will thus be around 50 meters long and 6 meters in the beam and displace just over 1,000 tons. The order must be placed this year if deliveries are to commence in 1986 as planned. A submarine of the A-17 class is estimated to cost around 200 million kroner if a series of four are built. If the series were increased to 10 or 12 the cost per submarine would fall to 150-160 million kroner. [Text] [LD071021 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Jan 80 p 17]

CSO: 3109

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH WEST

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 1 Dec 80 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara--Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilter Turkmen, speaking on the topic of the political situation that has been created by the military takeover in Turkey, reported that there is absolutely no concern with the West on the administrative level, but that what is wanted is to achieve a transition to democracy as quickly as possible.

When answering questions on various foreign policy issues posed by the weekly journal YANKI, which is published in Ankara, Turkmen said that the question of Varosia's being extracted from the Cyprus problem package is not a topic of discussion. The minister of foreign affairs stated in regard to the topic of Turkey's benefiting if the United States intervenes in the Middle East, "Issues such as this are handled through bilateral agreements" and noted that, to date, no one has made any such approach to Turkey."

Normal Relations with Europe

Evaluating the interest in Turkey displayed by the West, Turkmen said:

"We find the interest in Turkey's return to democracy displayed by the European Council normal, because it is a body composed of democratic countries. From this standpoint, we are not uncomfortable. We are striving to explain to them, in the widest manner possible, the program leading to democracy. We are of the opinion that no one doubts that Turkey will return to democracy. Despite this, the European Council Assembly is making some recommendations so as to hasten the end of this period."

In response to the question, "Are concerns being relayed to you?," Turkmen answered, "Not in the form of concerns, but in the form of wishes....They hope that it will be as quick as possible. We explained our program to them. Saltik Pasha presented an extremely detailed program. There is, however, no calendar, and we explain to them why there is none. This administration wants to accomplish its purpose in the shortest time possible, and they, undoubtedly, can see this."

Turkey and American Interference in Middle East

One of the questions directed toward Turkmen was related to the topic of whether or not, when talking about possible United States' intervention in the Middle East, the use of arms and ammunition depots located in Turkey has been placed on the agenda. The minister of foreign affairs answered by saying:

"There has been no request from us on this topic. This question is being discussed in general terms. The problem has two dimensions. The United States asks whether or not it can take on additional burdens if it interferes in order to keep the gulf open so that Europe will not be weakened. On another hand, intervention, slipping into the use of force would be the easy course to take. However, this topic is put forth as a general problem. The solution to such issues lies in bilateral agreements. To date, there has been no such approach towards us. Our responsibility resides within NATO. We have no responsiblity outside this."

Cyprus

When speaking on the topic of the Cyprus problem, Turkmen stated that there is no pressure being placed on Turkey over the Cyprus issue. He reported that none of the four major topics of the negotiations can be implemented prior to the others and that the ceding of Varosia is not a topic of discussion. According to Turkmen's announcement, "There is no commitment to put into application any one of these four topics if it is completed before the others. The Turkish Cypriot community is working to ensure that developments on the four issues occur coincidently with one another." Turkmen said, "We are pleased at the progress of the talks."

Turkmen, who noted that, today, Cyprus does not have a significant effect on Turkish-American relations, reported that he hopes the United States will increase its military and economic aid to Turkey in the 1981-1982 fiscal year. He explained that this was communicated to American Secretary of State Muskie.

Turkmen added that, following Greece' return to NATO's military flank, there has yet been no reorganization in the Aegean region and that Greece' interim status will be discussed.

Saudi Arabia Wants a Strong Turkey

Turkmen said that Turkey continues to purchase petroleum from Iraq, that it is ensured that oil will be purchased from that country until the end of 1980, and that as much petroleum as possible is also being bought from Iran. Turkmen explained that the shortfall incurred because of the war will be made up for by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The minister evaluated his trip to Saudi Arabia saying, "The Saudis did not hide the

fact that they are pleased about developments in Turkey. They view Turkey's becoming a strong and stable nation as beneficial to Middle-East interests."

The minister of foreign affairs repeated that the statement made by United Nations' Permanent Representative Kirca following the 12 September take-over that criticized the Soviets is not the government's view.

11673
CSO: 4907

COMMANDERS RESPONSIBLE TO GENERAL STAFF CHIEF

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 Nov 80 pp 1,12

[Text] Ankara (MEDITERRANEAN AGENCY) -- The National Security Council [NSC] has approved a proposal to amend the Martial Law Act at its meeting yesterday. According to the final text, postponement of cases in the Martial Law Military Courts will not exceed 30 days. Suspects and their attorneys will be given no more than 15 days for their defense and cases involving crimes requiring 5 years' or more imprisonment will be heard by a magistrate of the Martial Law Military Court class.

The changes introduced reportedly are for the purpose of clarifying the duties of the martial law commanders in general, redefining as required by the new status the principle of responsibility and coordination among martial law commanders, speeding up lawsuits and increasing the effectiveness of penalties.

According to the text adopted by the NSC yesterday, when martial law is declared in various regions or nationwide, cooperation and coordination among martial law commanders will be provided by the Office of the Chief of the General Staff. The martial law commander will be responsible to the chief of staff for the duties and powers granted him by this law, and the general regulations will apply in the conduct of military services.

Another change makes binding the hearing by a magistrate of the Martial Law Military Court class of cases involving crimes requiring penalties of 5 years' or less [as published] imprisonment, excluding cases of certain high-level civil servants and military officers for crimes under the jurisdiction of Martial Law Military Courts. This is an effort to lighten the caseloads of martial law courts.

In the martial law military courts, decisions will be made concerning defendents without regard to "good conduct in trial." A paragraph added to article 17 of the Martial Law Act provides for the inapplicability of article 59 of the Turkish Penal Code in martial law courts. In this way, good conduct of the suspect during trial cannot be grounds for a lighter sentence. Article 59 of the Turkish Penal Code allows the judge to use his discretion.

Another amendment provides for the ruling as to whether the suspect should be held or continue to be held in custody during investigation to be made by a magistrate of the Martial Law Military Court class. Decisions made by military judges may still be protested to a military judge, with the same procedure to apply concerning search and seizure decisions. These decisions may now be made by a 3-person judicial board composed of two members from the military judge class and one from the regular officer class.

Postponement of cases to be heard in Martial Law Military Courts may not exceed 30 days. In these cases, the period allowed to the military prosecutor, his intercessor or deputy to lodge claims concerning principle and to the suspect or his deputy to present defense against the claims may not exceed 15 days. These periods may be extended up to a month in cases involving 15 or more suspects, however. In cases requiring application of a legal provision entailing a lighter sentence than the legal provision under which indictment is made, trial will not be deferred or postponed for additional defense

Action for nullity may not be filed concerning administrative provisions relating to the exercise of the powers granted martial law commanders by the Martial Law Act. Prior rulings for cessation of proceedings in nullity actions or damages actions based on administrative error will be automatically revoked.

8349
CSO: 4907

DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS QUERIED ON RESERVE OFFICER LAW

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Nov 80 p 7

[Text] Ankara, Special -- National Defense Ministry authorities answered questions on the newly issued Reserve Officer [RO] Law. According to the announcement on this topic, college graduates called up in December may take advantage of the 4-month curtailed military service tour.

Questions asked the National Defense Ministry authorities and their answers follow:

Question: Amendments have been made to Reserve Officer and Military Civil Service Law no 1076. Would you explain the reasons for these amendments and what changes were made?

Answer: As known, article 3 of law no 1076 was amended in 1970. The reason for this amendment was the imbalance which had begun to appear between the Armed Forces' need for reserve officer candidates [ROC's] and the large number of our young men who were being graduated from institutions of higher learning. Our institutions of higher learning were graduating approximately 20,000 male students annually. In contrast, the Armed Forces' requirement was 10,000. Therefore, the remaining 10,000 had to be left to accumulate. To resolve the problem and enable young men to complete their national duty at an early date, the law was revised. For example, a college graduate, after completing induction formalities, would be given a test, the Armed Forces' requirement would be filled according to the results of the test and those remaining would serve as enlisted men [EM] or NCO's for the period of time of an RO tour, that is, 18 months.

However, this badly needed provision of the law was not applied for various reasons for 10 years, and because of this, we had 100,000 young men waiting for military service as we approached the 1980's. The great Turkish nation looks up to the Armed Forces as a very important institution of learning, socially, culturally, scientifically and physically. A young man who has not performed his military service is not ready for life, as it were. These young men have difficulty finding work, setting up in business, or even getting married and establishing a home. For this reason, the need was felt for another revision of article 3 of the law.

It is possible to state the new principles introduced by the amendment as follows:

First, this law covers graduates of institutions of higher learning of 4 years or more. Graduates of 2- or 3-year institutions will be subject to Military Service Law no 1111.

Second, the principal articles of the amendment introduce an option system. For example, persons graduated from an institution of higher learning of 4 years or more after the effective date of this law will perform their military service as enlisted men or NCO's if they wish. The tour of duty will be half the RO tour. That is, since the legal tour today is 18 months, the volunteer EM-NCO will complete his national debt in 9 months.

Third, if the number of young men wishing to be reserve officers equals the Armed Forces' requirement, they will be sent to schools as ROC's; if the number exceeds the need, they will be called to the Armed Forces' induction and test centers where a lottery will be held. Those who draw EM status will complete their national debt as NCO-EM in 13 months, that is, by adding 4 months to half the RO tour. Of course, those who draw RO status will be sent to reserve officer schools. Health treatment and classification of ROC's will take place under the principles valid today. Moreover, those who fail to participate in the lottery without a legal excuse will also complete their service in 13 months as EM-NCO. To explain what I have said so far more clearly in figures:

By law:

The RO tour is 18 months.

--EM-NCO volunteers will fulfill their obligations in 9 months.

--Those drawing EM-NCO status as the result of the lottery and those failing to appear for the lottery without reason will fulfill their obligations as EM-NCO's in 13 months.

As I pointed out above, this applies to those being graduated after the law goes into effect.

Question: Could there be such indecision between the lottery and volunteer principles? What if there are a lot of NCO-EM volunteers and the Armed Forces cannot meet its requirement for ROC's?

Answer: Thank you. The law is very clear in this regard. Then there would be a lottery among the EM-NCO volunteers to fulfill the Armed Forces' ROC need. The Armed Forces' requirement is a basic principle of the main spirit of the law.

Question: According to the old law, if the numbers in certain professions or with certain skills did not meet the Armed Forces' needs, they would be automatically assigned as ROC's. What is the practice in the new amendment?

Status of Requirement

Answer: The Armed Forces always needs certain professional groups. This matter was borne in mind and the same principles retained in the amendment. In other words, if the number of inductees in certain professions and skills is less than the need as set by the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, ROC's will be assigned without regard to volunteer preference or lottery.

Question: You have been saying that this law applies to those who are graduated by institutions of higher learning after the law goes into effect. Now, what about those who have been waiting since 1975 and were graduated before the effective date of the law? Would you explain?

Answer: A provisional article has been added to the law for our young men who are now on the waiting list. Accordingly, again if the numbers are less than the Armed Forces' needs in certain professions and skills, they will become ROC's directly. As for the others, the obligants who were graduated prior to the effective date of this law and applied to their recruiting offices or to representations abroad for their final call-up, in other words, who have applied for military service, and obligants who have completed the formalities will take 4 months' basic military training as EM's and will be discharged as EM's. In this way, they will be considered to have fulfilled their national debt. If there are any among these young men who wish to be RO's, they will apply to the competent officers after discharge, but action will proceed according to the general regulations of the law; that is, if there are too many, ROC's will be chosen from among them by lottery. Moreover, those who successfully complete their training and education at the time and place designated by the Office of the Chief of the General Staff will become RO's and will be discharged as RO's upon completion of their service. I believe it will be clearer if I may give an example. Let us take an obligant having an occupation not needed by the Armed Forces. Say this obligant was graduated from a 2-, 3-, 4- or more-year institution of higher learning by the effective date of the law and had registered for the draft or applied in this regard at the recruiting office. This obligant, provided of course he was not a draft dodger or AWOL, would complete 4 months of basic military training as an EM and be discharged, and his national debt would be fulfilled. After that, he may apply not [as published] tobe ROC.

Question: Might there be young men who were graduated in the fall this year, November for example, but who have not had the chance to apply for military service. Would you explain what their status will be?

Answer: This matter was also covered in the law. As you know, our final draft takes place between July and 31 October. Every male citizen is obligated to register during these months of the year in which he becomes 20 years old. If he fails to do so without good cause he is guilty of draft evasion. As for young men in school, they are definitely obligated to register for the draft and join the military upon graduation, whether they are graduated between these dates or later. A paragraph in the law covers this: Obligants graduated after 31 October 1980 but before the effective date of the law who apply to their recruiting offices within 1 month and register for the draft will be able to take advantage of this provisional article, that is, undergo 4 months' basic military training to discharge their national debt as EM's.

Question: What about the December 1980 call-up? Will they be able to take advantage of this article?

Answer: Young men called up in December 1980 will be able to take advantage of this provisional article also. That is, those in excess of Armed Forces' needs will be discharged as EM's after 4 months' basic military training.

Draft Evasion and AWOL

Question: You have mentioned draft evasion and AWOL several times. Would you explain briefly -- a topic of concern to our entire society?

Answer: A higher-education graduate is subject to registration and completing the formalities with his age-group and is obligated to register and join the service the year he is graduated. However, if this obligant fails to register without an excuse by that date when his call-up group has completed the formalities and is in the service, he is guilty of draft evasion.

As for AWOL, those who have registered but fail to appear though they have been notified are guilty of being AWOL.

Question: There are obligants graduated prior to the effective date of the law who are working variously in the public sector. Has anything been done to protect their rights?

Answer: It has. According to the provisional article 6 of the law, those who have been assigned or are candidates on salary, per diem or wages in the public sector will be considered on leave without pay for the period in which they complete their 4 months' basic military service as EM's.

To summarize briefly the matters presented thus far, if I may:

--Henceforth, graduates of 2- or 3-year institutions of higher learning will not come under this law but will perform their national duty for 20 months as EM's in accordance with Military Service Law no 1111.

--Graduates of 4-or more-year institutions of higher learning may opt to complete their service in 9 months in NCO-EM status for half the RO tour.

--If those who do not wish to do this are in excess of the need, ROC's will be chosen by lottery and the remainder will fulfill their obligations by serving in NCO-EM status for 4 months longer than half the RO tour.

--Obligants graduated prior to the effective date of the law, providing they have registered for the draft or have applied at the recruiting offices for this purpose and are not draft dodgers or AWOL, will complete 4 months of basic military training as EM's to fulfill their obligations. They may become RO's later if they wish.

8349
CSO: 4907

APPROACHES TO 1981 BUDGET EXAMINED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Professor Dr Dundar Saglam, Ankara Academy of Economics and Commercial Science, teaching member]

[Text] The general budget is described in classic economics books as a legislative instrument setting forth the state's income and expenditures for a period of one year and permitting them to be put into practice. Now when preparations for the 1981 budget are proceeding apace, it would be well from the standpoint of casting light on the future to look at the problems created by past practices.

The 1981 budget has a special and important place in prevention of the rampant inflation of such long endurance and in the success of the government's stabilization program.

It is seen in a careful study of the budgets adopted in Turkey that the major sources and mechanisms fueling inflation have come about through the articles introduced into these laws.

Lost Discipline

It has become possible for budget appropriations to be increased easily by the Finance Ministry.

Funds with various names have been established in the Finance Ministry budget through articles added to general budget laws and the finance minister has been authorized to increase appropriations for these funds by 5 or 10 times and in some cases without limit. There are 15 of these funds in the 1980 budget (1980 Budget Law, article 16). The principal ones are the wages fund, the Fund to Speed Investments, the Fund for Unforeseen Expenses, the Fund to Increase Capacity in Higher Education, the Aid for Municipalities' Debt Payment Fund and the Fund for Financing Pilot Provincial Development Plans.

Budget appropriations, increased by the funds whose numbers and dimensions grow from year to year, change significantly from the original appropriations amounts and have destroyed "budgetary discipline" in public spending. For example, the original appropriation for the 1978 budget was 266.3 billion liras, but the year-end appropriation was 455.9 billion liras. The 1979 budget had an original appropriation of 406.9 billion liras which came out to 661.1 billion liras at the end of the year.

The steadily growing disparity between original budget appropriations and year-end appropriations has led to more and more Treasury use of Central Bank resources. The Central Bank Law allows the Treasury to take short-term advances form the Central Bank at the rate of 15 percent of total general budget appropriations. As general budget appropriations increase every year, the amount of advances rises too, and this situation has the effect of increasing the printing of paper money.

The authority granted the finance minister in the general budget law to increase appropriations with the help of the various funds violates the basic principles of the budget and is a major source of fuel for the inflation in Turkey.

And Overstaffing

After State Civil Service Law no 657 went into effect, "staffing" came under the authority of the governments with the help of the general budget laws, bringing a steady, rapid growth in staff numbers. Many articles of the general budget laws adopted every year contain regulations pertaining to staffing of the state and public economic enterprises. For example, artilce 34 of the 1980 general budget law says: "Hiring may be introduced by the Council of Ministers upon the request of the relevant agency, the view of the State Personnel Office and the proposal of the Finance Ministry." Taking advantage of this possibility, the governments used various rationales for raising staff numbers. While legislation was required prior to enactment of law 657 for even one staff increase, staff multiplication became easy after 1970.

In order to get the staff problem under control, it is necessary either to remove government powers in this regard or to expand many "excepted" positions.

Central Bank and KIT's

Articles added to the general budget laws have made it possible for the public economic enterprises (KIT's) to borrow directly from the Central Bank. The public is well aware of the unprecendented losses suffered by these organizations for such reasons as keeping prices of goods and services produced by the KIT's at artificially low levels for many years, excessive hiring and low productivity. Articles have been added to every general budget law since 1974 making it possible for the growing financing deficits of the KIT's to be covered by resources obtained from the Central Bank. For example, article 63 of the 1980 general budget law allowed the KIT's to borrow heavily from the Central Bank by issuing special securities or bonds guaranteed by the Treasury. There is no need to say that this source is inflationary. It is as though the Central Bank has had no function in recent years but to finance public sector deficits. An important task of the new government is to save the Central Bank from the grasping hands of the governments and to make it autonomous in the full sense.

Catch-All Law

Placing regulations in the budget law which have nothing to do with the budget has become a habit. Years of loading down the budget law with articles on every conceivable sugject has made it into a virtual "catch-all" law.

The final paragraph of article 126 of the Constitution says, "No regulations may be placed in the budget law except budget-related regulations," but governments in Turkey have frequently taken this route, wishing to avoid the difficulties of

getting legislation through. Articles of this sort have been placed in the budget laws and have gone into effect despite many Constitutional Court decisions published in the RESMI GAZETE. In this way, the Finance Ministry's field of endeavor has steadily expanded, and problems under the jurisdiction of other ministries have been left to Finance Ministry control. And this had led the Finance Ministry farther and farther from its basic duties, being burdened with responsibilities in every area.

What is Expected

Now when the 1981 general budget is under preparation, the government which came to power with the 12 September action has important duties to perform.

The breakdown seen in every area in Turkey in recent years has totally destroyed appropriation and spending discipline; in short, budgetary discipline. The budget, one of the fundamental documents making the state the state, has largely lost its meaning. Improvements that the new government will make and the measures it will take in this area will not only dry up sources of inflation of many years' standing but will also win the state a large measure of respect.

8349
CSO: 4907

INFLATION, INVESTMENT, PAYMENT BALANCE DISCUSSED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 28 Nov 80 pp 1,9

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) -- A report entitled the "Economic Stabilization Measures and their Results" has been published on the results of implementation of the 24 January 1980 economic decisions of the State Planning Organization (SPO) under Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. The following paragraphs are found on page 22 of the SPO publication no 1736, dated November 1980:

"1. Inflation has reached an annual rate of 80 percent, a monthly rate of 8 percent, and may be 150 percent annually if not brought under control.

"2. Steadily declining use of capacity,

"3. Exportation performance within a general slump for years,

"4. Declining domestic savings,

"5. Severity of foreign loans -- especially short-term loans,

"6. Unemployment -- (state organizations have become the employment center),

"7. Unfair taxation -- (disintegrating income distribution, disappearing middle class)."

Under the heading of "Major Problems" in the SPO report, which contains data basic to 1981 economic planning, the list begins with the view:

"Our problems have been aggravated by mistakes, deficiencies and delays in making and implementing economic and political decisions and by the shift to the state and public economic enterprises of many jobs which could be done more efficiently through individual initiative."

The following views appear later under the heading "Major Principles of the Economic Measures Package":

"Decision Integrity in Economic Administration"

--Inflation control policy: (Our first priority) is to control inflation. Thought may be given to restoring healthy growth only when this has been done.

--The money and credit policy must be followed meticulously.

--Deficit financing of the public sector will be completely eliminated in time.

--Rapid increase of exports is the major strategy. (A realistic, flexible exchange rate policy will be practiced.)

--Increasing and giving direction to savings (realistic interest policy).

--Encouraging private foreign capital (to make up the financing deficit).

Showing all general economic indicators in charts and figures, the SPO report gives a picture of developments in the production and prices of basic goods by year and, comparing general price increases with prices of public sector products, says, "How far KIT price regulating lags behind the general upward trend of prices is clearly seen in the table."

Next on page 23 of the report, there is a table detailing the relationship between basic goods produced by the public sector and "price regulation results" which shows that a net contribution of 443 billion liras was obtained as the result of price regulation. A sentence at the bottom of the chart says, "Contributions are amounts to be obtained in 1980."

Expected Transfers

The "Expected Transfers" section on page 28 of the report gives a comparison. Transfers expected on 24 January 1980 were a total of $947 million, $221 million in the private sector and $728 million in the public sector. On 3 October 1980, however, there were total expected transfers of $468 million, with $193 million belonging to the private sector and $275 million to the public sector. The report says this "is the equivalent of the economy's needs for only about 20 days."

Export Situation

In giving export figures for January-September 1980, it is pointed out that exports rose to $1.78 billion in this period of 1980 from $1.655 billion in the same period of 1979. The following paragraph appears under these figures:

"If amounts of wheat, cement and cotton thread exported in the January-September period of 1979 had been exported in 1980, an additional $173 million would have been earned in export revenues and exports would have reached $1.953 billion, representing an 18 percent increase in export revenues over 1979."

According to the export table, export amounts increased in 1980 in tobacco, citrus, buses and automobiles, countered by declines in export amounts of cotton, nuts, raisins, wheat, chrome, raw borates, cement and cotton thread.

Worker Remittances

The report then discusses worker remittances. A comparison of 1979 and 1980 shows an increase in 1980. Worker remittances received by October 1979 were $1.501 billion, while worker remittances by October 1980 were $1.687 billion.

Investments

The SPO report also has other sections dealing with "production, encouragement and implementation, foreign capital" and gives extensive information on these topics. The following appears in the section on "investments" which begins on page 95:

"There are around 9,100 public projects in the 1980 investment program with a total cost of 2.9 trillion liras. Investment allocations for 1980 are 310 billion liras. The total public investment volume began to decline (at real prices) starting with 1978. The amounts realized physically have declined steadily in recent years. Personnel costs within investment spending and elements not an integral part of the investment are steadily growing. The total project value of public sector projects proposed for 1981 is around 8 trillion liras."

Factors delaying investments are then listed in the report.

1981 Program Estimates

The "balance of payments" table for 1979, 1980 and 1981 appears on page 110 of the SPO report. The 1979 figures are given as final, with the 1980 and 1981 figures as "estimated." According to the 1981 program table, exports are estimated at $3.5 billion. The import estimate is $9.3 billion. Therefore the balance of foreign trade shows a projected deficit of $5.8 billion in the table. The "invisible procedures" section of the table shows interest on foreign loans at $820 million in 1981 and estimates revenues at $2 billion from worker remittances and $300 million from tourism and foreign travel. The current procedures balance along with other entries is $4.2 billion.

"Program credits" in the "capital movements" section of the same table are envisaged as $3 billion in 1981. In other words, it is estimated that $3 billion in credit will be obtained from abroad as the result of various initiatives in 1981. According to the table, the program credits entry was realized at $677 million in 1979 and is estimated to be $1.86 billion in 1980.

It is pointed out separately below the table that this table was taken from "25 September 1980 program studies."

The 160-page SPO report has 81 tables presenting data related to the economic situation.

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'HURRIYET' COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT CIRCULAR

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 2 Dec 80 pp 1,13

[Article by Cuneyt Arcayurek]

[Text] Ankara--The new tax laws have captured our attention. We discuss and debate them almost exclusively.

In state life, there is no problem with the tax laws. It is with these laws that there are no problems in reportage to the general public. However, the new government is certainly dealing with other subjects, making other preparations affecting our future.

There is usually something interesting going on in Turkey. In our lifetime, important events have taken place and developed, and we have crawled into ourselves. Yet, the relation between domestic developments and the judgments made by our foreign neighbors are extremely important. This is life from time to time.

For example, if you listen to "former" members of parliament who have been to the European Council, you will note a difference between what they say and what you read in the newspaper. The foreign world is following with curiosity the preparations made by Turkey in order to make the transition for a return to democracy. It is being said that, if the inaugural date for a founding assembly cannot be specified by the time the European Council holds its important meetings this January, the resistance of the moderate rightists and liberals in Europe, who have come out against the European left that opposes us and who defend, with understanding, the present-day situation in Turkey, will diminish considerably.

Let us, for now, put aside developments there, because the European Council is not our subject. Aren't there other developments in our nation other than taxation? Let us take a look at them.

We want to do so, because the contents of a circular signed by Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu and sent to all ministries has attracted our attention.

Text of Circular

The text of the circular, which was distributed on 20 November 1980 and marked "urgent," reads, in its entirety:

"1. Each ministry will draft a report that cites examples of proven administrative irregularities and improprieties, based on research and investigations, that took place during the period prior to 12 September 1980 within its own organizations and within those affiliated with it. The report will include the following:

"A. Information, written documents, photographs, and movies of the quality that will give proof, when transmitted to the press and the public, of injustices and improprieties committed by past administrations.

"B. Data regarding the planning activities within a state or state organization, its organizational status, its deficiencies, and infringements of the law. Particulars stating how personnel are directed through notices and administrative requirements, orders, and instructions, what their activities and functions are, and the manner of control and supervision. Information regarding special characteristics of the office or organization.

"C. Proposals and ideas on how to deal with the illegalities and irregularities that are cited and that will help to reorganize the offices.

"Examples that will be placed in dossiers will include examples related to the need for the 12 September takeover.

"2. Because reports were previously received from the Maritime Bank Sea Transport Directorate General, the Maritime Bank Directorate General, and the State Airport Operations Directorate General due to their ties with the Istanbul municipality, new reports will not be required from these offices.

"3. I request that three copies of the reports be at the prime minister's office by 15 December 1980."

Interesting Aspects

This notice bearing Prime Minister Ulusu's signature was sent to all ministries except the ministries of state and was also forwarded to the General Staff Directorate, the MGK [National Security Council] Secretariat General, and the General Staff Martial Law Military Services Coordination Directorate "for their information."

The fact that the new administration is taking serious action against all improprieties is the primary subject impressed upon us with great sensitivity since the first day of the 12 September takeover. However, in the first article of this circular, which asks that reports of irregularities

be made, the term, "administrative improprieties," is used. Elsewhere in the circular, in the second sentence of Paragraph C, the statement, "Examples that will be placed in dossiers will include examples related to the need for the 12 September takeover," is made.

There were so many just reasons well known to the public for the new administration's coming to power that the "request to justify the action once again" made through such a notice can be regarded as strange.

Important Point

Won't the request, in general terms, for "examples related to the need for the 12 September takeover" when looking for injustices and irregularities committed by past administrations and documentation of these ensure that those who are skillful at doing so, those who are masters at this will draft dossiers and confuse those who are responsible with those who are not?

Four days following the 12 September action, our state chairman, Gen Kenan Evren, held a press conference at which he explained the reasons for seizing total control of the nation's administration. At that time, someone -- we believe it was our colleague Oktay Eksi -- said to Evren, "The impression left by your words is that civil service personnel will not be held responsible for the wrongs of past administrations." He then asked, "Am I mistaken?" Our state chairman responded by saying:

"Let's not speak of responsibility for past administrations. Let's not even use that term. We will save the nation from the widespread blindness to improprieties, the failure to enforce laws, and the avoidance of doing one's job that took place in past terms so as to bring the nation to this state."

Just as the statement in the notice, "Examples that will be placed in dossiers will include examples related to the need for the 12 September takeover," immediately holds civil service personnel responsible for the wrongs of past administrations even though this is not what is sought, won't various new developments take place that will discomfort the community?

We wish to draw attention to this important point.

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SIX NEW TAX BILLS PRODUCED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 29 Nov 80 pp 1,7

[Article by Yalcin Dogan]

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU) -- Six of the tax bills introduced by various political administrations since 1970 but blocked for a number of reasons have been adopted by the National Security Council [NSC] and have gone into effect with publication in yesterday's RESMI GAZETE.

It is figured that the newly-effected tax laws will generate approximately 75 billion liras in revenues. Envisaged is 35 billion liras' additional revenues from the stamp tax, 15 billion from fees, 5.5 billion from the motor transport tax, and 20 billion from the vehicle purchase tax.

The aspects of the laws published in the RESMI GAZETE which were not reported when they were being examined individually may be summarized as follows:

Valuable Papers Law

An amendment to the valuable papers law increases on the one hand the value of the paper upon acquisition, but on the other introduces something new. This innovation has to do with including invoices within the scope of "valuable paper." In other words, every invoice made out by every businessman or tradesman will henceforth be prepared by the Finance Ministry and will be sold by the Finance Ministry. When a person bills another for goods he has sold, he will have to use invoice forms obtained from the Finance Ministry.

Stamp Tax

Changes in the stamp tax are aimed at increasing this tax rate between 10- and 100-fold. Proportional rates generally remain the same with only slight changes but, for example, the .50-lira stamp tax on certain instruments is raised to 400 liras. Regulations in the Stamp Tax Law provide for a 10-lira stamp tax on invoices up to 1,000 liras and a 100-lira stamp tax on invoices over 500,000 liras. Before, a 5-lira stamp was required on invoices above 500,000 liras.

Fees

Fees are increased 25-fold on average as the result of changes in the fees law, with proportional rates left practically the same.

The important thing here which most concerns the general public has to do with court costs. The petition fee for Magistrate Courts is raised from 10 liras to 500 liras and for Courts of First Instance from 20 liras to 750 liras. The fee for petitioning the High Court of Appeals and the Council of State, meanwhile, is raised from 30 liras to 1,000 liras.

Tax protest and appeal and Council of State protest, monopoly, stamp and valuable paper concessionaires' fees are also increased.

New pharmacies opened in cities with greater than 400,000 population will pay a fee of 15,000 liras each; architects-engineers, doctors, chemists, dentists and attorneys hanging out a shingle will each pay a fee of 500 liras.

Diploma fees to be paid are: 100 liras for middle school; high school, 150 liras; college and university, 250 liras; amateur driver's license, 1,250 liras; professional driver's license, 500 liras; heavy transport, 1,500 liras; tractor, 30 liras; driver's visa, amateur -- 500 liras, professional -- 250 liras, tractor -- 15 liras. The technical [automobile] inspection fee is set at 250 liras.

Vehicle Purchase Tax

An important point of the new form of the vehicle purchase tax is that the tax exemptions are dropped. This tax used to have exemptions in certain cases; now there are no exemptions.

The old purchase tax was not collected when a vehicle was sold through an agent to someone else. Realization of the tax depended on operating in traffic. In this way, that is, those who gave permission to use a vehicle by proxy although the vehicle was sold or who bought a vehicle in this way paid no vehicle purchase tax. Now the new law includes the "turnover of the right of possession by proxy" in the scope of the tax.

Imported Vehicles

Similarly, only customs duties, but no purchase tax, used to be paid on cars imported from abroad. The amendment envisages payment of the vehicle purchase tax in addition to customs duties.

Multiple Auto Purchase

Another important change in this tax has to do with doubling the tax rate "in the event of the purchase of more than one automobile." This principle, which takes place in article 4 of the law, is worded as follows:

"These limits for an automobile owned by the taxpayer, his wife and dependent members of his family, in the event that more than one automobile is purchased, are doubled."

Moreover, the principle of a 100 percent increase in the tax rates for sports cars and luxury automobiles is among the innovations in the law.

Public Receivables Collection

An important change in the collection of public receivables has to do with the late penalty. A late penalty of 10 percent will be collected for the first month, with 3 percent for each subsequent month. This rate used to be 2 percent.

As for income which may be garnisheed, the amounts of salaries, pensions and every type of wages which may be garnisheed will not exceed one-third of income or be less than one-fourth. This principle is retained verbatim in the new law. The new point is that "more than one-tenth of monthly income which does not exceed minimum wage will not be garnisheed."

Another change in this tax authorizes the Finance Ministry to collect public debts. According to the change: "Upon the written request of the director of the Tax Office, the minister of finance may give a written order for the immediate collection of those taxes and duties not yet paid by the taxpayer which will be determined and announced by the Finance Ministry and of the fines and penalties thereon."

Motor Vehicle Tax

The name of the Motor Surface Vehicles Tax is changed to "Motor Vehicles Tax." In this way, the scope of the tax is expanded to include aircraft and marine transport vehicles as well. Yachts, cutters, airplanes and helicopters come under the tax.

While the tax rates or amounts have been generally increased, weight and horsepower standards have been introduced.

This tax, which is paid on a usage basis, will be paid, as before, in two installments, one in June and the other in December. Because the new law went into effect as of yesterday, vehicle taxes will be paid under the new law. In other words, vehicle tax payments to be made in December will be paid according to the new regulations. Those who paid the two installments at once will deposit the difference at the tax offices by the end of December.

Differences to be Deposited

According to the provisional third article of the law, those who deposited the two installments of the 1980 vehicle tax at once are responsible for depositing the new [as published] at the offices. Those who have not yet deposited the second installment will deposit the total of the differences along with the second installment.

Not to be Deducted as Expense

Another important point is that private vehicles and marine and aircraft taxes which come under schedules 1 and 3 in the Motor Vehicle Tax will not be recorded as expenses and these taxes may not be deducted as an expense from income taxes. However, the motor vehicle taxes paid for commercial vehicles under schedule 2 may be counted as expenses.

Enforcement

The final important change in this regard has to do with a new method of oversight. Henceforth, persons responsible for paying motor vehicle taxes will be checked by traffic directorates during technical inspections as to whether the installments of this tax have been paid. Automobile inspections will be made only after the tax has been paid.

Mineral Exploration Permit

A change in the fees law significantly increases mineral exploration permit fees. The fees presently 500; 1,500 and 5,000 liras are raised to 50,000; 100,000 and 150,000 liras. However, the important thing here is that payment is to be made for this permit each year.

The permit fee for exporters is also raised significantly. The exporter permit which used to be 500 liras is raised to 15,000 liras.

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MUMCU SCORES CORRUPT BUREAUCRACY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Jan 81 pp 1, 7

[Editorial by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] Are bureaucratic appointments being made based on objective criteria? It is impossible to respond "Yes, they are." For government bureaucracy in the past has been corrupted by various types of political pressures. Political prejudice has taken the place of an objective judgment based on merits. The records of civil servants have been prepared based on these prejudicial judgments. These records have played a role in appointment procedures transplanted from the past.

These prejudices are completely ingrained in police departments where objective criteria have been replaced by political channels. Honest and upright policemen who have waged a merciless fight against underworld kingpins have been labeled "Rightists" or "Leftists." Meanwhile, police chiefs tight with the underworld enjoy good fortune.

Do you want an example? Here is one: The mercedes-driving police officer named Zahit Avcibasioglu, who was a fixture for years in the Istanbul Police Department and who was arrested in Ankara for possession of narcotics. For years no one has been able to tackle people like Avcibasioglu. But Sadettin Tantan, who gave no quarter to the Istanbul underworld, was whisked from his duties after being labeled a "Rightist."

Today I want to give another example:

Superintendent Okan Unal had worked for the Fiscal Police in the narcotics branch since 1965. He was a police officer who received expert training in this field. In 1968 Okan Unal seized 462 foreign-made weapons along with the smugglers. At various times he seized 125 kilos, 41,800, and 3,494 kilos of narcotic substances together with the accused traffickers. He raided opium dens and smashed counterfeiting rings. And he received assorted commendations for his work.

These can well constitute "objective criteria" for a police officer expert in such a line of work to be utilized in duties of this kind. But Okan Unal was not assigned to his field of expertise and the one in which he had demonstrated success. Labeled a "Leftist," he was given a myriad of other tasks.

The prejudice that brands the Sadettin Tantans as "Rightists" and the Okan Unals as "Leftists" for years kept these two policemen from the fields where their services would have benefited the country. And who knows how many policemen are in the same predicament!

Later, the Istanbul and Izmir police chiefs were arrested on the grounds that they had contacts with underworld kingpins. Because bribery and graft have corrupted the civil bureaucracy, many upright policemen besides these two have been bounced here and there, having been labeled "Rightists" and "Leftists." The stage has been left to those who drink with underworld kingpins at night clubs. Yes, indeed...so it has become.

Why should this surprise us?

A Police Academy director with whom Okan Unal did not get along prepared records on Unal. Previously, an investigation had been opened on this director as the result of tip-offs, and the director's file had been sent to the Second Department of the Council of State with the authorization that a criminal action be commenced. One of the motions that had resulted in a file being opened on the director was signed by Okan Unal.

Okan Unal's record was prepared by this director. Unal was first sent to a province without a narcotics branch. The retribution meted out by the Academy director and rulings by the Council of State were interposed forcing this honest civil servant to undergo extreme hardship.

I do not want to detail the handling of Okan Unal. The authorities are as aware of it as I am.

I only want to explain how an honest superintendent was crushed by judgments grounded in the past.

In the end, Okan Unal left his wife and infant to find a job that had nothing to do with his line...he sells household items.

What have we gained by labeling the Sadettin Tantans as "Rightists" and the Okan Unals as "Leftists"? What has the country gained? And what will it gain?

We must thoroughly review records prepared in the past and judgments on individual merit made in the past. We ought not divorce ourselves from this obligation at a time when smuggling is reaching incredible dimensions. And we should reevaluate the personnel files of individuals whose merits have been branded by political judgments.

"Rightism" and "Leftism" are abstract rationales. They are sometimes used as labels and sometimes as brands.

We should lift up these labels and brands to examine what lies beneath such abstract rationales. For, most of the time, the facts are discovered in places concealed, closed off, and covered up by labels and brands--not in the labels and brands themselves.

CSO: 4907

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS GIVEN ARTICLES 141, 142

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 2 Dec 80 pp 1,7

[Article by Isik Kansu]

[Text] Ankara--The topic of "jurisdiction" in regard to crimes covered by Articles 141 and 142 of the TCK [Turkish Penal Code] has led to various conflicting interpretations from the military courts and departments of the Military Supreme Court of Appeal.

In a decision reached 7 October 1980, the Military Supreme Court of Appeal Fourth Department ruled that crimes covered by TCK Article 142 are "the foundation for the creation of an anarchic environment and widespread terrorist activities" and decided that the martial law courts have jurisdiction over cases stemming from this article. Following immediately on the heels of this decision was the 5 November 1980 decision of Istanbul Martial Law Commandant Military Court No 3. Here the court noted that "it is not possible to consider crimes covered by TCK Article 142 to be widespread terrorist activities" and thereby ruled that the martial law courts do not have jurisdiction over cases dealing with Article 142.

On another hand, in a decision reached 17 April 1980, the Military Supreme Court of Appeal Departmental Council asserted that "crimes noted in TCK Articles 141 and 142 are not widespread terrorist activities" and stated that cases dealing with these articles will not be heard in martial law courts.

Istanbul Martial Law Court Decision

Istanbul Martial Law Commandant Military Court No 3 made its "lack of jurisdiction" decision for a case involving a first lieutenant, a sergeant, and a private initiated in accordance with TCK Article 142, which was sent to it after the General Staff Chairman's Office Court ruled that it "lacked jurisdiction."

Istanbul Military Court No 3 Decision No 1980-213 dated 5 November 1980 gave the opinion that, pursuant to the law that sets down the jurisdiction

of martial law military courts, "these courts have the authority and are responsible for trying those whose crimes are connected by general and mutual goal with any crime handled in the martial law military courts along with those crimes that are related to the declaration of martial law and the activities of the martial law administration."

The Istanbul martial law court noted, in its decision, that the element of mutuality as written in Article 124 of the constitution and in situations that require proclamation of martial law constitutes the creation of terrorism. It said:

Cannot Be Considered Terrorism

"Because the activities ascribed to the suspects and that are characterized as a form of written communist propaganda as noted in TCK Article 142 cannot be considered widespread terrorist activities, they cannot be spoken of as among the crimes that were the reason for proclamation of martial law. On another hand, it is not possible to say that there is a connection of general and mutual goal between the crime ascribed to the suspects and any crime handled by the martial law military courts.

"For this reason, because there is no relation in a narrow, legal sense between the crime attributed to the suspects and cases heard by the martial law military courts, it is not deemed possible to speak of a connection which necessitated the suspects' trial before the martial law military courts."

The Istanbul Martial Law Administration Military Court No 3 decision also spoke of the 17 April 1980 decision of the Military Supreme Court of Appeal Departmental Council.

In its decision, the Military Supreme Court of Appeal Departmental Council stated that the crimes cited in TCK Articles 141 and 142 are not widespread terrorist activities and said:

No Transition to Terrorism

"...The crimes covered by TCK Articles 141 and 142 are not widespread terrorist activities as described previously. They do not fit into any of the categories of the commencement of commission of terrorist activities. Even though these crimes could, at the stage of decision and preparation, be the starting point of an action, their dangerousness has been taken into consideration from the standpoint of result achieved, and penalties are to be given accordingly. Moreover, the element of action which is found at the heart of these types of activities has not been able to be determined. Because these actions were not transformed into terrorist activities, the crimes did not reach the point that necessitated proclamation of martial law.

"...If there is no connection in a narrow, legal sense with an action that takes place in such a manner as to establish a communist society or to engage in communist propaganda, then the case cannot be heard in the military courts. A crime can be committed with the hope for a communist order as a general goal. These crimes may also bear 'joint aims.' However, it is not possible to establish ties of 'general and mutual goals' between these crimes and cases heard, because they are related to the proclamation of martial law, in the martial law courts."

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AMMUNITION EXPORT BEGINS TO NATO COUNTRIES

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 14 Nov 80 pp 1,9

[Article by Erkan Yigit]

[Text] MKE [Machine and Chemical Industry] began as a sideline of a weapons plant in Ankara 46 years ago and has become the single largest "arms industry complex" of the Middle East. Operating in Kirikkale with eight units having daily-increasing capacity, MKE is manufacturing annually at its rifle facility alone, according to army demand, "40,000 G-3 automatic infantry rifles, 6,000 MG-3 light machine guns, 2,500 short stock commando rifles and, also bound to demand, 16,000 revolvers and shotguns." Authorities, who have dubbed the capacity achieved by the factory the "Kirikkale miracle," say that the weapons, manufactured under German patent with all local materials, have received "quality awards" from many Western arms manufacturers.

In the rifle and pistol unit, which employs 1,200 workers within the "ammunition, brass, steel, artillery, automotive, gunpowder, steel drawing and pipe and weapons" factories which make up MKE, each part of the weapons is made separately in automatic machines. Great care is shown in the manufacture of the "G-3, MG-3 and short-stock commando rifles" with which the Turkish army is largely equipped as well as in predelivery checks. The modern rifles undergo firing tests called "surcharge" in which "cartridges with too much gunpowder are fired," "function firing" which shows the normal performance of the weapon and "zero-in firing" which normalizes the targeting mechanism, in addition to one further firing test at -40 degrees. The firing controls are monitored on a television system, with one out of each 3,000 rifles pulled out to have 6,000 rounds fired through it for the final test before delivery.

MKE has achieved a remarkable technology which saves Turkey billions of liras in payments to foreign nations and, moreover, fully meets our army's need for "artillery, rifle, pistol, machine gun, bazooka and antiaircraft" ammunition. It is also exporting ammunition to certain NATO member nations. In addition to the millions of shells per year manufactured by the ammunition factory the artillery plant also produces "French patented howitzers and 106 mortars." Pointing out that work is being done on new rifle and handgun models and that preparations are in progress for a project to manufacture long-range heavy artillery, officials state that MKE's automotive facility is manufacturing many spare parts to keep the army's communications and transportation services going.

MKE's rifle factory, which employs many technician graduates of the engineering and trade institutes, supplies its own need for qualified workers from its "Apprenticeship School." After middle school, students complete 2 years of training at the school and are employed in the various departments of the factory after graduation. Rifle Factory Director Mehmet Bekiroglu says that the factory can work a double shift when necessary to meet the army's requirements. He says:

"The factory first manufactured a rifle body called the 'kubuz.' Kubuz orders stopped after World War II. Handgun manufacture began in 1946. This continued until 1950. The name of the factory was Military Factories Directorate General when it became Machine and Chemical Industry. In 1949, the manufacture of shotguns began. Production completely stopped in 1954. Nothing at all was manufactured between 1954 and 1957. In 1957, handgun production was resumed. Then in 1959, the manufacture of shotguns resumed. Manufacture stopped again from 1960 to 1962. At that time, the production of G-3's, MG-3's and the others was started. Our factory is now able to meet our army's needs with all local materials."

Meanwhile, the specifications of the rifles used in the army and produced at the rifle facility, which constitutes an important part of our defense industry, are as follows:

G-3 automatic infantry rifle:

Weight: 4.25 kilograms
Caliber: 7.62
Maximum range: 4 kilometers
Shells fired per minute: 600
Number of parts: 208

MG-3 light machine gun:

Weight: 11.5 kilograms
Caliber: 7.62
Maximum range: 4 kilometers
Shells fired per minute: 1,200
Number of parts: 322

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BRIEFS

ANKARA MEETINGS--Turkey's Head of State Kenan Evren received a written message from President Saddam Husayn regarding the strengthening of bilateral relations and developments in the Iraq-Iran conflict. Revolutionary Command Council member Tahir Tawfiq, who is Minister of Industry and Minerals and the President's special representative, delivered the message during his meeting with Head of State Evren on Tuesday in Ankara. Iraq's ambassador Taha 'Aziz Hasan also participated in the meeting. In a statement Mr Tawfiq made to the Iraqi News Agency following the meeting, (he said that) Evren wished to send President Husayn greetings and his best wishes. He characterized the meeting as friendly and very successful. Moreover, all aspects of relations between the two countries were discussed and stress was placed on the need to improve and strengthen these relations. In the statement that the President's representative made concerning his discussions, (he said that) Head of State Evren maintained that friendship between the two neighbor countries is (a) true and realistic (platform) for strengthening relations. Mr Tawfiq held several meetings in Ankara on Tuesday with Turkish Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilhan Ozturun, and Commerce Minister Kemal Canturk. [Text] [Baghdad YURD in Turkmen 12 Dec 80 p 1]

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